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Abstract  
 
 
In this study, I explore the connections between Freud’s metapsychology and the 
practice of psychoanalysis. Until his very last papers, Freud continued to assert that the 
specificity of the genuine psychoanalytic cure was the research of infantile memory. In 
1937 he wrote: “What we are in search of is a picture of the patient’s forgotten years that 
shall be alike trustworthy and in all essential respects complete” (Freud, 1937b, p.258).  
 
In order to perceive how this picture of a patient’s forgotten years is to be found not in 
the discovery of an archive-memory but through the construction of an infantile mode 
of thinking, it is necessary to go back to a theory of memory that Freud elaborated 
during the first twenty years of his metapsychological work.  
 
Reminiscences are not faithful representations of the past but the outcome of a conflict 
between conscious and unconscious ideas. In the same way, memory is not an apparatus 
that registers the past but a system that inscribes contingent scenes of existence within a 
psychical destiny. Freud researched this psychical destiny through the description of an 
unconscious mode of thinking and through the invention of a new form of writing: a 
metapsychological writing.  
 
I propose to read the construction of a metapsychology as a grid on which one can write 
unconscious ideas. My focus throughout this work is to understand the functioning of 
the metapsychological grid and to answer the question of what it reveals in the clinical 
encounter.  
 
I discovered that the answer to this question could be located in Freud’s clinical paper A 
Child is Being Beaten (1919) and it involved the construction of a masochistic phantasy. A 
Child is Being Beaten stands, therefore, outside the timescale of this thesis, as an icon that 
captures the discursive argument of the whole. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Construction of the Question 
 
 
The Seed and the Soil  
 
In an appendix to Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis, James Strachey listed no less than sixteen 
of Freud’s papers that aim at giving a definition of psychoanalysis.1 As a starting point, I 
will use the longest definition that Freud proposed for psychoanalysis, which is to be 
found in Two Encyclopaedia Articles: 
 
Psycho-analysis is the name (1) of a procedure for the investigation of mental 
processes which are almost inaccessible in any other way, (2) of a method (based 
upon that investigation) for the treatment of neurotic disorders and (3) of a collection 
of psychological information obtained along those lines, which is gradually being 
accumulated into a new scientific discipline. (Freud, 1923[1922], p.235) 
 
The assertions of this definition can be transformed and developed into three 
interrogations: 
 
1. A hermeneutical interrogation: In the first point of the definition, Freud 
challenges the dogma of psychological knowledge, according to which what is 
mental is identical with what is conscious. Conversely, Freud proposes that what 
is in the mind does not coincide with what one is conscious of and, as a 
consequence, some mental processes are only accessible through interpretations. 
Hence the hermeneutical interrogation is: how to justify the validity of those 
interpretations? 
 
2. A clinical interrogation: In the second point of the definition, Freud challenges 
the dogma of psychiatric practice according to which mental life can be clearly 
divided between the normal and the pathological. The psychoanalytic 
investigation establishes continuity between normality and pathology. The mental 
mechanisms behind a symptom are equivalent to those behind a dream, and can 
                                                        
1 In Freud, 1910a, p.56. 
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be explored in the same way. Moreover, because Freud proposes a model in 
which mental life operates beyond the principle of homeostasis, recovery from 
psychic disorders does not consist in a return to a state of balance. Hence the 
clinical interrogation is: is there an a-symptomatic mental life? 
 
3. An epistemological interrogation: In the third point of the definition, Freud 
challenges the dogmas of positivism around the wide question of what 
constitutes a scientific method. Positivism used mathematical-physics as the 
model of all scientific discourses. The Freudian epistemological bet is that a 
science can exist whose object of study is human subjectivity. Given that one 
accepts this premise, such a science would develop its own model, which would 
differ from those of other sciences. At the heart of the psychoanalytic model 
there is the hypothesis that a form of scientific knowledge can emerge from the 
analytical encounter, the encounter between two subjectivities. The “collection of 
psychological information” (Ibid., p.235) that constitutes the empirical material of 
psychoanalysis comes from such an encounter. Hence the epistemological 
interrogation is: what would be the model of a science whose object of study is human 
subjectivity?  
 
Interestingly enough, these three interrogations correspond to the main criticisms 
through which psychoanalysis is attacked: 
 
1. The hermeneutic criticism challenges the validity of psychoanalytic 
interpretations. In particular, the moral attack that reproaches the pansexual 
dimension of psychoanalytic interpretations is to be found in this category. 
 
2. The clinical criticism challenges the effectiveness of the psychoanalytical cure. 
 
3. The epistemological criticism argues that psychoanalysis is not a science. 
 
A definition is a kind of birth certificate for an idea. Thus, the birth certificate of 
psychoanalysis questions hermeneutics, psychiatry and positivism. But this birth 
certificate also contains an idea that is the starting point of all that follows: the idea of the 
Freudian unconscious. Indeed, in this definition, Freud mentions the unconscious 
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through a sort of circumlocution: ‘inaccessible mental processes’ (Ibid., p.235). It is from 
the premises of these ‘inaccessible mental processes’ that psychoanalysis is defined as a) 
what investigates them, b) a cure that makes use of these investigations and c) a form of 
knowledge about these processes.  
 
If the definition given in Two Encyclopaedia Articles is the most used by Freud’s 
commentators it is not only because it is the most exhaustive. I believe that it is also 
because this definition establishes the link between the idea of the unconscious and 
psychoanalysis as a cultural reality. Although the unconscious is not mentioned directly, 
this definition shows clearly that the discovery of the Freudian unconscious is the 
starting point of psychoanalysis as a new cultural form: a new medical practice with its 
rules and its ethic (the analytical cure); new institutions and the power created by these 
institutions (the various psychoanalytic societies as well as the psychoanalytic journals 
and publishing houses); a new vocabulary and, in a more general way, a new form of 
knowledge.  
 
It is in its consideration as a new cultural form that psychoanalysis is engaged with the 
pre-existent disciplines: hermeneutics, psychiatry and positivism, behind which we find 
Freud’s dialogue with the most canonical cultural forms of the Western world: 
philosophy, medicine and science. My suggestion is that Freud’s idea of the unconscious 
is both what founds this triple dialogue and what constitutes its limits. Indeed, I propose 
to think of Freud’s idea of the unconscious not as a hermeneutic concept, nor as a 
positivist hypothesis, nor as a clinical fact but as a metapsychological speculation. The 
idea I would like to explore in this study is that metapsychology is at the basis of an 
epistemological model particular to psychoanalysis.  
 
Metapsychology is Freud’s original gesture by which clinical material is read beyond 
empirical observation in order to extract knowledge from it. I would suspect that it is 
precisely what Wittgenstein had in mind when he expressed this intuition about Freud: 
 
I believe that my originality (if that is the right word) is an originality 
belonging to the soil rather than the seed. (Perhaps I have no seed of my 
own.) Sow a seed in my soil and it will grow differently than it would in any 
other soil. Freud's originality too was like this, I think. I have always believed - 
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without knowing why - that the real seed of psychoanalysis came from Breuer, 
not from Freud. Of course Breuer's seed-grain can only have been quite tiny. 
Courage is always original (Wittgenstein, 1998[1977], p.36).2 
 
Mauro Mancia described Wittgenstein’s assessment as "a gross historical error, for 
psychoanalysis was actually born when Freud separated from Breuer and forged a bond 
with Fliess" (Mancia, 2002, p.170). However, I believe that Wittgenstein’s intuition 
contains an element of truth. Freud’s breaking away from Breuer and joining Fliess 
corresponded to the attempt to make sense of clinical material through a general 
speculative framework. As Paul-Laurent Assoun has proposed, in the genealogy of the 
Freudian discovery, Breuer personifies the therapeutic act and Fliess the theoretical 
decision (Assoun, 2007). Thus, the truth in Wittgenstein’s remark is not so much a 
historical truth - I am certainly not proposing that Freud would have stolen the real germ 
of his discovery from Breuer - but rather a narrative truth. It describes how a key 
moment in the emergence of psychoanalysis came from the encounter between the 
clinical material collected by Breuer in his cure of Anna O. and Freud’s reflections about 
mental life. Breuer and Freud consider the same clinical material, but while the former 
retains an empirical position toward it, the latter gradually made sense of it within a larger 
speculative framework. In other words, what is at stake is the encounter between the 
seed-germ of Anna O's "talking cure" (Breuer, 1893, p.30) and the soil of Freud's 
metapsychology. 
 
Cranefield rightly wrote that, “If by psycho-analysis is understood a discipline relying on 
the therapeutic technique of free association, psycho-analysis was solely Freud's 
discovery” (Cranefield, 1958, p.322). The idea I would like to propose is that the 
speculative research that Freud named metapsychology led him to evolve from the 
cathartic model of the talking cure toward the model of free association in the 
psychoanalytic encounter. Freud’s ‘originality’ would be the invention of a speculative 
theory that reorganised the hermeneutic of the symptom around the patient’s psychic 
reality. The empirical doctor would put aside the noise of psychic reality, seeing it as a 
contamination of the ‘objective’ and recordable clinical material. On the contrary, Freud 
installs psychic reality at the centre of his encounter with the patient.  
 
                                                        
2 Wittgenstein wrote this note in 1939. 
 11 
This seems to me to be a revolution of the medical encounter. I think that it is Freud’s 
invention of metapsychology that makes this revolution possible. With metapsychology, 
the doctor acquires a speculative tool with which to observe the emergence of psychic 
reality in the encounter with a patient. I translate Wittgenstein’s remark into the 
following hypothesis: metapsychology is a way for Freud to extract a new knowledge 
from material that is already available. Thus, the invention of metapsychology would be 
the founding moment – the soil – of a psychoanalytic epistemology: a new system to 
create knowledge about the psyche. 
 
It is striking that Freud invents these two neologisms simultaneously: psychoanalysis and 
metapsychology. In a paper originally written in French, Heredity and the Aetiology of the 
Neuroses, Freud uses the term psychoanalysis for the first time: 
 
I owe my results to a new method of psycho-analysis, Josef Breuer's 
exploratory procedure; it is a little intricate, but it is irreplaceable, so fertile has 
it shown itself to be in throwing light upon the obscure paths of unconscious 
ideation. (Freud, 1896a, p.151)  
 
This paper was published on 30th March 1896 but sent off to the Revue Neurologique on 
5th February 1896.3 Eight days later, in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud creates the word 
metapsychology: 
 
I am continually occupied with psychology – really metapsychology (Letter to 
Fliess of 13th February 1896, see Masson, 1985, p.172). 
 
Psychoanalysis: intended for a scientific publication, metapsychology: used in the secrecy 
of a private correspondence. So could it be that metapsychology is the other name, the 
esoteric name of psychoanalysis? Rather than following this avenue of research, I would 
like to stress the interdependence of a method: the practice of psychoanalysis – and a 
concept: metapsychology, as if one could not exist without the other or, more precisely, 
as if the existence of one was necessary for the existence of the other. 
 
                                                        
3 Letter of 6th February 1896 from Freud to Fliess (in Masson, 1985, p.170). 
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If the link between the psychoanalytic cure and metapsychology existed in Freud’s 
thought since their birth, then what is the exact nature of this link? Epicurus created an 
immanent philosophy of existence from the physical supposition of the atom. Deleuze 
explains that Spinoza’s novelty in the history of ideas was that Spinoza conceived of his 
ethics as a consequence of his ontology: a system of values that stems from a theory of 
being (Deleuze, 1981). I propose to think of the pair: metapsychology/analytical cure in the 
same way as the pair: atom/Epicureanism or of: Spinoza’s ontology/ Spinoza’s ethics. In other 
words, I want to research whether Freud’s new clinical practice could have stemmed 
from a form of knowledge that he called metapsychology. 
 
The broad question I am trying to answer is: what is the function of metapsychology in 
Freud’s psychoanalytical practice? It has almost become a dogma that Freud’s 
metapsychological writings distance the reader from the clinical experience and yet the 
intuition which has led to the current investigation is that a metapsychological way of 
thinking makes operative a form of clinical practice specific to psychoanalysis. The 
demolition of Freud’s metapsychology would aim at the demolition of this specificity of 
the analytical cure. Hence the question would be: what is this specificity made operative 
by metapsychology? 
 
If the psychoanalytical clinic generates positivist discoveries and hermeneutic 
interpretations, it also generates metapsychological creations. Through metapsychology 
the psychoanalytic dialogue generates a creative linguistic mode of thought because 
metapsychology puts the emergence of the analysand’s psychic reality at the centre of the 
analytical encounter. In the analyst-analysand dialogue an unexpected part of the 
analysand’s subjectivity appears in the creation of a way of thinking through language. It 
is by this aspect of the cure that – using Foucauldian terminology – psychoanalysis re-
establishes the dialogue with unreason. It is also this aspect that makes psychoanalysis a 
form of knowledge about the creation of language. Hence metapsychology would be 
necessary in order for the analysand to create a way of thinking through language about 
unthinkable parts of his psychic reality. Such are the initial intuitions that have led me to 
formulate the main question from which this study on Freud originates: what is the 
function of metapsychology in Freud’s psychoanalytic practice? What kind of 
psychoanalytical clinic was made possible by Freud’s metapsychological corpus? 
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In a first moment that moves from the emergence of metapsychology to the first attempt 
to systematize its concepts in the 1915 papers, metapsychology appeared in Freud’s work 
as a new form of knowledge, which enabled him to put unconscious processes into 
writing. In this study, I will try to describe the epistemological nature of this 
metapsychological knowledge in order to understand the relationship between Freud’s 
speculative theory of the unconscious and its medical practice. I think that the 
understanding of this relationship is composed of a double movement: to understand, on 
the one hand, how Freud’s metapsychology operates as a conceptual framework – a sort 
of container – for Freud’s clinical discoveries, and on the other hand, to understand how 
metapsychology, as an ontological discourse on the unconscious, casts a new light on the 
signs generated by Freud’s clinical empiricism. 
 
I will conduct my reading of the emergence of Freud’s metapsychology through three 
types of inquiry: 
 
1. What is the epistemological nature of Freud’s metapsychological speculations on 
the unconscious? 
 
2. What are the formal means by which Freud wrote his metapsychological 
speculations? 
 
3. How did Freud’s metapsychological speculations appear in his clinic? 
 
“Remaining a Prisoner in Order to Escape!” 
 
In his introduction to Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Jean Laplanche appeals to “a latent 
and partially unconscious history” of psychoanalysis in order to define the problem of 
the objects of psychoanalysis. In opposition to a manifest history, there would be a latent 
history of Freud’s thought, “entailing an evolution through reversals and crises, mediated 
by contradictions whose status will not be immediately apparent in any attempt to situate 
them” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.1). For such a history to appear, Laplanche proposed a 
free-floating reading of Freud’s texts, whereby one is “perpetually prepared to treat at the 
same level sequences of varying length: of words (even if they make no sense), of 
sentences, and of texts” (Ibid., p.4).  
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Laplanche’s new reading of Freud’s theory of seduction was guided by such a method. 
Against the manifest history of psychoanalysis that describes Freud’s abandonment of 
the seduction theory as the true beginning of psychoanalysis, Laplanche pointed out that 
fundamental aspects of psychoanalysis are articulated by this very theory: namely the 
encounter between the infant in need of care and the sexual unconscious of the adult. 
This canonical example illustrates how, rather than studying the history of Freud’s theory 
as a dialectic reasoning that tends towards a final aim, a latent history would try to reveal 
the hidden themes that shape the specificity of Freud’s thought. 
 
My hypothesis is that Freud’s metapsychology would be the archive of this latent history 
of psychoanalysis. More than an attempt to theorize psychical processes beyond 
consciousness, it would be a way to register the unconscious dimension of 
psychoanalytic concepts. In other words, metapsychology would be the unconscious of 
Freud’s theory, a sort of ‘negative psychology’ that is reminiscent of the mystical 
traditions of ‘negative theology’ in which “saying is never an affirmative definitory 
naming, as what is named is always Other (…) the breakdown of speech before the 
unknowable” (Emery, 2000, p.814). In a paper discussing the psychoanalytic notion of 
truth from within a non-positivistic framework, Gunnar Karlsson compares the problem 
raised by a science of the unconscious with negative theology: “What other science 
investigates something which is defined by the prefix un-?! The only resembling 
discipline, in this sense, may be the so-called ‘negative theology’, which claims that an 
understanding of God can only be reached by stating what God is not” (Karlsson, 2000, 
p.4). 
 
The point of this comparison between metapsychology and negative theology is not to 
represent the unconscious as a mystical unknowable entity, rather, it is to indicate that 
unconscious processes generate ideas of a type that exceed the framework of any 
systematic psychological knowledge. Freud’s discovery of the unconscious through the 
practice of analysis has generated new forms of knowledge and parts of this knowledge 
resist being structured around the usual categories of science, philosophy or logic. 
Metapsychology would be a way to formalise this type of knowledge that resists the usual 
categories of the logos, a sort of archive of the vanishing points that are found in the 
systemic aspects of the theory. 
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From this angle, there are resonances between metapsychology at the theoretical level 
and dream at the individual level. Just as in the genesis of psychoanalytic knowledge 
metapsychology operates as an archive of what resists being theorised, in the genesis of 
the individual’s subjectivity dreams function as an archive of the signs that have not been 
symbolized. Freud forges a system in which “dreaming is another kind of remembering” 
(Freud, 1918[1914], p.51). A dream can contain memories that have never been 
experienced subjectively by the dreamer because they are made of ideas that exceed his 
capacity to symbolise. Dreaming shows that infantile ideas are irreducible to 
consciousness, the most striking example being dreams of ‘primal scenes’. 
 
In The Wolf Man, Freud explains that primal scenes “are not reproduced during the 
treatment as recollections, they are the products of construction”(Ibid., p.50-51). In his 
investigation into the origins of subjective life, Freud presents a view in which memories 
from primal scenes are archived through a code that goes beyond any experience lived by 
the subject, belonging instead to a hypothetical primacy of the species. Dreams or 
neurotic symptoms are the expression of such a non-verbal system of primal ideas, 
primal ideas for which the work of construction in analysis will aim to create a verbal 
form. Dreaming would be a way of remembering that represents ideas with no subjective 
origins: a way of remembering that shows the impossibility of a primal memory. In a 
similar way, metapsychology would be the dream of psychoanalytic theory: a system that 
shows the impossibility of systematizing the unconscious. 
 
In Louis Althusser’s moving autobiography The Future Lasts a Long Time, which is also an 
account of his analysis, he explains an escape plan he had conceived, while a prisoner of 
war in Germany during the Second World War: 
 
Having noticed that the Germans alerted all the police and troops within a 
very wide radius once they realised one of us had escaped, which usually 
resulted in the capture of the daring individual concerned, I decided the surest 
way of escaping would be to let them believe someone had escaped, wait until the 
general alert was over which never lasted more than three or four weeks, and 
then escape after that. What I therefore had to do was disappear from the camp 
(…) and let them think I had gone, before actually going once the alert was 
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past. To do this, I did not actually have to escape, but simply disappear, in 
other words hide within the camp itself (which was not impossible) and only 
then vanish into thin air, when all the measures adopted for the alert had been 
dropped (…) In essence I had found a way of escaping from the camp without 
actually leaving and of remaining a prisoner in order to escape! (Althusser, 
1993[1992], p.108). 
 
Althusser never carried out his plan but he describes how the principle of remaining 
within an ideology in order to escape it will become a significant metaphor for his 
intellectual path. My research hypothesis in this thesis is that Freud’s metapsychology 
constitutes an endeavour similar to the one described by Althusser in his escape plan. In 
his metapsychological texts, Freud would describe a mode of thinking that resists being 
systematised through a categorisation of signs: it escapes the jail of semiotics from within 
a semiotics of the psychical apparatus. 
 
With the psychoanalytic framework, Freud invented a new practice of psychic 
investigation utilising a dialogue formed from the resistance to free associations and 
transference. This new practice studies an unconscious mode of thinking that generates 
signs whose description goes beyond the conceptual and formal resources Freud had at 
his disposal. Freud’s metapsychological texts are recordings of the attempt to describe 
the signs beyond those resources in the very language of those resources. Through such 
notions as ‘proton pseudos’, ‘unconscious wishes’, ‘memory-traces’ or ‘thing-
presentations’ Freud describes the products of unconscious processes, which cannot be 
reduced to the categories of consciousness and of introspection. He presents us with an 
unconscious mode of thinking that produces signs, which manifest themselves in the 
subjectivity, for instance through dreams or neurotic symptoms, under the form of an 
irreducible otherness. 
 
The objects of my research will be Freud’s metapsychological texts from the genesis of a 
metapsychological perspective in the correspondence with Fliess to the first attempt to 
found a metapsychological system in the Papers on Metapsychology that Freud wrote around 
1915. Twenty years of research around intentional ideas that appear to consciousness 
only under a distorted form and that have given birth to very peculiar texts amongst 
Freud’s work. From scientific articles to clinical cases, from papers on psychoanalytic 
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technique addressed to his colleagues to more didactical papers intended for a larger 
audience in order to explain the main analytical concepts or from semi-autobiographical 
papers in which Freud presents his version of his intellectual path to papers of applied 
psychoanalysis: there is a great diversity of textual categories in Freud’s work. Amongst 
this wide range of ‘Freudian genres’, the metapsychological texts seem very different 
from the rest. As a reader of Freud’s work, one feels almost nervously that the 
metapsychological texts display a form of knowledge that operates in a very peculiar way. 
Jean-Claude Rolland describes with great accuracy this impression when he writes: 
 
whoever reads with sustained attention any one of these papers [the 
metapsychological texts] soon discovers to what extent this speculation 
distances him from the clinical sphere, to the point of making him lose sight 
of it; but he also discovers how, behind the impeccable figuration Freud gives 
to this or that concept (…) thought comes to life in extravagance and luxury, a 
thought that I would say engages with its object more than just explaining it 
(…) The writing in these papers is choppy, in turn advancing and retreating, 
sometimes abrupt as if it were not possible, for example, to elucidate the drive 
it speaks of except by submitting to its fits and starts and its violence (…) 
 
Unique writing, invocative more than evocative, calling for, demanding an 
equally unique reading founded on empathy, on the reader’s unconscious 
participation in the author’s unconscious. We do not read the 
metapsychological texts in the way we read Freud’s clinical cases or ‘The 
Interpretation of Dreams’, not because they are more difficult because more 
abstract, would resist comprehension or committing to memory more 
vigorously, but because they compel the reader to confront the strangeness of 
what they bear witness to more than actually formulating it: strangeness of the 
melancholy colouring any identificatory movement of the ego, strangeness of 
the unconscious movements which shy away just as they show themselves, 
strangeness of the affect that, arising makes the ego oscillate between pain and 
pleasure. The particular status conferred on metapsychology at the heart of the 
Freudian oeuvre is mainly owed to that fact that this production of the esprit is 
saturated with strangeness, a strangeness we must guard against assimilating if 
we want it to remain operative, a strangeness, finally, that prizes the dizzying 
 18 
proximity it entertains with what Freud liked to call the ‘psychology of the 
depths’ (Rolland, 2005, pp.96-97). 
 
As suggested by Rolland, I believe that the ‘strangeness’ experienced by the reader of 
Freud’s metapsychological texts comes from the novelty of the objects they describe. For 
a period of twenty years Freud’s metapsychological research was an attempt to write the 
nature of intentional forms generated by an unconscious mode of thinking. It seems to 
me that the portrait of the unconscious system drawn by Freud at this time constitutes 
the most subversive representation of the unconscious that is to be found in his work. 
Freud’s metapsychological notion of the unconscious is subversive because it puts 
forward a model that cannot be fully transcribed in pre-existing forms of intelligible 
discourses. It is an epistemological kind of subversion.  
 
From his clinical material, Freud discovers psychical processes that cannot be explained 
through observation and induction and that cannot be understood though interpretation 
of meanings. In Freud’s metapsychology, the dynamic unconscious is neither a positivist 
object of science nor an idealist metaphysical substance and neither methods based on 
causality nor methods based on meaning can give an account of metapsychological 
unconscious processes. There is a rupture of the usual forms of rational intelligible 
discourse, in other words a breakthrough from the logos. I will try to read Freud’s first 
metapsychology beyond the logos in order to both understand and describe this 
breakthrough. 
 
However, my aim will not be to understand how Freud perceived his work in dialogue 
with the main form of knowledge of his time. There are many instances of Freud’s 
complex positioning towards discourses of knowledge. For instance, his claim in the New 
Introductory Lectures that the only acceptable Weltanschauung for psychoanalysis is a 
scientific one (Freud, 1933[1932]a, p. 158) and the same year in his letter to Einstein the 
declaration rhetorically presented as a question that “every science comes in the end to a 
kind of mythology” (Freud, 1933[1932]b, p.211). My methodology will not consist in 
analysing how the complexity of this apparent paradox is linked with a metapsychology 
of the unconscious. My attempt will rather be to read in the first sequence of Freud’s 
metapsychology the discovery that it was impossible to systematize unconscious 
processes in a positivist or a hermeneutic framework.  
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Paraphrasing Derrida, who writes in Dissemination of a non-formalizable programme “for 
reasons that can be formalized” (Derrida, 1981[1972]a, p. 52), I will try to systematize the 
metapsychological processes that resist being described in a systematic way. The purpose 
of my reading of Freud’s metapsychology will therefore be twofold: to provide an 
analysis of the functioning of unconscious processes whose meanings cannot be 
interpreted through a ready-made code and whose determinism cannot be put in an 
equation; at the same time, to examine the formal means invented by Freud to write 
about those processes. 
 
It was Jacques Derrida who first attempted to understand how Freud’s formalisation of 
the unconscious challenged the main intelligible discourses of his time. In March 1966, 
André Green invited Derrida to give a paper at his seminar in the Parisian Psychoanalytic 
Institute. François Dosse in his book on structuralism has described 1966 as the peak 
year of the structuralist movement (Dosse, 1991). According to Derrida’s biographer 
Benoît Peeters, Green had invited Derrida in order to introduce structuralism to the 
Parisian Institute from where Lacan had been expelled in 1953. The lecture given by 
Derrida – whose transcript would be published the next year as a chapter of Writing and 
Difference under the title Freud and the Scene of Writing – was in fact a rather curious 
introduction to a structuralist reading of Freud.  
 
One of Derrida’s purposes in this paper is precisely to point out the limitations of a 
structuralist reading of Freud and, more generally, to use Freud to undermine the 
structuralist notion of the sign. In the note preceding his paper, Derrida explains that his 
intention in giving this lecture was to explore whether the notions of presence and archi-
trace could “have a place within the field of psychoanalytic questioning” (Derrida, 
(1978[1967]), p.246). In Of Grammatology (Derrida, 1976[1967]), Derrida had developed 
the concepts of presence and archi-trace as a critique of Saussure’s logocentric notion of the 
sign and Freud and the Scene of Writing shows how this critique finds a crucial point of 
articulation with Freud’s metapsychology. 
 
It seems that from the beginning, Derrida had entertained an ambivalent relationship 
with the ‘structuralist adventure’. In an interview that he gave for the newspaper Le 
Monde some years later, he defined his method of deconstruction as both “a structuralist 
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and an anti-structuralist gesture: one dismantles an edifice, an artefact in order to reveal 
its structures, its veins or its skeleton but at the same time one shows the precariousness 
of a formal structure that does not explain anything since it is not a centre, not a 
principle, not a force, not even a law of events in the more general sense”.4 I believe that 
this clarifies Derrida’s position in regards to structuralism: deconstruction is an operation 
by which the code that structures an experience is revealed, but more fundamentally, 
Derrida’s deconstruction points out what it is in an experience that escapes the code.  
 
Derrida subscribes only partially to the structuralist application of Saussure’s linguistic 
model to the study of social phenomena. On the one hand, Derrida seems to accept that 
a social phenomenon can be studied as a system – a set of elements that are defined by 
their relations to each other – but on the other hand, his main philosophical endeavour at 
the end of the sixties was to show how there is always an aspect of the phenomenon that 
escapes the determinism of this system. Derrida embraced structuralism as a way to think 
beyond the humanist philosophies of Sartre’s existentialism or of phenomenological 
analysis. However, from his first publications he also attempted to think beyond 
structuralism and chapter two of Of Grammatology is often recognised as the text that 
made the shift from structuralism to post-structuralism possible: from “a philosophy of 
structures” to “a philosophy of differences” (Maniglier, 2011, p.371). 
 
As I understand it, Derrida’s attempt to think beyond structuralism rests on his intuition 
that there is always an aspect of man’s spiritual, intellectual and practical experience that 
escapes the interplay of structures. The philosophical form that this intuition takes is to 
be found in the critique developed by Derrida in Of Grammatology against a logocentric 
notion of the sign from Plato and Rousseau through to Saussure and Lévi-Strauss. 
Derrida wanted to reveal how throughout the history of western thought, logos 
associates the faculty of speech with the ideal of reason and intelligibility. Writing, in 
contrast, has been assigned a secondary status as a supplement to the truth of the spoken 
word. Scriptural language is seen as a distorted form of logos, a sort of monstrous 
offspring.  
 
                                                        
4 “Déconstruire, c’est un geste à la fois structuraliste et antistructuraliste: on démonte une édification, un 
artefact, pour en faire apparaître les structures, les nervures ou le squelette, mais aussi, simultanément, la 
précarité ruineuse d’une structure formelle qui n’expliquait rien, n’étant ni un centre, ni un principe, ni une 
force, ni même la loi des événements, au sens le plus général de ce mot.” (Jacques Derrida interviewed by 
Christian Descamps, published in Le Monde, 31st January 1982, my translation in the text).  
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Against this logocentric paradigm, Derrida challenges the ‘secondariness’ of the sign: 
there was never an original time of the natural phoné-consciousness that would have been 
corrupted by the confusions of the signs, but there were “always already” transcriptions of 
signs. Hence, what is at stake in Derrida’s endeavour is not so much the rehabilitation of 
writing, but to undermine the idea of an origin in which the subject could enjoy his or 
her full presence to him or herself. As explained by Geoffrey Bennington, Derrida 
“asserts, from the beginning, that the sign is at the beginning. Which will imply very rapidly that 
there is no beginning, thing, or sign” (Bennington, 1993[1991], p.24).  
 
Derrida’s objective is not to reverse the hierarchy of logos by questioning the hierarchy 
between the sign and the thing it represents or between writing and speech. Instead, 
Derrida attempts to challenge the very possibility of a hierarchy because there would 
never be a primal form of presence – and in reading Freud he finds a precious ally in this 
deconstruction of an absolute origin: 
 
That the present in general is not primal but, rather, reconstituted, that it is 
not the absolute, wholly living form which constitutes experience, that there is 
no purity of the living present—such is the theme, formidable for 
metaphysics, which Freud, in a conceptual scheme unequal to the thing itself, 
would have us pursue. This pursuit is doubtless the only one which is 
exhausted neither within metaphysics nor within science (Derrida, 
(1978[1967]), p.266). 
 
Derrida perceived in Freud’s metapsychology the description of a kind of idea that 
cannot be subsumed to the usual frames of metaphysics or science; a structuralist reading 
would threaten this momentous epistemological breakthrough. Hence, Derrida’s attempt 
to read Freud beyond the frames of metaphysics and science is in a conflictual dialogue 
with a structuralist reading of Freud, which means of course, a conflictual dialogue with 
Lacan. However, this conflict is not a relation of sheer opposition and again, one can 
sense a dialectical movement in Derrida’s position towards structuralism. Derrida agrees 
with Lacan in considering that the unconscious does not have the status of a 
transcendental, an empirical or a historical subjectivity but that it operates like a language. 
However, Derrida thinks that the language of the unconscious is irreducible to a 
structuralist linguistic model.  
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Put otherwise, Derrida accepts the idea of the unconscious as a text, but unlike 
structuralism that conceives the unconscious text as a system coding conscious thoughts, 
Derrida tries to describe this text as a form of psychical writing that makes enigmatic the 
very idea of a code:  
 
It is here that the Freudian break occurs (…) he makes of psychical writing so 
originary a production that the writing we believe to be designated by the proper 
sense of the word—a script which is coded and visible “in the world” would only 
be the metaphor of psychical writing. This writing, for example the kind we find in 
dreams which “follow old facilitations,” a simple moment in a regression toward a 
“primary” writing, cannot be read in terms of any code (Ibid., p.262). 
 
Bennington warned his reader against a misreading according to which deconstruction 
would be a psychoanalysis of philosophy: “Derrida’s relationship with psychoanalysis 
(…) has never taken the form of an alliance” (Bennington, 1993[1991], pp.134-135). 
Derrida himself had stated in the note preceding Freud and the Scene of Writing: “Despite 
appearances, the deconstruction of logocentrism is not a psychoanalysis of philosophy” 
(Derrida, (1978[1967]) p.246). Despite this, I would like to justify my temptation to think 
of the articulation between Derrida and Freud as a form of alliance. Of course, Derrida’s 
critical engagement with ‘symptoms’ of logocentrism is not a textual psychoanalysis, and 
reciprocally one would not find in Freud’s work the premises of a systematic critique of 
logocentrism.  
 
Thus, my point is certainly not to hunt for the ambiguities in Freud’s adherence to the 
logocentric tradition in order to present him as the prophet of post-structuralism. On the 
contrary, I would like to show how Freud’s metapsychological texts are built on this 
tension between a form of unconscious idea irreducible to the sign and Freud’s 
theoretical and descriptive apparatus that remain in the sign. Therefore the alliance 
formed with Freud’s texts would aim to organise the escape of the metapsychological 
unconscious from the prison of the sign.  
 
Derrida showed that unconscious processes described by Freud in his metapsychology 
could not be thought through pre-existing ontological frames and he tried to accentuate 
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this breakthrough through his “ontology of writing”.5 What is at stake is therefore the 
alliance between Freud’s discoveries of unconscious forms of intentionality and Derrida’s 
proposal of a new ontological framework. Derrida perceives in Freud’s description of 
unconscious processes an alternative to structuralist models and the primacy of the 
signifier. Psychical writing found in memories, dreams or neurotic symptoms “produces 
its own signiﬁers; does not create them in their materiality, of course, but produces their 
status-as-meaningful (signiﬁance). Henceforth, they are no longer, properly speaking, 
signiﬁers” (Ibid., p.263). 
 
The question of Derrida reading Lacan and of their more or less hidden dialogue6 is not 
the object of my study and it is certainly a more complex research than this brief attempt 
to situate Derrida in relation to structuralism. My aim is to contextualise my commentary 
of Freud’s metapsychological texts, to provide the ontological key that I will use in order 
to understand Freud’s metapsychological model of the unconscious. This key is Derrida’s 
concept of the trace. Derrida’s trace seems to me crucial to understanding the nature of 
those signs, which exist at the beginning of psychic life and yet which manifest 
themselves under forms irreducibly extraneous to consciousness. Derrida’s trace would 
offer a conceptual framework through which to conceive of unconscious processes that 
cannot be subsumed to an origin: 
 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin—within the discourse that 
we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the origin 
did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a 
nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin. From then 
on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would 
derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which would 
make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or 
archi-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all 
begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace (Derrida, 
1976[1967], p.62). 
                                                        
5 The term “ontology of writing” was proposed by Christopher Johnson in his book System and Writing in 
the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida (1993) to describe Derrida’s general theory of writing.  
 
6 René Major has pointed out how in Lituraterre, Lacan had answered some of Derrida’s objections without 
ever mentioning his name (Major, 2002, p.170).  
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Freud’s first metapsychology would have been an escape from the jail of the sign through 
the trace. Put somewhat differently, the escape is from a type of representation, which 
has its origins in reflective consciousness and is the technical carrier of memory, towards 
a type of representation irremediably alien to consciousness, whose origins cannot be 
fixed and which undermines the notion of memory as an archive. Hence, Derrida’s 
concept of trace not only provides intelligibility for the nature of this new type of 
unconscious representation, but it also casts a new light on the nature of Freud’s 
metapsychological endeavour as an escape from logos from within logos itself. If Freud 
has managed to break through, beyond, and beneath the Platonic closure of the logos, it 
is through “the question which disorganizes and disturbs” the literalness of his 
“metapsychological fable”: through what “was spoken without being said, thought 
without being thought: was written and simultaneously erased, metaphorized” (Derrida, 
1978[1967], pp.287-288). 
 
The Vanishing Points 
 
More than a model of unconscious psychical processes, Freud’s first metapsychology – 
from the Project to the 1915 Papers on Metapsychology – was an attempt to describe psychical 
processes operating beyond the conceptual and formal resources in which they were 
expressed. Hence, the structural impossibility of completing such an attempt: if Freud 
rejected the Project and destroyed the seven drafts that, added to the five existing papers 
of 1915, would have formed a book on metapsychology, it is for essential reasons that 
are linked with the very nature of the object he was studying: the sign produced by an 
unconscious mode of thinking. 
 
The purpose of my work will be to investigate this incompleteness in Freud’s first 
metapsychology, to question this excess by which the text inscribes the nature of the 
object it tries to define. I will attempt to decipher in Freud’s writing the function of 
unconscious traces beyond the cover of the logos. In order to do that, I will propose a 
reading of Freud’s first metapsychology in which I will not assess the empirical truth of 
its hypothesis nor will I judge the coherence of its narrative. Instead, I will read it 
through Derridean lenses – I will search for modes of thought, and the type of ideas they 
produce in those passages in which the text escapes itself. In other words, I will look for 
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the dispersal of the subject in the vanishing points of Freud’s text. I will follow this 
escape of the sign into the trace by inquiring at a conceptual level into the impossible 
aspects of the texts and at a formal level into Freud’s non-verbal writing, a type of 
writing that escapes into the margins. 
 
To conduct such an inquiry today manifests a kind of assumed anachronism, as 
mainstream contemporary psychoanalytic research seems to have denied Freud’s 
metapsychological escape. As reported by Sidney Hook (1959) in the 1958 New York 
University conference on ‘Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy’, 
psychoanalysts were directly challenged by epistemologists on the scientific status of the 
method they had received from Freud. However, the assault on Freud’s metapsychology 
from within the psychoanalytic movement started properly in North America in the early 
seventies. In the name of empirical or clinical evidence, some analysts have tried to 
reintroduce an informative subjectivity that could be reduced to a set of data introduced 
into the heart of psychoanalytic theory. In chapter two of my thesis, I will study the 
controversy triggered by those attacks. I will try to show how, as a result, this new figure 
of the subject is not only transparent to itself, but also transparent to two main forms of 
discourse: the hermeneutic discourse on the one hand and the positivist discourse on the 
other. 
 
The rest of my thesis will aim to reopen the closure of hermeneutic meanings and 
positivist evidence in order to research how Freud’s metapsychology is a theory that 
resists systematisation and completeness. I will attempt to read Freud’s metapsychology 
as a speculation that draws a portrait of a mode of thinking that operates beyond the 
logos: 
 
- A theory of the psyche in which memory operates beyond an archive memory.  
- A form of writing beyond the sign.  
- A clinical practice beyond interpretation. 
 
In chapters three, four and five of my thesis, I will study the mode of thinking that 
generates the unconscious traces. My purpose will be to extract the concept of a 
hallucinatory mode of thinking from a reading of Freud’s metapsychological texts from 1895 
to 1915. Through the hallucinatory mode of thinking, I wish to emphasize how Freud’s 
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notion of the unconscious led to a tragic understanding of memory that does not 
function like an archival system, but rather like the prescriptive apparatus of a destiny. I 
would like to show that it is the hallucinatory dimension of unconscious processes that 
made of memory an apparatus that constructs the representation of a forgotten past, 
rather than an apparatus that would accurately register an archived past. 
 
In my sixth chapter, I will study the formal stratagems invented by Freud to describe 
unconscious traces. My purpose will be to show that Freud’s metapsychology is not only 
a theoretical endeavour but also an aesthetic one. Freud developed a form of 
metapsychological writing to solve the problem raised by the formalisation of unconscious 
ideas. In his book on the rediscovery of hysteria by Charcot, Georges Didi-Huberman 
(2012[1982]) stressed the importance of the role played by photography. The 
iconography of hysteria, as it was recorded through photographic images, would have 
been the outcome of a certain connivance between the doctor’s glance and the hysteric’s 
body. Charcot’s discoveries on hysteria would have been filtered through the production 
of those images. My hypothesis in the sixth chapter will be that Freud’s 
metapsychological writing played a similar role for psychoanalytic knowledge as 
photography did for Charcot’s medical knowledge. By penetrating the backstage of the 
hysterical scene, Freud would have replaced the production of images by the production 
of a text, thus Freud’s metapsychological writing would also be an aesthetic tool to 
describe the specificity of the psychoanalytic encounter. 
 
In chapter seven, I will investigate the consequences of Freud’s first metapsychology for 
his clinical practice. In order to do this, I will study Freud’s clinical paper A Child is Being 
Beaten, which he wrote in 1919. I consider this the first text in which Freud articulates the 
conjuncture of his metapsychology and his clinical practice in an accurate way: a text in 
which Freud’s practice operates as a correlate of his metapsychology. It suggests, in as 
much as Freud’s first metapsychology theorises the psyche not as an essence but as 
modes of thinking, that the aim of the clinic is not to discover a secret memory but to 
construct a memory. In this paper, the idea of an experience with no origins in self-
presence appears as a construction of the analysis. In this way, the analytic cure does not 
reveal a secret memory from a forgotten past but aims to give verbal form to memories 
that belong to an archaic pre-verbal past. As stressed by Jacqueline Rose: “In his case 
studies Freud had increasingly demonstrated that the history of the patient did not 
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consist of some truth to be deciphered behind the chain of associations which emerged 
in the analytic setting; it resided within that chain and in the process of emergence which 
the analysis brought into effect” (Rose, 1986, p.228).  
 
The theory of an unconscious mode of thinking whose code echoes with an absolute 
past of the species, is linked to the construction of a phantasy phase that “is never 
remembered”, that “has never succeeded in becoming conscious” and that is 
nevertheless a “necessity” of the psychoanalytic account (Freud, 1919, p. 185). To a 
subjectivity made of traces, there corresponds an analytic practice that can be reduced 
neither to observation nor to meaning because it also asymptotically tends towards the 
construction of an encounter with an irreducible otherness in the self. Jacques Press ends 
his paper on the question of construction in analysis, by an address to his colleagues: “To 
go towards the unknown, the unknown in ourselves as the unknown in our patients, this 
unforgettable that we could not transform. To approach it not without a form of terror, 
as that would be too much to expect but nevertheless to approach it and to emerge 
changed from this encounter: such is my understanding of what is at stake in our 
enterprise” (Press, 2011, p.192, my translation).7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 “Aller vers l’inconnu, inconnu de nous-mêmes comme de nos patients, de cet inoubliable que nous 
n’avons pas pu – pas su – transformer, savoir s’y tenir, non sans effroi, ce serait trop demander, mais s’y 
tenir néanmoins, et ressortir changés d’avoir pu le faire: c’est ainsi que je comprends l’enjeu de notre 
entreprise.”  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Study of a Controversy 
 
 
At the beginning of his Introductory Lectures, Freud wrote: “I can assure you that the 
hypothesis of there being unconscious mental processes paves the way to a decisive new 
orientation in the world and in science” (Freud, 1916-17[1915-17], p.22). One of the 
main purposes of my study is to understand how the writing of metapsychological texts 
played a strategic role in this new orientation of knowledge. To this effect, I would 
suggest seeing metapsychology as the new epistemological framework that Freud was 
forced to build in order to contain his discoveries of unconscious processes. In my 
commentary of Freud’s first metapsychological texts I will try to understand how this 
new form of knowledge of the unconscious operates (chapters three, four and five), how 
it is formalised (chapter six) and its effects on Freud’s practice (chapter seven). My 
commentary is therefore centred on the epistemological dimension of Freud’s 
metapsychology.  
 
Understanding the nature of Freud’s metapsychological knowledge had been at the heart 
of a controversy triggered by a new generation of American psychoanalysts in the 1970’s. 
In this chapter, I will review the main epistemological readings of Freud’s 
metapsychology that have been generated by that controversy. This literary review will, 
therefore, mainly present a sort of reverse image of the views I expound in the rest of my 
thesis, since most of the hypotheses that I will examine in this chapter try to identify the 
particularity of Freud’s metapsychology in order to exclude it from the field of 
psychoanalytic knowledge. 
 
“The Maidservant of Psychiatry” 
 
Freud was highly suspicious of the future of psychoanalysis in the United States. 
Amongst all the, more or less, sensible testimonies of Freud’s anti-Americanism, one 
caught my attention. It is to be found in one of his last letters to Theodor Reik. About 
the issue of lay analysis, Freud wrote that for American analysts: “analysis is nothing else 
but one of the maidservants of psychiatry” (in Gay, 2006, p.633). This quote contains 
Freud’s feeling that in the United States psychoanalysis cannot be considered as a 
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singular field of knowledge but has to be absorbed into another mainstream practice. I 
think that it was such a motivation - finding a theoretical womb for psychoanalysis - that 
pushed a series of American analysts to attack Freud’s metapsychology in the 1970’s. 
These analysts were trying to “understand, clarify, and put at work the psychoanalytic 
theory of thinking” (Holt, 2009). In other words, they were attempting to find new 
epistemological foundations for psychoanalysis. Even if the results of these attempts 
have given birth to many models, they all started their endeavours with a complete 
rejection of Freud’s metapsychology.  
 
Throughout the world of psychoanalysis these attacks have generated a series of 
reflexions that seem to me to constitute the most acute and up-to-date body of literature 
on the joint question of the definition and the function of Freud’s metapsychology. Of 
course, attacks on Freud’s metapsychology started long before the 1970’s: the first 
‘dissidents’ Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung had already attempted to replace Freud’s 
metapsychology with a general psychology or with a psycho-mythology. However, it 
seems to me that the American critics I will review were the first to conjointly raise the 
clinical assessment of metapsychology against the question of defining an epistemological 
status for psychoanalysis. 
 
Moreover, I believe that an examination of these controversies will help us to understand 
why the theory of drives and, more generally, of metapsychology is often considered 
rather unfashionable these days (Steiner, 1993, p.45). In his detailed study of the North 
American psychoanalytic movement, Steven Ellman (2010) has showed how these more 
contemporary critics of metapsychology would lead to Jay Greenberg and Stephen 
Mitchell’s rallying slogan of the relational critique, that one had to choose between a 
relational and a drive model (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).8 But before examining the 
content of these radical criticisms, it is necessary to understand where they come from. 
 
This challenge to Freud’s metapsychology by the 1970’s critical movement in the United 
States was in fact part of a more general movement against classical ego psychology. 
When the American critics questioned Freud’s metapsychology, they were studying it in 
the form that they have received it: through the theorists of ego psychology, which 
means mainly through Heinz Hartmann. From 1940 to 1960, Heinz Hartmann and Anna 
                                                        
8 In his more recent papers, Jay Greenberg has somewhat altered the radicalism of his position. 
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Freud were indeed the two most influential Freudian theorists in the United States 
(Ellman, 2010, p.169). Through the US publication of the English translation of Anna 
Freud’s The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence in 1946 and the publication of Hartmann’s 
Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation in 1958, a certain reading of Freud’s structural 
model was spread that emphasised a way to gain knowledge of the unconscious through 
the mediation of the preconscious and conscious aspects of the ego. A striking example 
of the fact that what was evaluated was an ego psychological model of metapsychology, 
is that these critics retained nothing of the death drive but aggression. Hence, it is 
important to understand the definition of metapsychology given by classical ego 
psychology. 
 
Hartman thinks of psychoanalysis as a natural science that is, “moving in the direction of 
becoming a general theory of human behavior” (Hartmann, 1964b, p.12). He did not 
raise the question of the role played by metapsychology in the evolution of Freud’s 
thought but treated it as a set of given concepts that he tried to make as easily digestible 
as possible for the science and social science of his time. As he wrote, his aim was to 
balance the “rationalism of enlightenment and the irrationalism of the romantics” 
(Hartmann, 1964a, p.9). Within the psychoanalytic scientific edifice, he viewed 
metapsychology not as meta-theory but as “theory on the highest level of abstraction” 
(Ibid., p.328). Hartmann’s approach partakes of a desire to establish a hierarchical 
classification of psychoanalytic propositions, which would constitute one of the 
epistemological obsessions of ego psychology and a first foundational point for the 
critics of metapsychology. 
 
In their ground-breaking paper, ‘The Points of View and Assumptions of 
Metapsychology’ published in 1959, Merton Gill and his mentor David Rapaport 
proposed such a classification with an ascending order of generalization: empirical 
proposition, general psychoanalytic proposition and metapsychological propositions. 
Freud had defined a metapsychological presentation as a description of a psychical 
process “in its dynamic, topographical and economic aspects” (Freud, 1915c, p.181). For 
Rapaport and Gill, the metapsychological propositions include the dynamic point of 
view, the economic point of view, the structural point of view, the genetic point of view 
and the adaptive point of view. 
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With this paper, Rapaport and Gill signed a form of manifesto of an ego psychological 
understanding of metapsychology and this manifesto had two main consequences. 
Firstly, they replaced the topographical point of view with the structural point of view, 
which indicates their decision to reject Freud’s topographical model of the mind and to 
think only within Freud’s structural model of the mind. Secondly, they added the genetic 
and the adaptive point of views in order to redefine metapsychology within the 
framework of psychoanalysis understood as a natural science. It is precisely the idea that 
such an attempt would lead to a dead end and that, “Freudian natural-science 
metapsychology is a serious obstacle to the development of psychoanalysis” (Gill, 1988, 
p.46) that will push Gill to change his view and to redefine Freud’s metapsychology 
within “a self-contained hermeneutic” model of psychoanalysis. 
 
Another attempt to classify psychoanalytic propositions was made by Robert Waelder in 
his 1962 paper, ‘Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy’. Waelder 
distinguished six degrees of relevance in Freud’s doctrine, from the most important to 
the less important: the level of observation, the level of clinical interpretation, the level of 
clinical generalizations, the level of clinical theory, the level of metapsychology and finally 
the level of Freud’s philosophy. It is worth noting that unconscious mental processes are 
classified by Waelder not at the level of metapsychology but at the level of clinical 
observation. 
 
The way these analysts from the ego psychology school established a hierarchy of 
Freud’s corpus in fact prepared the ground for the general attack on metapsychology, 
because with such classifications they passed down two types of prejudices. The first 
consists in approaching Freud in a non-historical way: as if Freud’s concepts had 
appeared at once in a ready-made organised system. An aspect of my work will be to 
show how more than a system, Freud’s theory seems a constant work-in-progress and, 
moreover, that in this work-in-progress, metapsychology occupies a very particular role. 
Metapsychology operates on the side, irreducible to any possible classification as a sort of 
toolbox, or as a ‘scaffolding’ that would provide new structures when the clinic, the 
theory or the expression encounters its impasses. 
 
The second prejudice was to force on Freud’s theory a type of hierarchy borrowed from 
natural science. In this hierarchy, the main authors from ego psychology placed 
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metapsychology as the most speculative part of Freud’s theory. Many analysts would 
cling to this definition in their criticisms. Thus, Frank (1979) understood metapsychology 
as the metatheory of psychoanalysis and Arlow defined it as “a priori assumptions 
beyond hypotheses derivable within the clinical setting” (Arlow, 1975, p.517). In my 
commentary, I will attempt to show that Freud never presented such a hierarchical 
edifice of knowledge, but rather, how throughout his research he developed a very 
peculiar epistemological framework. I will be following Vannina Micheli-Rechtman who 
pointed out that, even “more than the unconscious in itself, the radical novelty was in 
Freud’s eyes the whole intellectual endeavour that led to this discovery” (Micheli-
Rechtman, 2010, p.29, my translation).9 
 
In The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis (Freud, 1925[1924]a), a paper published in 1925 in 
which after A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis (1917b), Freud returned to the motives 
behind the hostility triggered towards psychoanalysis, he stressed the peculiarity of the 
psychoanalytic epistemological framework, which does not succumb completely to the 
mechanistic approach of the natural scientist, but also not completely to the speculative 
one of the philosopher. It maintains a difficult middle position between perception and 
speculation, between the clinical fact and the philosophical concept. Freud already 
predicted how psychoanalysis would derive “nothing but disadvantages from its middle 
position between medicine and philosophy. Doctors regard it as a speculative system and 
refuse to believe that, like every other natural science, it is based on a patient and tireless 
elaboration of facts from the world of perception; philosophers, measuring it by the 
standard of their own artificially constructed systems, find that it starts from impossible 
premises and reproach it because its most general concepts (which are only now in 
process of evolution) lack clarity and precision” (Freud, 1925[1924]a, p.217). 
 
One other important foundational point for metapsychology’s critics can be traced to 
Lawrence Kubie’s article: ‘The Fallacious Use of Quantitative Concepts in Dynamic 
Psychology’. In this paper published in 1947, Kubie argued that Freud’s economic 
principle holds a special fascination due to its pseudo-scientific aspect. Now, because the 
quantitative changes of individual energy components are impossible to measure in a 
                                                        
9 “Mais plus que l’inconscient lui-même, c’est toute la démarche permettant d’y accéder qui justifie aux 
yeux de son inventeur le statut de radicale nouveauté.” 
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clinical observation, the use of economic quantitative terms is, according to Kubie, “the 
weakest element in all current theories of psychological causation”(Kubie, 1947, p.518). 
 
In Kubie’s article the word metapsychology never appears. However, two elements in it will 
have a strong influence on the two main currents of the American critique of Freud’s 
metapsychology: the positivist and the hermeneutic one. The first will be developed 
through the positivist criticism of metapsychology: it is Kubie’s criticism of the psychic 
energy model. Indeed, most of the criticism will be addressed to the economic point of 
view and to the idea that Freud’s concern with psychic energy is a scientific anachronism. 
Kubie argues that Freud’s economic metaphor is used as a convenient way to cover the 
difficulties of psychodynamic causation and to evade the task of finding methods to 
quantify these psychodynamic mechanisms.  
 
Kubie’s reading of the economical point of view refuses to attribute to Freud’s texts any 
metaphorical possibilities and so can appear somewhat naïve. Yet, this demand for 
measurable parameters will be at the centre of the positivist critic against Freud’s 
metapsychology. In his introduction to a new translation of Freud’s metapsychological 
papers, Mark Cousins rightly linked this demand with the development of quantitative 
data in psychological research: “Within psychoanalysis it is more the idea of the 
economic dimensions and its relation to the drive that has come in for criticism or simply 
neglect. Faced with the inexorable progress of measurement within psychology there has 
been an increasing reluctance to refer to a quantitative dimension within psychical life 
without being able to assign numbers or measured relations to it” (Cousins, 2005, pp. 
xiv-xv). 
 
The second element will be at the core of the hermeneutic critique: it is the way Kubie 
questions psychoanalytic epistemology from the perspective of a distinction between 
description and explanation in science. Kubie’s thesis is that the use of non-measurable 
quantitative concepts to explain psychological phenomena is fallacious because it rests on 
the delusion that “we have explained a phenomenon which we have merely described in 
metaphors” (Kubie, 1947, p.508). 
 
This distinction between explanatory and descriptive scientific methods finds its roots in 
the ‘dispute on method’ [Methodenstreit] that took place at the end of the nineteenth 
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century in German-speaking universities 10 . This debate, which started amongst 
economists, erupted in the whole field of academic knowledge with the publication in 
1883 of Wilhelm Dilthey’s book, Introduction to the Human Sciences. Dilthey’s aim was to 
give human sciences an epistemological status that would be both independent and as 
scientific as that of the natural sciences. This endeavour led to an epistemic split which, 
as noticed by De Robertis, is still unresolved more than one hundred and fifty years later 
(De Robertis, 2001, p. 134).  
 
On the one side, a form of knowledge developed by natural sciences [Naturwissenschaften] 
with a nomothetic approach searches to explain [erklären] its objects from the outside by 
establishing universal laws out of experimental facts using ‘causal’ categories. On the 
other side, a form of knowledge developed by human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] with 
an idiographic approach constitutes an attempt to understand [verstehen] its objects from 
the inside by describing their singularities using the categories of ‘aim’ and ‘meaning’. I 
will show in this literary review how the hermeneutic critics – particularly under the 
terms: “how-question” and “why-question” (Klein, 1973; Schaefer 1975) – will reopen 
the ‘dispute on method’ at the heart of Freud’s metapsychology by identifying it as a relic 
of Freud’s scientism and by proposing to replace this explanatory discourse by a 
descriptive one. Noticeably, Heinz Kohut in The Restoration of the Self (1977) develops a 
similar view: he accepts any innovations when it comes to descriptive theory but believes 
that a crisis of the explanatory theory has come. 
 
To summarize, the two premises that support the common understanding of Freud’s 
metapsychology by classical ego psychologists are: 
 
1. Psychoanalysis is a natural science. 
2. It is necessary to ‘synchronize’ Freud’s work in order to remove speculation from 
theory. 
 
As a result of this ‘idealistic’ scientific view, Freud’s metapsychological corpus is 
perceived as an uncanny speculative artefact that resists a natural science framework and 
metapsychology becomes a part of psychoanalytic theory that remains in opposition to 
                                                        
10 This question was mainly initiated by the work of three economists: Gustav Von Schmoller, Karl Knies 
and Carl Menger. 
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the clinical theory. The idea, put forward notably by Hartmann, that psychoanalysis is 
composed of two theories – a clinical and a speculative one – will be a rock for the 
criticism against metapsychology. Thus, some critics of metapsychology, such as Gill or 
Schafer, will consider that their endeavour to develop “a further rational reconstruction 
and extension of metapsychology” (Holt, 1996, p.9) continues this aspect of Hartmann’s 
work. Moreover, the critique of classical ego psychology consolidates a perception of 
metapsychology as an anachronism of Freud’s scientism. Therefore, their general aim will 
be to replace Freud’s metapsychology by another discourse that could be “a sounder 
base from which to engage the ambiguities, uncertainties, simultaneities, and pluralities of 
the therapeutic encounter” (Leffert, 2010, p.2). 
 
The attempts to find a new theory to make sense of clinical observations will give birth 
to many proposals. Gill distinguishes “four major and two minor positions on the 
epistemological status of psychoanalysis. The major ones are psychoanalysis as natural 
science, hermeneutic discipline, bridge between mind and body, and information theory. 
The minor ones (…) are sui generis and metapsychology as metaphor” (Gill, 1988, p. 37). 
Gill had mentioned the possibility that psychoanalysis could have an epistemological 
model of its own kind, however he does not explore this idea further in the course of his 
paper. 
 
As a theoretical foundation of psychoanalysis, Mark Leffert has proposed “an 
interreferential schema which balances the influences of postmodernism, complexity 
theory and neuroscience as its key factors” (Leffert, 2010, p.2). Leffert, who trained in 
the 1970s under the influence of the radical critics of the ego psychology school, resumes 
the epistemological examination of Freud’s metapsychology from a new angle. He argues 
that metapsychology rests on implicit “assumptions of knowability and predictability that 
are not ontologically sustainable” (Ibid., p.xi). Leffert tries to find in the combination of 
postmodernism, complexity and neuroscience a discourse on the limit of knowledge that 
would provide a better ground for psychoanalysis than metapsychology. 
 
Luyten, Blatt and Corveleyn (2006) have advocated a methodological pluralism that 
would “bridge the gap” between the two main psychoanalytic cultures: positivist and 
hermeneutic. In this attempt to pacify the ‘dispute on methods’ that the 1970’s critical 
movement had transposed from nineteenth-century German epistemology to 
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psychoanalysis, they propose to establish psychoanalysis in a theoretical landscape that 
would combine intelligible discourses based on meaning and interpretation with an 
intelligibility based on causality and empiricism. However, they never consider the 
possibility that the metapsychological discourse could be a form of intelligibility specific 
to psychoanalysis. 
 
In their great diversity, all these proposals to found the epistemological status of 
psychoanalysis converge on one point: that it is not possible to have an epistemology 
which is proper to psychoanalysis only. Each of these epistemological proposals are 
founded on models external to psychoanalysis. Hence, the necessity to attack Freud’s 
metapsychology, because in Freud’s mind the function of the metapsychological 
concepts was to offer a foundation for psychoanalytic theory. In a footnote to A 
Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, Freud justifies his project to write his so-
called metapsychological paper as a way to “clarify and carry deeper the theoretical 
assumptions on which a psycho-analytic system could be founded” (Freud, 1917[1915]a, 
p. 222, fn.1). 
 
In the course of this chapter, I will try to show how behind the 1970’s challenge to 
metapsychology lay an attack on a sui generis epistemological status of psychoanalysis, 
because such a status could only be built around an understanding of metapsychology as 
a model of theoretical assumptions specific to psychoanalysis. In the next chapters, my 
purpose will be to comment on some of Freud’s metapsychological texts in order to 
draw the strange map of this epistemic scaffolding. My main hypothesis will be that one 
of Freud’s greatest subversions was epistemological: to establish a dialogue between a 
practice and a form of discourse that makes unifying labels or systemic classification 
intensely problematic but that cultivates plurality and hidden determinism. To invent 
paradigms from a practice through the description of a mode of thinking that is 
irreducible to any metaphysic of the subject. 
 
To classify the criticisms against Freud’s metapsychology, I will use the theoretical 
models proposed by these critics to replace metapsychology as the foundational 
discourse of psychoanalytic knowledge. Two main tendencies appear: the followers of 
hermeneutics, who see psychoanalysis as a theory of interpretation - and the followers of 
positivism, who view psychoanalysis as a natural empirical science. They both share a 
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reading of metapsychology as a model that offers mechanistic explanations. The 
difference between these two approaches will be that for the upholders of hermeneutics 
the purpose will be to refute metapsychology as non-analytic and to replace it by another 
fundamental theory. On the other hand, for the supporters of positivism, the aim will be 
to translate the metapsychological hypothesis into a hypothesis that is empirically 
testable.  
 
This distinction matches the one made by Modell who in his 1981 article ‘Does 
Metapsychology Still Exist?’ distinguished the attacks against metapsychology that 
attempt to modify it because it is no longer congruent with observation (the positivist 
view) and those that understand it as a completely irrelevant discourse (the hermeneutic 
view). These two lines of thought somehow confirm Freud’s fear about the future of 
psychoanalysis in the United States, as psychoanalysis finds itself threatened with being 
assimilated into psychology on the one side and into biology on the other. 
 
The Hermeneutic Point of View: A Return to Phenomenology?  
 
I will consider the views of three of the most representative analysts who critiqued 
Freud’s metapsychology from a hermeneutic angle: George S. Klein, Roy Schafer and 
Merton M. Gill. 
 
George Klein: 
 
In the story of this controversy, the first unambiguous call for the rejection of 
metapsychology was made by George Klein in 1973 with the publication of his article: ‘Is 
Psychoanalysis Relevant’. Klein distinguished two theories in Freud: two lines of 
development that “express different conceptions of what psychoanalysis is and ought to 
be” and whose “more profound point of distinction is that they derive from two 
different philosophy of inquiry and explanation” (Klein, 1973, pp.9-10). One theory rests 
on clinical explanation and its aim is the reading of intentionality. For that purpose it 
tries to decipher the meaning of  “behavior, experience, testimony (…) as jointly 
exemplifying directive ‘tensions’, avowed, disavowed, repressed, defended” (Ibid., p.10). 
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The second side of psychoanalytic theory is metapsychology, which Klein perceived as 
an approach by which “the terms of explanation have nothing to do with the subject’s 
own vantage point; it is the person observed as a physical process that is the main objective” 
(Ibid., p.12).  Klein argued that these two lines are incompatible because the former 
describes the intentionality of the subject, whereas the later rejects the very notion of a 
psychological subject. The coexistence of these two paradigms leads, therefore, to a form 
of confusion that blurs the distinction between mechanistic drive and subjective 
motivation.  
 
According to Klein, it is the clinical orientation to explanation that is the most 
characteristic of psychoanalysis because it informs an exchange in which the analyst 
searches for a depth intentionality in the patient’s experience and tries to communicate 
this intentionality to the patient through meaningful interpretations. Therefore, Klein 
proposed that “to get to the core assumptions of clinical psychoanalysis (…) surgery is 
necessary – a theorectomy, so to speak – that separates” clinical from metapsychological 
notions “so as to free the irreplaceable core concepts of clinical psychoanalytic theory” 
(Ibid., p.9). 
 
Stripped of its mechanistic line of explanation, Klein described psychoanalytic theory 
more as a humanistic discipline than a natural science and he compared the role of the 
analyst to “the historian’s obligation of narrative construction” or “the playwright’s 
responsibility for depicting a logic of motivation”(Ibid., p.13). In his 1976 paper, ‘Freud’s 
Two Theories of Sexuality, Psychology versus Metapsychology’, Klein further developed 
this logic of motivation to replace metapsychology. He proposed that motivations are the 
results of experiences perceived by the self in its development and its goal to be 
protected. This theory of motivation is in fact articulated around the developmental 
psychological concepts of experience and behaviour in order to integrate psychoanalysis 
as a part of psychology. In Klein’s epistemological utopia, psychoanalysis would be a part 
of psychology that provides an adequate language for the description of the subject’s 
depth intentionality. 
 
Throughout his work, George Klein is looking for a conception of intentionality that can 
always be transcribed within a conscious mode of thinking. From this angle, a neurotic 
symptom is perceived as a meaningful solution found by the subject to face the demand 
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raised by several conflictual intentional ideas. These conflictual ideas belong to the same 
category of presentations produced by the same mode of thinking. Klein never 
considered intentional contents that would not be subjugated to consciousness. He put 
forward a vision of the psychological subject as a self-present subject: a subject that 
could ideally think itself in its entirety.  
 
More than a cure, the setting for the classical psychoanalytic treatment becomes a means 
for human observation, a sort of psychological laboratory. Consequently, one 
understands George Klein’s rejection of Freud’s metapsychology, since metapsychology 
puts forward a form of intentionality that resists being transcribed in the language of 
consciousness and which deconstructs the notion of a psychological subject. Moreover, 
as I will try to explain in the last chapter of this thesis, far from revealing to the analysand 
the depth of its intentionality or the most intimate secrets of its being, Freud’s 
metapsychology makes possible a cure that constructs a form of radical otherness in the 
self. A clinical act that creates a form of intimacy that remains irreducible to 
consciousness or to the ego. 
 
Instead of the dynamic unconscious that produces ideas irreducible to consciousness as 
conceptualized by Freud’s metapsychology, Klein proposed a sort of phenomenological 
unconscious made of non-accepted or even non-socialized experiences. One of the most 
striking aspects of this shift is the replacement of sexuality by sensuality, thus he speaks 
of “the theory of infantile sensuality”(Ibid., p.4). The sexual energy of the drive is 
replaced by sensuality as an experience. The source of sensuality is not a drive with its 
enigmatic demand but a quest for an adaptive goal with a clear meaning. Klein has 
replaced Freud’s metapsychology, built around the concepts of drive and energy, with a 
phenomenology built around the concepts of meaning and goals. 
 
Roy Schafer: 
 
In 1976, Roy Schafer presented himself as being in the forefront of “a new critical 
movement concerned with the logic, language, implications and applications of Freudian 
psychoanalysis” (Schafer, 1976, p.x). Indeed, the work of Schafer appears to be one of 
the most original amongst the American critics of metapsychology. This is probably due 
to the fact that his views are strongly influenced by analytical philosophy, a philosophical 
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movement that for the most part has not directly engaged with psychoanalysis, although 
there are of course some important exceptions such as Richard Wollheim or Jim 
Hopkins. A main characteristic of analytical philosophy is to investigate reality from its 
formulation (Laugier and Plaud, 2011, p.13). Schafer’s critique of metapsychology will 
therefore be addressed at the level of its language, which fails to deal with meanings and 
the singularity of subjective experience. Schafer’s verdict is therefore irrevocable: “It is 
time to stop using the mixed physicochemical and biological language of Freudian 
metapsychology” (Schafer, 1975, p.41). 
 
Following Wittgenstein, Schafer understands the notion of language as “a set of rules for 
saying things of the sort that constitute or communicate a version of reality or a world” 
(Ibid., p.42). Schafer wants to replace metapsychology by another language, firstly, 
because in his view it is not conceptually rigorous and systematic enough and secondly, 
because its language borrowed from natural science eliminates the subject. Schafer thinks 
that the subject excluded by the scientific aspect of metapsychology comes back through 
the anthropomorphic aspect of its language. Moreover, this anthropomorphic language 
takes an infantile form and the language of metapsychology seems to reproduce the 
archaic body of infancy: “notions of internal, external, boundaries, thresholds, damming 
up and discharging: all these and many others may be viewed as psychosexual body 
language inappropriately elevated to the status of theoretical terms” (Ibid., p.42).  
 
This last criticism had been already developed by Home who accused Freud’s 
metapsychology of having applied metaphors to meaning and of understanding those 
metaphors literally: metapsychology “reifies the concept of mind and elaborates a 
scientific type theory in terms of causes. To reify is to deify, for reification creates the 
ideal immortal object by the simple process of definition, just as personification in the 
era of humanism created the immortal gods” (Home, 1966, p.47). 
 
This suppression of the subject puts metapsychology in contradiction with what Schafer 
understands as the essence of psychoanalysis: to make of the subject the agent of its 
actions. Gilbert Diatkine (1985, p.1219) has pointed out the influence of Sartre on the 
way Schafer defines the aim of the analytical cure. In order for psychoanalysis to 
rediscover what Schafer understands as its true nature, an alternative language is 
necessary. From 1972 onwards, with his paper ‘Internalization: Process or Fantasy’ and 
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through his book published in 1976, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, Roy Schafer would 
literally devise this new language that he named “action language”.  
 
To create this alternative language, Schafer used ideas from the main philosophical 
currents of the twentieth century. His main influence is to be found in the part of 
analytic philosophy called philosophy of mind inaugurated by Wittgenstein’s later 
writings, but he also takes concepts from existentialism – notably his use of Sartre’s 
concept of “bad faith” (Schafer, 1976, p.235) – and phenomenology. This return to 
classical western metaphysics in order to describe the psyche as it appears in the 
psychoanalytic encounter is, I believe, in complete opposition with Freud’s 
metapsychology. An important part of this thesis will aim to show that metapsychology 
was Freud’s declaration of war against a metaphysic of the subject and that through it 
Freud invented a non-systemic language that operates beyond the logos. 
 
Action language is defined as an attempt to stress the transformative significance of 
psychoanalytic interpretation through “its bringing home to the analysand the extent to 
which, and the terms in which, he has been the author of its own life, unconsciously and 
preconsciously as well as consciously, and the extent to which and the terms in which he 
has been disclaiming this activity” (Schafer, 1975, p.44). Hence, the action language is 
built as a feature of psychoanalysis understood as a practice of interpretation: a 
hermeneutic language to replace Freud’s metapsychological language. The fundamental 
rule of the action language is to regard all psychological processes, events, phenomena or 
behaviour as actions. The only human phenomena that are not classified as actions by 
Schaffer are bodily changes because according to him, “they are devoid of symbolic 
content” (Schafer, 1973, p.178).  
 
Because, in his view, the psychoanalytic cure deals only with actions, to speak of mental 
processes one should replace the use of nouns and adjectives by active verbs and 
adverbs. Schafer banishes from his action language the use of the passive form. 
Moreover, in the use of this language Schafer recommends to no longer refer to location, 
movement or direction and to never mention quantity. The topographical, dynamic and 
energetic metapsychological points of view are therefore eliminated. In the same way, 
“we shall not speak of internalization except in the sense of a person’s imagining his 
incorporating something” (Schafer, 1975, p.45).  
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The main psychodynamic concepts such as drive, impulse or psychic energy are excluded 
from this action language and the concept of the ‘id’ limited to an adverbial usage is 
emptied of all content (Ibid., p.47). Similarly, the systems conscious, preconscious and 
unconscious are replaced by three descriptive “modes of actions”. In this framework the 
ideal interpretation has to be formulated in a strictly coherent and rational language. 
Schafer redefines psychoanalysis not around the unconscious - that becomes a simple 
matter of point of view - but around the notion of action. What qualifies a psychological 
process is to be regarded as an action and its classification within the rules of ‘action 
language’. Whether this psychological process is conscious or unconscious becomes a 
secondary matter. 
 
Many articles have been written to refute Schafer’s proposals (Wurmser 1977; Barratt 
1978; Meissner 1979; Anscombe 1981; Oppenheimer 1984; Diatkine 1985). I have 
extracted from these criticisms four points that I find the most relevant for my study: 
 
1. Action language suppresses the difference between doing and saying. 
2. In Schafer’s view the aim of psychoanalysis is reduced to making the subject 
responsible for his actions. 
3. His idea of creating a sort of Orwellian Newspeak devoid of any unconscious 
phantasy that would avoid any misunderstanding seems an illusion. Moreover, 
such a language could be experienced as persecutory by the analysand. 
4. The unconscious becomes a secondary point of view to qualify mental processes. 
From this angle, Schafer’s action language appears as a pre-psychoanalytic 
formulation. 
 
What is at stake behind the effort to replace the language of Freud’s metapsychology by 
‘action language’ is the effort to reintroduce a subjectivity in which meanings are 
transparent and immediately available to consciousness. Schafer posits a 
phenomenological subjectivity made of actions. As with George Klein, who replaced the 
drive theory by a phenomenology of motivations I understand Schafer’s work to be an 
attempt to replace a psychology of the unconscious by a phenomenology of action. 
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Merton Gill: 
 
The importance of Gill’s criticism comes from his theoretical shift: he moved from being 
Hartmann’s close colleague and redefining an ego psychology reading of 
metapsychological points of view with Rapaport (Rapaport and Gill, 1959) to supporting 
George Klein’s view that “metapsychology is irrelevant to psychoanalysis” (Gill, 1975). 
He actually carried Klein’s argument one step further by stating that metapsychology is 
not psychology at all but provides, “explanations which are only pseudoscientific apings 
of natural science” and that psychoanalysis on the other hand, “needs to develop in its 
own terms as a self-contained hermeneutic science” to which the usual canons of 
empirical research could be applied (Gill, 1988, p. 46).  
 
Gill stands up against the idea that renouncing metapsychology would be an 
“abandonment of the fact that a human being is a biological organism as well as a 
person” because according to him “psychoanalysis deals with biology as it is 
psychologically experienced, not in somatic terms” (Ibid., p. 46). Gill set out with great 
clarity the premises and the reasoning at work in the hermeneutic assault on 
metapsychology. This rests on the argument that the object of psychoanalysis would not 
be the biological reality of the mind but the way this biological reality is subjectively 
experienced. The psychoanalytic theory would then be a descriptive and interpretative 
discourse of these subjective experiences. 
 
Metapsychology is considered only as an unnecessary explanatory discourse and the 
supporters of the hermeneutic view never consider a reading of metapsychology as a 
more abstract way to describe the psyche in the context of the analytical encounter. If 
they never consider that metapsychology could be a description of unconscious modes 
of thinking it is because they reduce the unconscious to intentional contents expelled 
from consciousness. In other words, they refuse Freud’s dynamic unconscious and so 
ignore the problem raised by the description of intentional presentations that cannot be 
apprehended by consciousness. In this hermeneutic model of psychoanalysis every 
subjective experience can be transcribed into empirical variables. Subjective experiences 
manifest themselves in the purity of self-presence to consciousness and the cure aims to 
describe this phenomenology of intentionality so that the subject would regain a form of 
control over it. 
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The Positivist Point of View: Lost in Translation? 
 
The positivist criticism of metapsychology originates from a different line of reasoning. 
Indeed, unlike the supporters of a hermeneutic epistemological status for psychoanalysis, 
the positivist point of view retains the idea of metapsychology as a set of “theoretical 
assumptions on which a psychoanalytic system could be founded”. The positivist attacks 
against Freud’s metapsychology will be directed against its speculative aspect and the 
project will be to link metapsychology with a method whose scientific nature would be 
guaranteed by empiricism and the Popperian principle of falsifiability. Hence, the main 
endeavour of a positivist reading of Freud’s metapsychology will be to find correlations 
between metapsychological concepts and hypotheses that can be tested: in other words, 
an exercise of translation. This translation follows two steps. The first is to identify what 
the observable phenomena in psychoanalysis are. The second consists in generalizing this 
data into a scientific theory. 
 
I distinguish two broad trends amongst positivist critics. The first proposes a new 
scientific theory to generalize the observable data. To describe this view, I will use 
Emanuel Peterfreund. The second conserves metapsychology as a generalizing theory 
with the condition that metapsychology follows the rules of empiricism: a 
metapsychology that has given up speculation and introspection. I will examine this 
second view through the work of Charles Brenner. 
 
Emanuel Peterfreund: 
 
Emanuel Peterfreund thinks that the aim of psychoanalytic research is to find 
generalizations about the phenomena of observation. Unconscious phenomena are not 
observable but “patients have experiences - sensations, feelings, images, fantasies, 
thoughts, and so on - which can be thought of as the raw data of psycho-analysis, the 
phenomena of observation” (Peterfreund, 1975, p.534). Peterfreund proposes that in “all 
sciences there are high-level theories which use terms that are quite abstract and remote 
from observable phenomena” (Ibid., p.535) and he defines metapsychology as the 
language in which the high-level, abstract psychoanalytic theory is expressed. 
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Peterfreund argues that Freud’s metapsychology is based on a pre-Freudian view of man 
that is no longer tenable. According to him there are two fundamental untenable 
assumptions in Freud’s metapsychology: firstly, the idea that the mind is separate from 
the body and secondly, that the mind is unique to man. This Cartesian pre-Darwinian 
view of man would make of Freud’s metapsychology an unacceptable paradigm. Hence, 
Peterfreund argues for a change of paradigm in order to “use the most advanced 
creations of the human mind to attempt to explain the mind itself” and as a new 
paradigm, he proposed: “information processing and a systems model which is 
consistent with neurophysiology” (Ibid., p.547).  
 
Instead of being perceived through an abstract theory of the unconscious, Peterfreund 
expressed the clinical encounter by using information-processing approaches. He 
understands psychological experience as the input and feedback of information and 
psychical conflicts are conceptualized using “a complex hierarchically arranged, 
branching tree of contingent situations” (Ibid., p539). It is as if a neurotic destiny is not 
linked with a part of ourselves that escapes us but rather with a mistake in the 
programming of the mind. In Peterfreund’s information model, the dynamic 
unconscious has literally disappeared and has been replaced by a descriptive unconscious 
that is pre-metapsychology. Peterfreund’s description of the unconscious would be a sort 
of program that reprograms information; he is representative of the attempt to replace 
Freud’s tragic unconscious and its metapsychological knowledge with a computer-like 
unconscious and its theory of information.  
 
Charles Brenner: 
 
Brenner offers a trenchant criticism of the hermeneutic reading of metapsychology. He 
explains that the separation between a concrete level of psychoanalytic theory that is 
supported by clinical data of an abstract, unproved and unprovable level, rests on a 
misconception of knowledge formation, since there is no such thing as a neutral 
observation: in “every branch of science even the simplest observations involve ideas of 
the highest order of abstraction” (Brenner, 1980, p.200). Brenner is opposed to the view 
that psychoanalysis is a science of meaning and argues that it is a branch of natural 
science since “mental phenomena are an aspect of brain functioning, it follows that 
psychology and psychoanalysis are necessarily a branch of biology” (Ibid., p.206).  
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Brenner explains that the data of every branch of science is unique, but that they all share 
a common endeavour to find cause and effect relationships with respect to their data: 
“Science is, in any case, adjectival, not nominal. It is not what one observes that defines 
science: it is the attitude one brings to one’s observations and how one deals with them” 
(Ibid., p.206). Thus, if indeed psychoanalysis deals with meanings as data, it would 
nevertheless be fallacious to conclude that it is a science of meanings. Brenner’s 
epistemological subtlety is to point out that the types of meanings gathered by the 
psychoanalytic encounter constitute a new category of data that was unknown before 
Freud. Freud’s discovery of free association as “the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis” 
(Freud, 1911-1915[1914], p.107) would be the discovery of a technique that generates a 
new category of objects: wishes, fears, fantasies, dreams, neurotic symptoms, and 
associative material expressed in language and gestures. In Brenner’s view, the clinic 
becomes a technique, a sort of laboratory to discover the human psyche. 
 
According to Brenner, these new objects of knowledge should be studied through the 
method that is shared by all natural sciences: observation, formulation of generalizations 
and the testing of these hypothetical generalizations as rigorously as possible. In this 
epistemological model, Brenner understands Freud’s metapsychology as synonymous 
with “psychoanalytic psychology”: a psychology of unconscious mental processes. As 
long as this “psychoanalytic psychology” has available data of observation, Brenner 
thinks that metapsychology can be used as a generalizing theory. I have proposed that 
the positivist criticism was always a form of translation. In Brenner’s case it would be a 
kind of tautological translation: metapsychology is translated by metapsychology.  
 
However, from Freud to Brenner’s metapsychology there is an obvious loss in 
translation since Brenner completely disregards the idea that introspection or any form of 
speculation could be a research method in psychoanalysis. Brenner acknowledges the 
novelty of free association as a method of observation of the psyche but never considers 
that metapsychology could be the manifestation of this method of free association in the 
construction of a theory: he refuses to see any links between free association and 
metapsychology. If introspection is not relevant for psychoanalytic research one may 
wonder what is the epistemological value of clinical cases? Moreover the consequence of 
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Brenner’s claim - introspection is not a psychoanalytic method – would make it necessary 
to test psychoanalytic hypotheses through extra-clinical experiments.        
 
This refusal of introspection, shared by most of the positivists, is a denial of Freud’s step 
beyond empiricism. At the beginning of Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud writes a kind 
of epistemological manifesto that I find especially relevant here, since, on the one hand, 
it anticipates Brenner’s critique of a neutral observation of meanings, but on the other 
hand, it also points toward a theory of knowledge that would exceed the realm of 
positivist empiricism: 
 
Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying certain 
abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or other 
but certainly not from observations alone. Such ideas – which will later 
become the basic concepts of the science – are still more indispensible as the 
material is further worked over. They must at first necessarily possess some 
degree of indefiniteness; there can be no question of any clear delimitation of 
their content. So long as they remain in this condition, we come to an 
understanding about their meaning by making repeated references to the 
material of observation from which they appear to have been derived, but 
upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. (Freud, 1915a, p.117) 
 
Freud writes that metapsychological ideas are not derived from “observations alone” but 
from “somewhere or other”. What could this “somewhere or other” be? Freud would 
give an answer to this in one of the last psychoanalytic texts to be published in his 
lifetime: Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937a). In this text, that denotes a certain 
pessimism, Freud questions the therapeutic efficacy of the analytical cure. In the third 
section, Freud explains that when it comes to the treatment of severe cases of illness, the 
decisive factor in achieving any success is a taming of the drives. “If we are asked by 
what methods and means this result is achieved” writes Freud, “it is not easy to find an 
answer. We can only say: “So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!—the Witch Meta-
psychology. Without metapsychological speculation and theorizing—I had almost said 
‘phantasying’—we shall not get another step forward” (Freud, 1937a, p.225).  
 
 48 
When clinical work reaches its limits, the only way to progress is through 
metapsychology, even if this progression is fraught with pitfalls for “what our Witch 
reveals is neither very clear nor very detailed” (Ibid., p.225). Hence, the “somewhere or 
other” from which metapsychological ideas are derived is speculation, theorizing and 
even phantasying. The hypotheses provided by metapsychology form a kind of 
mythology borne from Freud’s theoretical speculations, from Freud’s phantasies. 
 
Freud had already articulated this idea in an exchange of letters with Albert Einstein 
published under the title Why War?: “It may perhaps seem to you as though our theories 
are a kind of mythology and, in the present case, not even an agreeable one. But does not 
every science come in the end to a kind of mythology like this? Cannot the same be said 
to-day of your own Physics?” (Freud, 1933[1932]b, p.211) Paul-Laurent Assoun noticed 
how in Freud’s metapsychological texts, the shifts from Oedipus to Narcissus and then 
to Thanatos involve a growing use of “phantasying” (Assoun, 2009a, p.81). One of the 
main purposes of this thesis will be to understand the epistemological value of such an 
act of ‘phantasying’ at the core of a theory of the human psyche. 
 
The reflections of analysts about metapsychology and more generally about the 
epistemological status of psychoanalysis have influenced and, in their turn, have been 
influenced by the work of philosophers on the same question. Because of the exclusive 
intellectual perspective of this philosophical approach and its lack of any clinical 
elements, I have chosen to focus on a body of literature generated by analysts. Indeed, 
my question is to understand the link between metapsychology and psychoanalytic 
practice. Hence, my concern is a questioning of Freud’s metapsychology that rests on 
clinical arguments and not only on conceptual ones. I have centred my reading on this 
1970’s American assault against Freud’s metapsychology because it seems to me that this 
controversy constitutes the roots of a certain abandonment of metapsychology in 
psychoanalytic research. In this work, I wish to reopen the debate: to reinstall Freud’s 
metapsychology into the centre of a questioning of psychoanalytical epistemology. I 
would like, nevertheless, to briefly note how the main philosophical criticisms of Freud’s 
metapsychology also come from a hermeneutic and a positivist point of view.                                                
 
Paul Ricœur and Jürgen Habermas both considered that psychoanalysis was not a natural 
science and proposed a hermeneutic ‘reconstruction’ of psychoanalysis. In Knowledge and 
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Human Interests, Habermas defended the view that with metapsychology, Freud 
succumbed to a "self-misunderstanding of psychoanalysis as a natural science" 
(Habermas, 1971, p.247), a scientist’s misunderstanding of his own theory. He argued 
that the models proposed by metapsychology were antecedent to clinical experience and 
were superimposed onto them. In Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation 
(1970[1965]), Ricœur distinguished two levels of discourse in Freud’s theory. On the one 
side, a metapsychological explanatory level that rests on conflictual forces and a 
circulation of energy and on the other, an interpretative level that rests on the 
deciphering of latent meanings.  
 
Unlike many analysts defending a hermeneutic perspective, Ricœur justifies the duality in 
Freud’s theory and argues that this correlation between forces and meaning is a 
consequence of the singularity of the objects studied by psychoanalysis (Ricœur, 
1970[1965], p.75). To qualify the singularity of these objects, Ricœur speaks of a 
“semantics of desire” and through this notion he attempts to show how in dreams or in 
symptoms meaning is trapped. The task of psychoanalysis would be a re-appropriation of 
meaning: an exegesis of the meanings of the subject’s desire at the service of a better 
knowledge of the self. For that reason, Ricœur has compared psychoanalysis to an ethical 
system. In his understanding of interpretation, Ricœur has transformed the modes of 
functioning of the unconscious processes into interpretative techniques external to the 
psyche. As if the subject’s desire was a form of text waiting to be interpreted rather than 
an unconscious mode of thinking. 
 
On the positivist side, Karl Popper (1972) and then Adolf Grünbaum (1984), through 
two different modes of argument, both challenged the empirical status of Freud’s theory. 
According to Popper, psychoanalytic hypotheses are not scientific because they cannot 
be falsified. Popper takes the instance of Freud’s hypothesis about dreams: a dream is a 
fulfilment of a wish. Popper examines Freud’s answers to dreams, like nightmares that 
contradict this hypothesis, and he concludes that Freud’s argument does not leave any 
space for falsification. Hence, Freud departs from scientific methods.  
 
To the contrary, Grünbaum argues that Freud’s theory can be falsified and that 
psychoanalysis should be confronted with scientific criteria. But Grünbaum points out 
the various epistemological faults in Freud’s clinical method of justification. He argues 
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that psychoanalytic hypotheses cannot be tested in an intra-clinical way. According to 
Grünbaum, the associations of the patient on the couch are contaminated by the verbal 
or non-verbal suggestions of the analyst. Thus, the clinical case would be no more than a 
self-validation and only extra-clinical tests could validate Freud’s hypotheses. 
 
To conclude on the criticisms of Freud’s metapsychology, I propose a chart that would 
summarize and confront the hermeneutic and positivist view: 
 
Hermeneutic point of view Positivist point of view 
G Klein; M Gill; R Holt; R Schafer; H 
Home; D Spence 
E Peterfreund; C Brenner; J Arlow; A 
Frank; B Rubinstein 
Refute metapsychology as non-analytic Translate the metapsychological 
hypotheses into empirically testable 
hypothesis  
Psychoanalysis is a human science  Psychoanalysis is a natural science 
Propose a monism of psychoanalytic 
theory 
Propose a dualism of psychoanalytic theory 
The aim of the theory is: understanding - it 
answers the general question: How? 
The aim of the theory is: explaining - it 
answers the general question: Why? 
Teleological theory (understand meanings 
and intentions) 
Causal theory (understand the causes) 
Idiographic  Nomothetic 
Psychologist’s reductionism: 
psychoanalysis is a branch of psychology 
Biologist’s reductionism: psychoanalysis is 
a branch of biology 
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The Supporters of Metapsychology: “Psycho-analysis farà da se.”11 
 
In a letter to Jung dated the 30th of November 1911, Freud protests against the idea that 
psychoanalysis should be subordinate to another discipline: “What troubles me most is 
that Fräulein Spielrein wants to subordinate the psychological material to biological 
considerations; this dependency is no more acceptable than a dependency on philosophy, 
physiology, or brain anatomy. ΨA farà da se” (in McGuire, 1974, p.469). Responses to the 
American criticisms are quite diverse, however it seems to me that they all support the 
right of psychoanalysis to have its own epistemological structure and not to become 
subordinate either to a general psychology or to biology. 
 
Thus, Arnold Modell refuses to abandon a metapsychological approach because 
“psychoanalysis cannot be fitted into ready made epistemology”(Modell, 1981, p.400). 
Elisabeth Roudinesco justifies Freud’s metapsychology as a way to separate 
psychoanalysis from a descriptive psychology of consciousness and to avoid the 
assimilation of psychoanalysis into philosophy: Freud, “invented metapsychology, a 
speculative model, in order to inscribe psycho-analysis at the junction between natural 
science and speculative reflexion. Hence the idea to translate metaphysic into 
metapsychology: to renounce knowledge of being for knowledge of unconscious 
processes” (in Roudinesco & Derrida, 2001, p.279, my translation).12 
 
Agnès Oppenheimer, in a paper called ‘Qu’est ce que la Métapsychologie?’ [What is 
Metapsychology?] that she wrote in reaction to the American controversy, argues that it 
is precisely because the discovery of unconscious processes undermines any philosophy 
of consciousness, which had constituted the epistemological horizon until Freud, that 
psychoanalytic questions should be formulated in a new framework and, according to 
her, metapsychology is this new epistemological framework (Oppenheimer, 1985, 
p.1212). Oppenheimer defends the idea that metapsychology makes it possible to study 
psychological phenomena beyond the mind-body problem.  
                                                        
11 To remain coherent with the first part of my literary review, I have tried to gather in this section the 
views of practicing psychoanalysts who wrote in response to the American challenge to Freud’s 
metapsychology. 
 
12 “Il inventa la métapsychologie, c’est à dire un modèle spéculatif, afin de l’inscrire au croisement des 
sciences de la nature et de la réflexion spéculative. D’où l’idée de traduire la métaphysique en une 
métapsychologie, c’est à dire de renoncer à la connaissance de l’être pour celle des processus inconscients.”  
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If the project of an exhaustive description of metapsychological concepts cannot be 
conceived it is, on the one hand, because metapsychology has constantly to take into 
account new clinical material and on the other, because when clinical material stops 
being informative, metapsychology is the only way to carry the theoretical reflection 
further. Metapsychology would be the laboratory of psychoanalytic research: a constant 
work in progress that invents the specificities of the analytical discourse. Gilbert Diatkine 
stresses this view of metapsychology as a place for exploration in a very enlightening 
way. He speaks of the “metapsychological attitude” that he defines as the ability to “let 
hypotheses flow unhindered while maintaining one’s critical judgement” (Diatkine, 1985, 
p.1231). Moreover, Diatkine notices how metapsychological speculations always 
implicate the question of origins both at the level of the individual (ontogenesis) and at 
the level of the species (phylogenesis). 
 
It is this metapsychological attitude that Freud adopted when he wrote: “What follows is 
speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss 
according to his individual predilection. It is further an attempt to follow out an idea 
consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead” (Freud, 1920, p.24). Diatkine 
points out the analogy between this attitude and free association. There is a parallel 
between the technique that produces the clinical material: free association – and the 
attitude that provides the “scaffolding” of the psychoanalytical edifice: metapsychology. 
 
Diatkine proposes a symptomatic reading of the American assault on metapsychology: in 
a similar way to some patients who experience a great difficulty in free associating, some 
analysts would have a sort of inaptitude to adopt a metapsychological attitude. They 
replace the fruitful tension between theory and speculation with a methodical hierarchy 
between a descriptive and an explanatory level of the theory. Diatkine attributes this 
rigidity to an idealization of an empirical model of science. It is worth noticing that the 
enthusiastic adherence to such an ideal model of science seems to have renounced the 
question that Freud had addressed to Einstein: “It may perhaps seem to you as though 
our theories are a kind of mythology (…) But does not every science come in the end to 
a kind of mythology like this?” (Freud, 1933[1932], p.211). 
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From a different angle, Jean-Claude Rolland also defends the idea that metapsychology 
as a place for exploration was crucial for Freud’s work. He defines metapsychology 
through an analogy with the role played by the drives in psychical activity: “Certainly 
metapsychology has no more decisive definition than to be, as drive is for psychical 
activity, the call to work imposed on the theoretician by the concern to make clinical 
experience more coherent” (Rolland, 2005, p.97). In this attempt to find coherence in the 
clinical encounter, Rolland identifies metapsychology as a specific type of writing in 
Freud’s corpus and he compares metapsychological writing to poetical writing: “writing 
that would be like the concrete trace of the psychical transformation the author inflicted 
on himself to bring to conscious awareness and impose on his ego this reality of the 
psychical depths that even the most penetrating clinical experience does not 
spontaneously bestow on the observer” (Rolland, 2005, p.96).  
 
In his epistemological model, Rolland makes a distinction between a “beforeness” 
metapsychology: metapsychological hypothesis elaborated before the clinical observation 
that “anticipates and authorizes the rigorous observations of clinical facts” (Ibid., p.93) 
and an ‘afterwardsness’ metapsychology that arises from and is informed by the clinical 
experience. Moreover, Rolland distinguishes three levels of psychoanalytic terms: “a 
clinical fact, a theoretical concept and (…) a metapsychological ‘tool’” (Ibid., p.102). 
Unlike the hierarchy established by the metapsychological critics, who ascribed to the 
ascending levels of abstraction a decreasing importance, Rolland puts the 
metapsychological proposals at the very basis of the psychoanalytic theory: 
“Metapsychological concepts belong, undoubtedly always belong, to this category of 
what is paradigmatic” (Ibid., p.101). 
 
This idea of metapsychology as a ‘tool’ is also often found in thinkers who understand 
metapsychology as metaphor. Such is the model put forward by Leon Wurmser who 
conceives psychoanalysis as an autonomous field of knowledge of symbolic forms that 
cannot be reduced to the natural sciences or to the humanities: “Psychoanalysis is a 
symbolic form of theoretical knowledge sui generis and sui iuris: of independent origins, 
nature, lawfulness, criteria of validity, and structure of theory” (Wurmser, 1977, p.495). 
Many articles have stressed the central place of metaphor in clinical work: Arlow (1969), 
Caruth and Ekstein (1966), Lewin (1970), Sharpe (1940), Voth (1970). Wurmser’s 
originality was to study the place of metaphor from an epistemological viewpoint: the 
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role it plays in the formation and formulation of psychoanalytic theory. From this angle 
his work is a direct answer to Schafer who through his action language has argued for 
“an ametaphorical theory” (Schafer, 1975, p.49).  
 
Wurmser shows how Schafer’s theoretical construct is not free of metaphors: “They may 
be paler, but they remain metaphors” (Wurmser, 1977, p.477). Wurmser adopts a 
Kantian perspective to argue that metaphors are indispensable for scientific generativity. 
A specificity of psychoanalytic metaphor would be their anthropomorphic dimension 
since the “lawfulness of mental phenomena is by definition of ‘human form’” (Ibid., 494). 
Hence, Freud’s energetic point of view that, “has become the bugaboo of critics of 
metapsychology” is, in Wurmser’s opinion, made of “perfectly acceptable metaphorical 
concepts, not only because they resemble so closely similar laws of relations in physics” 
but also “because the very physical notions of ‘energy’ and ‘quantity’ are themselves of 
anthropomorphic origin” (Ibid., p.487). In Wurmser’s epistemological model of 
psychoanalysis, a metapsychology made of metaphors operates like mathematics for 
modern physics: its role would be to formalise and to integrate knowledge about our 
inner life. 
 
Joseph Sandler’s article, ‘Reflections on Some Relations Between Psychoanalytic 
Concepts and Psychoanalytic Practice’ is partly an answer to George Klein’s attack on 
metapsychology. In this paper, Sandler stood up for the specificity of psychoanalytic 
practice based on metapsychology, but he nevertheless points to three concepts where 
“distance between theory on the one hand and clinical practice and experience on the 
other is particularly wide” (Sandler, 1983, p.42): 
 
1. Drives and motives: According to Sandler not “all unconscious wishes derive from the 
instinctual drives.” (Ibid., p.42) 
2. Conflict: Sandler takes over the criticism about the anthropomorphic aspect of 
metapsychology. 
3. Object relationship and transference. 
 
Later on, Sandler developed an idea that seems crucial, according to which, each analyst 
has their own unconscious metapsychology: even “those who disdain explicit and formal 
theorizing develop, of necessity, their own personal (and to some extent idiosyncratic) 
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inner sets of theories. They may be unaware of the existence of such theories or frame of 
reference, or be unable to verbalize them. (…) Even the “purest” clinician has her 
theories about her patients” (Sandler, Holder, Dare, and Dreher, 1997, p.5 fn.2). 
 
Amongst the supporters of metapsychology, I think it is crucial to mention the view of 
André Green. As Riccardo Steiner writes, Green sometimes evokes “a solitary, worried 
biblical prophet, warrior, and defender of Freud’s work as he understands it, not so 
much to stick dogmatically to it, but to remind everybody, particularly at this moment in 
history, of the danger of forgetting the richness and still unsurpassed complexity of 
Freud’s inspirational model” (Steiner, 2000, p.5). Green is one of those analysts who 
reacted in the most radical way against the reduction of psychoanalytic theory. In 
addition, through Green’s figure, one can perceive how the metapsychological 
controversy has triggered a series of debates in psychoanalytic research and, notably for 
the argument here, on the relevance of infant observation. 
 
According to Green, the central debate in psychoanalytic research is metapsychology 
versus empirical research. Green attacks the idea that a theory of the unconscious could 
rest on empirical foundations: “Observation cannot tell us anything about intrapsychic 
processes that truly characterize the subject’s experience. Objectivism cannot be changed 
into subjectivism without denying what it wants to replace” (Green, 2000, p.60). 
 
Green argues that many critics of Freud’s metapsychology fail to perceive the 
fundamental change between Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) and the 
breakthrough of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900-1901). The dream book inaugurated 
Freud’s metapsychological approach to thinking through psychic problems because the 
dream became a paradigm for psychoanalytic investigation (Green, 1979). The so-called 
scientific method seems to Green “very unscientific because of its irrelevance to the 
object of psychoanalysis” (Green, 2000, p.66). For that reason: “One must admit that a 
Shakespearean quotation can be more enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton of 
scientific literature!” (Green, 2001, p.19).  
 
Green argues that the interesting question is not so much to prove or disprove Freud’s 
metapsychological speculations but that we should rather ask ourselves “what the 
connection is between his speculations (…) and the central object of the discipline he 
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created. What are the underlying epistemological problems that even he did not always 
spell out?” (Green, 2000, p.69). These epistemological problems stem from the 
specificity of the object of psychoanalytic research, which Green defines as the study of 
“the way the human mind functions in regard to its specific forms of disorganization” 
(Ibid., p.68). Through a set of polysemic metaphors that refer to the analytical setting, the 
role of metapsychology would be to map and to make sense of those epistemological 
problems. 
 
By studying texts produced by analysts that have undermined Freud’s metapsychology in 
its very principle, I have tried to set up the contemporary ideological landscape in which 
I propose my own reading of Freud’s metapsychology. Reductions of metapsychology to 
hermeneutics or its translation into empirical positivism bring subjectivity back into the 
prison of the logos: into an epistemological framework sustained by a hidden 
metaphysics of presence and truth. Moreover, one can suspect that to replace a 
metapsychological notion of subjectivity made up of modes of thinking and of traces, 
with an informative notion of subjectivity made up of data and meanings, has 
consequences for the psychoanalytic clinic.  
 
As Jean Laplanche wrote: “One perceives to what extent only metapsychological 
considerations in their abstract forms are capable of appropriately centring what 
constitutes the essence of the psychoanalytic practice, Freud’s inaugural and primordial 
invention” (Laplanche, 2007[2000]b, p.50, my translation).13 The return of logos through 
a discourse of meaning or causality could perhaps fit in with a more normative clinic, be 
it the prescriptive morality of psychology or the technical standards of medicine. My 
hope in this commentary will be to look for a subject in Freud’s first metapsychology 
that cannot be reduced to a set of informative data or to a set of brain scans. I believe 
that such an endeavour has political implications whose stakes seem to me accurately 
summarized by Jacqueline Rose when she writes: 
 
To understand subjectivity, sexual difference and fantasy in a way which 
neither entrenches the terms nor denies them still seems to me to be a crucial 
task for today. Not a luxury, but rather the key processes through which – as 
                                                        
13 “On voit à quel point des considérations métapsychologiques d’allure abstraite sont seules capables de 
centrer convenablement ce qui fait l’essence de la pratique psychanalytique, invention primordiale et 
inaugurale de Freud.” 
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women and as men – we experience, and then question, our fully political fates 
(Rose, 1986, p.23). 
 
In the next three chapters, I will come back to Freud and propose a commentary of the 
main metapsychological texts written between 1895 and 1915. My third chapter will be a 
reading of the Project for a Scientific Psychology. My fourth chapter will be centred on Chapter 
VII of The Interpretation of Dreams. My fifth chapter will focus on the 1915 Papers on 
Metapsychology. Through this first part of his metapsychology, Freud drew a tragic portrait 
of subjectivity in which the representations that are found at our very core are also the 
representations most alien to us. In this metapsychological view, the most intimate 
memories take the form of oracles that a Pythia would have delivered in an enigmatic 
psychical writing inaccessible to consciousness.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 Project for a Scientific Psychology: The Impossibility of a Text 
 
 
“A Kind of Madness” 
 
The focus of this chapter is to research the causes that pushed Freud to abandon the 
writing of a draft published posthumously in James Strachey’s Standard Edition under 
the title of Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 19501895).14 The Project is an epistolary 
text that appeared in Freud’s letters to Fliess. 15  The trace of its genesis and its 
abandonment can therefore be followed in these letters. On the 27th of April 1895, Freud 
wrote that he was “caught up in The Psychology for Neurologists” and that he had 
“never before experienced such a high degree of preoccupation.” (in Masson, 1985, 
p.127) On the 8th of October 1895, Freud sent the two first parts of a draft that he had 
written at the speed of the train that had brought him back from Berlin to Vienna, 
carried away by the enthusiasm of one of his “conferences” with Fliess. Fruit of an 
intense intellectual research, sustained by the use of cocaine, the Project soon became, in 
Freud’s eyes, an impossible text. On the 29th of November 1895, Freud described 
renouncing the draft to Fliess: 
 
I no longer understand the state of mind in which I hatched the psychology; 
cannot conceive how I could have inflicted it on you. I believe you are still too 
polite; to me it appears to have been a kind of madness. (Ibid., 1985, p.152) 
 
When he wrote the history of his own scientific adventure,Freud presented the 
beginnings of psychoanalysis as a series of renunciations that opened the road for 
                                                        
14 In as much as it remained at the state of a draft, Freud never entitled this text. He referred to it as the 
“Psychology for Neurologists” (letter of the 27th of April 1895, p.127), the “psychology” (letter of the 17th 
of June 1895, p.132), the “ϕψω” (letter of the 23rd of September 1895, p.139) but also the “tyrant” (letter 
of the 25th of May 1895, p.128 and of the 8th of November 1895, p.150). Evidently the impossibility of a 
text is also the impossibility of a title. (For all correspondence, see Masson, 1985)    
 
15 I think it is worth noticing that the correspondence is characterized by Freud’s belief that Fliess had a 
secret knowledge about sexuality. As if Freud was the child driven by sexual curiosity and Fliess was the 
adult who knew the answers. This asymmetry is at the basis of Freud’s transference onto Fliess. In 
retrospect, it is assumed, probably rightly, that this transference played a key role in Freud’s self-analysis. 
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discoveries16. In his practice, Freud’s abandonment of hypnosis gradually gave birth to 
the technique of free association. In his theory, his giving up the hypothesis of seduction 
in the aetiology of neurosis led Freud to the discovery of psychical reality. Hence, there 
were essential reasons that justified the abandonment of hypnosis and of the seduction 
theory. The premise of my research hypothesis is that the reasons that made the Project an 
impossible text for Freud are also essential. More than a study of its actual content, I will 
focus my attention on the elements of the text that help to understand why seven 
months after he had started its writing, the Project appeared to Freud as “a kind of 
madness”: to locate in the body of the text the clues that explain its impossibility. 
 
It seems that readers of the Project can easily share the impression of “madness” that 
Freud attributed to his own endeavour. Indeed, many commentators have pointed out 
the strangeness or the almost abnormal difficulty of this text. Jean Laplanche wrote of 
the “uneasiness of the contemporary reader” who “begins wondering whether he has not 
been swallowed up by some monstrous pseudo-scientific machine” (Laplanche, 
1976[1970], p.31). In his introduction, Ernst Kris stressed the difficulty of the Project  
“even for the reader who approaches it with some preparation” (Kris, 1954, p.27). Isabel 
Knight described the “embarrassment” of “psychoanalytic traditionalists” and the 
uneasiness of “humanist sympathizers” in front of “a document at once so dense and so 
cryptic” (Knight, 1984, 340). 
 
The strangeness generated by the reading of this text comes partly from its formalism, 
which can appear out of date. This anachronism plays at two levels. The commentaries 
on these two types of anachronisms have established two main justifications for Freud’s 
renunciation of the Project. The first is that the neurological machinery imagined by Freud 
rests on scientific theories of his time. Freud’s intention that is expressed at the very 
beginning of the Project: “to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science” (Freud, 
1950[1895], p.295), inscribes the text in the physiological perspective of the Helmholtz 
school. The “oath” of this positivist movement, that developed itself, against vitalism, 
from the 1860’s onwards in German speaking universities, was summarized by Du Bois-
Reymond as “to put in power this truth: No other forces than the common physical 
chemical ones are active within the organism” (Du Bois-Reymond, 1927). Thus, the 
                                                        
16 See Freud, 1914b; 1925[1924]b. 
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Project combines an energetic approach with the anatomical discovery of the neurone that 
had just been introduced by Waldeyer in 1891.  
 
The anachronism of the scientific knowledge on which Freud developed his text is at the 
basis of the first justification for the failure of the Project: “Freud had realized that the 
current state of neuroscientific knowledge was such in 1895 that his physiological and 
anatomical speculations were in fact pseudoscientific explanations and -ironically- that he 
was on far more solid ground scientifically if he confined himself to a psychological 
language” (Solms, 1998, p.7). This idea could be named the ‘positivist explanation’. It 
supposes that if, at the time of Freud, “the serious limitations of the neuropsychology” 
justified abandoning the Project, the progress of neuroscience would make the working of 
the mind accessible to physical methods.  
 
In other words, there is nothing structural in the impossibility of the Project, it is on the 
contrary just a matter of timing: one day the advance of neuroscience would overcome 
this impossibility. Moreover the hypothesis put forward by Mark Solms and more 
generally by the whole neuro-psychoanalytic movement is that such a day has now 
arrived: the “neuroscience of the mind has developed to such an extent in the decades 
since Freud’s death in 1939 that the situation that he confronted in 1895 has now 
reversed itself” (Ibid., 1998, p.9). Thus neuro-psychoanalysis presents itself as the 
continuation of Freud’s Project: psychoanalysis would have suffered from a centennial 
confinement and the time of its return to natural sciences would have come (Stora, 
2006). 
 
The second anachronism within Freud’s work is the feeling that the Project is a pre-
analytic draft and that at this stage Freud’s models were more physiological and 
neurological than psychological. It is this impression that Janet Malcom expressed when 
she described the Project as Freud’s “strenuous, doomed effort to give a physiological 
source to the psychological phenomena he was discovering” (Malcom, 1981, p.26). In his 
introduction to The Interpretation of Dreams, James Strachey expressed a similar opinion, 
describing the Project as “elaborate physiological explanations” and explained how, as 
time passed, Freud’s “interest was gradually diverted from neurological and theoretical 
on to psychological and clinical problems” (Strachey, 1953, p.xviii). Isabel Knight has 
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described this view as the “orthodox opinion” of Freud’s Project (Knight, 1984, p.355, 
fn.2).  
 
Such a reading of the Project as a somehow ‘pre-Freudian’ text leads to the second 
justification for the giving up of the draft, this being the idea that the study of the psyche 
exceeds the frame of naturalistic science: “the Project stands as the greatest effort Freud 
ever made to force a mass of psychical facts within the framework of a quantitative 
theory, and as the demonstration by way of the absurd that the content exceeds the 
frame” (Ricœur, 1970, p.73). This idea could be named the ‘hermeneutic explanation’. 
Like the positivist standpoint, this explanation identifies that the objects studied in the 
text exceed the conceptual framework through which they are described. However, 
unlike the positivist explanation the hermeneutic view supposes that the excess of 
psychological phenomena within a naturalistic framework is structural, so that no 
progress of neuroscience could compensate for it. In other words, and paraphrasing the 
title of one of Paul Ricoeur’s chapters, the impossibility of the Project is the impossibility 
of “an energetics without hermeneutics” (Ibid., p. 69). 
 
The difficulty for Freud’s positivist commentators arises from the fact that they have to 
justify Freud’s departure from the language of naturalistic science. Against their view, I 
think that this departure is not only due to the limitation of nineteenth century 
neuroscience. Moreover, I would like to defend the idea that already in the Project, Freud 
“both preserves and overthrows the language of naturalistic sciences” (Friedman and 
Alexander, 1983, p.304). Indeed, under the appearance of the energetic and neuronal 
model developed in the Project, Freud’s metapsychology already appears. To use Paul-
Laurent Assoun’s formulation: “the neuronal model that is here developed is already 
transformed into a metapsychology” (Assoun, 2009 b p.502, my translation). 17 
 
The uneasiness of the hermeneutic commentators towards this text is due to the fact that 
it forces them to acknowledge the naturalistic roots of Freud’s theory and, therefore, they 
are tempted to reject it from the Freudian corpus, as if Freud’s giving it up was evidence 
that the Project was a theoretical dead end. Against this view, I propose that the 
impossibility of the Project is a fertile impossibility. In a way, Freud’s main discovery in 
                                                        
17 “C’est bien en effet un modèle ‘neuronique’ qui est là developpé, mais déjà  ‘méta-psychologisé’”.  
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writing this draft was its very impossibility: the discovery that some empirical 
psychological phenomena resist a verbal formalisation. Freud’s metapsychology will be a 
continual work in progress trying to describe those phenomena and therefore the Project 
in its impossibility can be read as precursory of the whole metapsychological research. 
 
My aim is to locate these phenomena and to understand how they resist formalisation. I 
hope this reading of Freud will clarify the genesis of a metapsychological model of the 
unconscious, a model that differs from either the positivist or hermeneutic model of the 
unconscious. Hence, I would like to develop a third explanation for Freud’s 
abandonment of the Project that would follow neither framework. This explanation rests 
on the premise that to identify the central problem raised by the Project as, “the nature of the 
relationship between the brain and the mind” (Solms, 1998, p.1) is a reductionist reading of the 
text. More than that, the Project is a text that describes the experience of hysteria, of 
obsessions and also the experience of dreams.  
 
Freud was certainly not the only one “to attempt to make use of the quite recent 
discoveries of anatomical science and the emergent physiology of the nervous system in 
an ambitious synthesis” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.55). Thus, for instance, Helmoltz’s 
former assistant, Wilhelm Wundt published in 1874, Fundamentals of Physiological Psychology 
(Wundt, 1874) and in 1894, Sigmund Exner von Ewarten published his Outline of a 
Physiological Explanation of Psychical Phenomena (Exner, 1894). However, the specificity of 
Freud’s approach came from the fact that his intention in the writing of the Project was 
also to give an account of neuropsychotic disorders. As he wrote to Fliess on the 25th of 
May 1895: 
 
I am tormented by two aims: to examine what shape the theory of mental 
functioning takes if one introduces quantitative considerations, a sort of 
economics of nerve forces; and, second, to peel off from psychopathology a 
gain for normal psychology. Actually, a satisfactory general conception of 
neuropsychotic disturbances is impossible if one cannot link it with clear 
assumptions about normal mental processes. (in Masson, 1985, p.129) 
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Freud identified hallucinatory thoughts from the clinical observation of hysteria. 
Through a theory of the ego and the so-called theory of the “hysterical proton pseudos” 
(Freud, 1950[1895], p.352), Freud tried to formalize these hallucinatory thoughts. 
 
What is at stake in Freud’s Project is not only an attempt “to create a model of mind that 
allowed for the psychic causation of illness” (Makari, 2008, p.64) but also to discover a 
form of writing to describe ideas that cause psychic illness. Hence, the strangeness 
triggered by the reading of the Project could come not only from its anachronism but also 
more fundamentally from the strangeness of the phenomena it tries to describe – or 
more precisely from the fact that those phenomena resist formalisation: an awkwardness of 
the verbal language that fails to formalize hallucinatory thoughts.18 
 
From Breuer to Fliess 
 
André Green has argued that when Freud “decided to contact Fliess in order to work 
with him (…) he thought of dividing the task to be accomplished: he would take care of 
the psychological aspects of the mind, expecting that Fliess would provide the 
neurobiological counterpart. He then became aware of Fliess's misunderstanding of his 
own hypotheses, and had to write a paper of his own to explain to Fliess what he 
expected from him. And that was the reason for the Project” (Green, 2001, p.16). If Freud 
started the Project in order to clarify his hypotheses to Fliess, it was also a way to liberate 
himself from his collaboration with Breuer.  
 
Isabel Knight has convincingly shown that the Project “was provoked by Freud’s 
dissatisfaction with the theoretical chapter in Studies on Hysteria, a section written by his 
reluctant collaborator, Josef Breuer” (Knight, 1984, p.340). Already, in the preface to the 
first edition of Studies on Hysteria, the authors mentioned that in the book “at some points 
divergent and indeed contradictory opinions are expressed”, which “arises from the 
natural and justifiable differences between the opinion of two observers who are agreed 
upon the facts and their basic reading of them, but who are not invariably at one in their 
interpretations and conjectures” (Freud and Breuer, 1893-1895, pp.xxix-xxx). For the 
                                                        
18 This anxiety of language as it confronts the hallucinatory, could in fact be one of the sources at the 
origin of the uncanny. Hence, the ‘uncanniness’ attributed by some to psychoanalysis could come from the 
fact that it puts the investigation of hallucinatory thoughts through verbal language at the core of its 
research.   
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sake of my argument, I wish to explore the sources of Freud’s and Breuer’s collaboration 
and the nature of their disagreement. 
 
In 1886, Freud had returned from Paris and had become the Viennese representative of 
Charcot’s ideas about hysteria, hypnosis and psychopathology. That same year, Hyppolite 
Bernheim (Professor of Medicine from the provincial city of Nancy in France) published 
a book called On Suggestion and its Therapeutic Application in which he challenged Charcot’s 
view on hysteria and hypnotism. Charcot attributed hypnosis to neural dysfunctions: a 
physiological phenomenon. On the contrary, in his book, Bernheim proposed a 
psychological explanation for hypnosis. According to Bernheim, hypnotism exaggerated 
a common property of psychological life, the one of suggestion: an idea introduced into 
the brain of the hypnotized by an external influence is then accepted by the subject as 
though it had arisen spontaneously. In 1888, Freud translated this book. In his preface, 
Freud adopts a balanced view of the dispute, and sides with neither Charcot nor 
Bernheim. He defends the idea that hysteria must be based on something other than 
mere suggestion but he also takes his distance from ‘grand hypnotisme’, the phenomena 
described by Charcot in the case of hypnotized hysterical patients. 
 
When Freud settled in Vienna as a specialist in nervous disorders the two main 
therapeutic tools he had at his disposal were electrotherapy and hypnotism. He soon 
realised the complete uselessness of electric treatment in regards to curing nervous 
disorders and focused on hypnotism. Freud wrote in An Autobiographical Study: “in the 
first years of my activity as a physician my principal instrument of work, apart from 
haphazard and unsystematic psychotherapeutic methods, was hypnotic suggestion” 
(Freud, 1925[1924]b, p.17). However, Freud makes clear that: “from the very first I made 
use of hypnosis in another manner, apart from hypnotic suggestion. I used it for 
questioning the patient upon the origin of his symptom, which in his waking state he 
could often describe only very imperfectly or not at all” (Ibid., p.19). Freud had learned 
this second way to use hypnosis from Breuer. Breuer made use of it within his cathartic 
method, which consisted in helping the patient under hypnosis to remember and even to 
relive in a hallucinatory manner certain traumatic events. This allowed the discharge, or 
abreaction, of the pathogenic affects attached to the memory of the trauma.  
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In his use of hypnosis, Freud encountered obstacles. First, he was unable to hypnotize 
many of his patients: “The percentage of cases amenable to somnambulism was very 
much lower in my experience than what Bernheim reported” (Freud, 1893-1895, p.108). 
Secondly, Freud realised that therapeutic success obtained through hypnosis does not 
last. In fact, the success lasts only as long as the patient is under the influence of the 
physician: “even the most brilliant results were liable to be suddenly wiped away if my 
personal relation with the patient became disturbed” (Freud, 1925[1924]b, p.27). When 
the suggestion of the doctor disappears, the patient falls again under the spell of a more 
antique and a more rooted suggestion, and the symptoms reappear. 
 
This antique suggestion is that of infantile sexuality, which the case of Anna O. had 
already demonstrated. Recalling the end of Anna O’s cure, Freud specified: “over the 
final stage of this hypnotic treatment there rested a veil of obscurity, which Breuer never 
raised for me; and I could not understand why he had so long kept secret what seemed 
to me an invaluable discovery instead of making science the richer by it” (Ibid., pp.20-21) 
Freud explained what the “veil of obscurity” was in a letter to Stefan Zweig of 1932: “the 
evening of the day that all her symptoms had been brought under control, Breuer found 
her confused and writhing with abdominal cramps. Asked what was the matter she 
replied, ‘Now comes Dr. Breuer’s child’”. At this point, adds Freud, Breuer had “the key 
in his hand” but “he dropped it” (In Gay, 2006, p.67). Anna O’s unconscious phantasy 
of being impregnated by her father, which had previously been expressed through her 
symptoms, found another way to express itself in the relationship with Breuer. In the 
same way, Freud described how an experience with a hysterical patient showed him “in 
the crudest light” what he had long suspected: 
 
It related to one of my most acquiescent patients, with whom hypnotism had 
enabled me to bring about the most marvellous results, and whom I was 
engaged in relieving of her suffering by tracing back her attacks of pain to 
their origins. As she woke up on one occasion, she threw her arms round my 
neck. (…) I was modest enough not to attribute the event to my own 
irresistible personal attraction, and I felt that I had now grasped the nature of 
the mysterious element that was at work behind hypnotism. (Freud, 
1925[1924]b, p.27) 
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Thus, the secret of hypnosis was hidden in what Freud would later conceptualise 
under the term of transference. The patient accepts the suggestion of the physician 
only because this suggestion of the present allows the patient to reproduce a 
suggestion of the past: that of infantile sexuality. Breuer was incapable of facing the 
transference in its crudely infantile sexual form. In his introduction to Studies on 
Hysteria, Strachey has stressed that this “chief difference of opinion” between Freud 
and Breuer was: “the part played by sexual impulses in the causation of hysteria” 
(Strachey, 1955, p.xxv). Freud recalled how when he “began more and more 
resolutely to put forward the significance of sexuality in the aetiology of neuroses,” 
Breuer “was the first to show the reaction of distaste and repudiation” (Freud, 
1914b, p.12).  
 
Behind the question of the role played by infantile sexuality in the hysterical 
symptom, what is at stake is an understanding of neurosis as an abnormal 
physiological state, against neurosis as a psychical conflict. Freud explained how 
Breuer “preferred what might be called a physiological theory”: abnormal hypnoid 
mental states would lead to the abnormality of hysteria. Freud on the other hand did 
not appeal to abnormality but was inclined to suspect the existence of psychical 
conflicts “such as are to be observed in normal life” (Freud, 1925[1924], p.23). 
Hence Freud summarized the divergence as: “a case of ‘hypnoid hysteria’ versus 
‘neuroses of defence’” (Ibid., p.23). 
 
By writing to Fliess, Freud was making contact with someone who recognised the 
importance of sexual aetiology and in this way covertly went against Breuer, who 
had fled from this idea. It is perhaps worth noticing that Freud’s intellectual 
transference was mingled with a therapeutic one, as Fliess became Breuer’s 
successor not only emotionally and intellectually but also as Freud’s physician. In 
April 1894 after a medical crisis, Freud favoured “Fliess’s diagnosis of nicotine 
poisoning” over Breuer’s suggestion “of myocarditis” and this “episode, which 
Freud experienced as life-threatening, contributed to the transfer of his trust from 
Breuer to Fliess” (Knight, 1984, p.342). 
 
Hence, I agree with Knight when she writes that the Project was “a suppressed 
response to the theory of hysteria presented by Josef Breuer in his and Freud’s joint 
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work” (Knight, 1984, p.340) and I would argue that this response can be articulated 
around two points: 
 
- The existence of divided mental processes that can lead to neuroses of 
defence. 
- The importance played by sexual ideas in pathological mental conflicts. 
 
In his manuscript, Freud developed the first of these two points through a model of 
the mental apparatus, and the second around the so-called theory of the hysterical 
proton pseudos. 
 
A Memory Without Objects 
 
The Project contains the first Freudian map of a divided psychical life. The originality 
of the model developed in the Project is to describe the subject in conflict through 
the language of natural science: a language that knows only energy (Q) and matter 
(the neurone). Thus, by “tracing all the qualities of our sensations back to external 
quantities” the path followed by natural science would be the exact reverse of the one 
operated by the nervous system, which “consists of contrivances for transforming 
external quantity into quality” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.309). This first model of the 
psychical apparatus is made of three systems of neurones. Neurones that compose 
the three systems are the same entities: they don’t differ in their essence; they are 
morphologically or histologically equivalent.  
 
The difference of functioning between the neurones of these three systems comes 
from the way they facilitate the passage of energy. Even more precisely, the 
difference comes from the quantity of energy to which their positioning in the 
nervous system exposes them: “A difference in their essence is replaced by a 
difference in the environment to which they are destined” (Ibid., p.304). The system 
ϕ (phi) is the system that serves for perception, its neurones are permeable: they 
offer no resistance to the passage of external energy. The system ψ (psy) is the 
system of memory, its neurones are impermeable “loaded with resistance, and 
holding back” the passages of energy, in such a way that “memory is represented by the 
facilitations existing between ψ the neurones” (Ibid., p.300). The system ω (omega) 
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describes the qualitative aspect of consciousness, its neurones are filled with the 
minimum amount of energy and are incapable of receiving flux of energy but they 
are sensitive to the period of the passages of energies in the two other systems.19 
 
Starting from the idea that there is no difference in essence between the neurones, 
but that only the facilitation of energy allows a representation of the different mental 
systems, Jacques Derrida proposed in Freud and the Scene of Writing, what seems to 
me, a deeply original and fruitful reading of the Project. Derrida noticed that the 
hypothesis of facilitation “is remarkable as soon as it is considered as a metaphorical 
model and not as a neurological description”(Derrida, 1978[1967], p.252) 20 . If, 
according to Derrida, the facilitation metaphor “is remarkable” it is because its 
models are “borrowed not from spoken language or from verbal forms, nor even 
from phonetic writing, but from a script which is never subject to, never exterior 
and posterior to, the spoken word” (Ibid., p.249). To describe memory as an 
interplay of facilitations existing between neurones is a metaphor that indicates a 
form of writing that “makes what we believe we know under the name of writing 
enigmatic” (Ibid., p.250). This writing is enigmatic because it is made of traces.  
 
Derrida distinguished the sign and the trace. He understood the sign to be the 
element of a nomenclature: an object that classifies meaning and which is observable 
in itself, in its essence. This idea of the sign is at the basis of Derrida’s attack against 
structuralism. At the beginning of Of Grammatology, Derrida argues that by using the 
sign to reach objectivity, structuralism limits “the sense of being within the field of 
presence” under “the domination of a linguistic form” (Derrida, 1976[1967], p.23). 
The essence of the trace, on the other hand, cannot be exposed because it finds its 
origin in differences: the trace appears in the differences between objects. The 
                                                        
19 The “ω neurones are incapable of receiving Qή, but that instead they appropriate the period of the 
excitation and that this state of theirs of being affected by period while they are filled with the minimum of 
Qή is the fundamental basis of consciousness” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.310). 
 
20 ‘Facilitation’ is the translation found in Freud’s Standard Edition for the word ‘Bahnung’. In Freud and 
the scene of writing Derrida’s translation of ‘Bahnung’ in French is «frayage ». To translate Derrida’s «frayage » 
Alan Bass used the word ‘breaching’. According to Alan Bass “Derrida’s translation of Bahnung” in 
frayage “has an idiomatic connection to pathbreaking in the expression, se frayer un chemin. ‘Breaching’ is 
clumsy, but it is crucial to maintain the sense of the force that breaks open a pathway, and the space 
opened by this force; thus, ‘breaching’ must be understood here as a shorthand for these meanings.” (Bass, 
1978, p.426) I will myself remain faithful to the translation of the Standard Edition apart from when I am 
quoting Bass’ translation of Derrida.   
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nature of these objects, in which the trace appears, then becomes almost contingent 
and secondary. Derrida invented the concept of archi-trace precisely to stress that 
the trace could not be reduced to an empirical system of notation.  
 
In Derrida’s reading of the Project the cathected neurone corresponds to the sign. Ideally, 
the cathected neurone could be observed under the microscope as an empirical reality. 
The trace however could never be observed because there is no “pure facilitation” 
without difference. Memory is constituted by the facilitation between the cathected 
neurones, but facilitation without difference would be “insufficient for memory”: “An 
equality of resistance to” facilitation “would eliminate any preference in the choice of 
itinerary. Memory would be paralyzed. It is the difference between” facilitations “which 
is the true origin of memory, and thus of the psyche” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.252).  
 
Approaching the question of memory from another perspective the philosopher Clément 
Rosset has reached very similar conclusions. He pointed out that to forget is not the 
disappearance of a memory but rather a mental state in which each memory appears 
undifferentiated - in the terminology of the Project: an equality of resistance to facilitation. 
In such a way, Rosset has argued, that it would be impossible to distinguish between a 
state of total amnesia and a state of total reminiscence (Rosset, 1977, p.18-20). 
 
The enigmatic writing of the psyche uses a “script” that cannot be observed, that does 
not have an essence, in as much as “différance is not an essence” (Derrida, 1978[1967], 
p.255). Différance is a neologism coined by Derrida, “a witticism of Derrida” as Geoffrey 
Bennington has stated, since “in French the difference between “différence” and 
“différance” is only marked in writing, which thus takes a certain revenge on speech by 
obliging it to take its own written trace as its reference if, during a lecture for example, it 
wants to say this difference” (Bennington, 1993[1991], pp.70-71). It is a concept that 
comes from Derrida’s critical reading of structuralism: by accentuating the idea of 
difference, which is at the basis of the structuralist principle of the sign, Derrida 
challenged the reduction of the sign to phonetic language. Broadly speaking, Derrida’s 
différance designates “the non-signifying difference that traverses (…) produces and 
maintains those systems of opposition (signifier/signified, speech/writing, 
presence/absence, nature/culture, etc.)” (Wortham, 2010, p.37). Now, what seems 
crucial to me, is that by putting the concept of différance at the core of the memory 
apparatus described in the Project, Derrida allows us to perceive that already in Freud’s 
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early work there is the presence of a type of memory that is activated by non-signifying 
and non-observable objects. 
 
Thus, Derrida’s reading of the Project shows a model of mental life in which memory is 
not formed of empirical objects. It is not an archival storage facility as it is not the 
qualitative memory that is described in the Project, but a contrivance capable of registering 
traces. In reality, it would be the whole psyche that confronts us with non-qualitative, 
non-empirical objects since memory “is not a psychical property among others; it is the 
very essence of the psyche” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.252). Freud writes in the Project that 
the neurones from the system ψ “are the vehicles of memory and so probably of 
psychical process in general” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.300) and Derrida noticed that the 
representation of memory by the system ψ corresponds to the very nature of the psyche.  
 
This reading has a fundamental and somehow ironic consequence: in his attempt to 
furnish a natural science for the study of mental life, Freud discovered a description of 
the psyche that escaped natural science: instead of an anatomical chart (or of any form of 
observable nomenclature), a script of absences. When Freud turned the positivist light on 
in the darkroom of the psyche, the ghost of the trace has already escaped the room: “Life 
must be thought of as trace before Being may be determined as presence”(Derrida, 
1978[1967], p.252). The fact that the description of the psyche through facilitations led to 
a non-empirical ‘psychical writing’ constitutes, I believe, the great discovery of the Project 
and one of the main reasons for its abandonment. 
 
The young Derrida, who proposed this original reading of Freud’s Project in Writing and 
Difference, is in fact a reader of a very peculiar type. Derrida’s first works are a series of 
critical close readings. In Of Grammatology, Derrida conceptualised this form of close 
reading under the name ‘deconstruction’. In his reading, Derrida does not adopt the 
position of the philosopher who judges from the outside the epistemological value of 
disciplines that would be in the ignorance of their metaphysical premises. Rather, as 
pointed out by Patrice Maniglier (2011), Derrida reads in order to prolong the elements 
from a text that operate beyond an organisation of knowledge described as ‘metaphysics 
of presence’.  
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The metaphysics of presence are those theoretical systems that think in two moments: 
first, a beginning that is the presence of an experience in the mind, and secondly a sign 
that represents this experience in its absence and which is necessarily derived from a 
devalued sense of appearance and is deceptive with respect to the first.21 These systems 
imply a linear conception of time in which past, present, future are fixed categories and 
in which logical connections are irreversible. Derrida deconstructs Saussure’s phonocentrsim 
by prolonging in Saussure’s text his definition of language in terms of difference; he 
deconstructs Husserl’s demand for presence by prolonging in Husserl’s texts his thought 
of ideality in terms of repeatability and he deconstructs Freud’s neurological fable by 
prolonging in the Project Freud’s model of memory in terms of facilitations. 
 
Patrice Maniglier has identified Chapter two from Of Grammatology as the paradigmatic 
example of Derrida’s deconstruction. This chapter is in fact a critical commentary on 
Chapter six of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (CGL) and the is 
considered responsible for the shift from “structuralism to post-structuralism, from a 
philosophy of the structures to a philosophy of the differences” (Maniglier, 2011, p.371). 
I think it is enlightening to establish a parallel between Derrida’s reading of the Project and 
his reading of the Course in General Linguistics. These two texts share many similarities. 
Freud and Saussure belonged to exactly the same generation as the first was born in 1856 
and the second in 1857. Like Freud, who received through Brücke the positivist training 
of the Helmholtz school, Saussure was trained in Leipzig by the neogrammarians whose 
ambition was to transform the study of language into a natural science based on 
observation and induction.  
 
Like Freud’s Project, Saussure’s Course was, for its author, an impossible text: it was 
published posthumously from materials compiled out of lectures Saussure had given 
between the years 1906 and 1911 at the University of Geneva. I believe that it is the 
impossibility of these two texts that motivated Derrida’s reading. He saw in it an 
philosophical escape, a major disruption in the ontological discourse. It was perhaps the 
                                                        
21  In the book he wrote in collaboration with Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington proposed this elegant 
definition of the metaphysics of presence: “The metaphysics of presence think in two (logical and often 
historical) moments: presence first, of the world to a gaze, of a consciousness to its own inspection, of a 
meaning to a mind, of life to itself, of a breast to a mouth; absence next – the world veiled, consciousness 
astray, nonsense, death, debauchery, language, weaning. By thinking the second moment as derived with 
respect to the first, one returns, if only in thought, the complex to the simple, the secondary to the 
primary, the contingent to the necessary. This is the very order of reason and meaning of the logos” 
(Bennington, 1993[1991], pp. 17-18).       
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most radical shift away from Plato’s ontology, as Patrice Maniglier has argued: “not 
because it gives up the ontological plan but on the contrary because it splits the notion of 
Being” from the one of presence, “to identify it with the one of variance” (Maniglier, 
2011, p.385, my translation).22  
 
Experiences produced by a scientific approach to subjectivity raise new epistemological 
problems. Studies on language or on the psyche produce new sorts of signs that cannot 
be apprehended within the frames of the Weltanschauungen: signs in search of causality and 
in search of meanings. Thus, the Project and the Course - two research studies that took 
their means of investigation (the psyche and language) as an object of study - reveal 
contents that escape the logos. A significant difference however, is that whilst Saussure 
never ceased resisting this escape, Freud, through his metapsychology, found a way to 
explore it. He transformed the impossibility of the Project into Chapter seven of The 
Interpretation of Dreams. 
 
Derrida showed that Freud’s description of facilitations of energy between the ψ (psy) 
neurones revealed that the psyche is constituted by correlations of differences. At this 
point, my aim is not to discuss the correctness of this idea but rather the problem that it 
raises. Thus, if at the core of Freud’s theory of the psyche – as it appeared in the Project – 
there is a “psychic writing” that resists direct observation and any form of nomenclature, 
in other words, that resists the classical logos; my question is, how did Freud formalize 
this in his text so as to draw a portrait of a being whose memory is represented by the 
facilitations existing between neurones? This question is not just relevant for the model 
of the psyche put forward in the Project. In fact, I think that this problem will reappear 
with each new model Freud will discover for the psyche. 
 
I would like to propose that, at the stage of the Project, Freud described ideas that operate 
beyond the logos through a theory of the ego and the so-called “hysterical proton 
pseudos” (Freud, 1950[1895], p. 352). The ego is described as the instance that incarnates 
the logos and the proton pseudos are the ideas that deceive the ego. Thus begins the 
tragic destiny of the ego in Freud’s ontology: that “poor creature” which from the Project 
                                                        
22 “Si renversement du platonisme il y a jamais eu, celui-ci est peut-être le plus radical: non pas parce qu’il 
renonce au projet ontologique, mais au contraire parce qu’il sépare la notion d’être de celle d’invariant, 
pour l’identifier à celle de variance.” 
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to The Ego and the Id “owes to too many masters” (Freud, 1923, p.56) and is menaced by 
dangers from both the external and internal world. 
 
I is an Other… 
 
Jean Laplanche has emphasized that the Project was: “the great Freudian text on the ego, a 
far more focused consideration of the question than any of Freud’s subsequent writings, 
including The Ego and the Id, would be” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.54). Indeed, the Project 
is the foundation of a Freudian theory of the ego because for the first time it is defined 
as the instance that distinguishes external perceptions from internal ideas. The ego allows 
the mental apparatus to recognize the object wished-for as not real: “We have brought 
forward the hypothesis that, during the process of wishing, inhibition by the ego brings 
about a moderated cathexis of the object wished-for, which allows it to be cognized as 
not real” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.327). 
 
The fruitfulness of this model, what “animates” it and “makes it something different 
from a purely speculative construct is the clinical experience of a still emerging 
psychoanalysis and the rather strange phenomena it observes” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], 
p.55). Freud identified in hysteria, obsessions and dreams, situations in which the mental 
apparatus is not capable of differentiating between what is perceived and what is wished 
for. In those situations the ego is unable to cope with a hallucinatory mode of thinking. 
It is crucial to notice that already at the stage of the Project, Freud did not conceive 
hallucinatory processes as pathological manifestations. These psychic processes “are daily 
presented to us during sleep” and moreover “the pathological mechanisms which are 
revealed in the psychoneuroses by the most careful analysis have the greatest similarity to 
dream-processes” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.336). 
 
By abandoning Charcot’s “position as master-hypnotist to allow himself to be taught by 
the patient’s knowledge” (Vives, 2012, p.873) and by replacing Breuer’s pathological 
hysterical ego by an ego in conflict, as it can be observed in normal life, Freud took the 
ego out of its rational temple. Ola Andersson has shown that during the year 1895 – the 
year he wrote the drafts that would become the Project – Freud focused his concern on 
“the relation between health and disease in the field of neurosis” and discovered against 
the doctrines of heredity and degeneration that “the psychic processes in his patients 
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were not, in principle, different from those of healthy persons” (Andersson, 1962, p.193-
194).  
 
The appearance of the term “psychoneurosis” in Freud’s vocabulary is an element of this 
discovery: Freud borrowed it from Krafft-Ebing who had employed it for many years 
“to designate neurotic affections in persons with no (…) ‘hereditary taint’”(Ibid., p.194). 
The ego of the healthy and that of hysterical subjects are both deceived, only a matter of 
degree differentiate them: pathology makes things larger and coarser and so it can draw 
our attention to normal conditions which would otherwise have escaped us. Years later 
Freud would write about “the reverential awe which peoples of the past felt for the 
insane. They have turned away from external reality, but for that very reason they know 
more about internal, psychical reality and can reveal a number of things to us that would 
otherwise be inaccessible to us” (Freud, 1933[1932]a, p.59). 
 
Freud described an “ego” that is not threatened by madness but by memories. Hence, 
what characterizes a pathological state ceases to be heredity or degeneration but rather 
the intensity of the conflict between the ego and a certain type of reminiscence. This 
conception of the ego is in fact a challenge for “the boundary between reason and 
madness that had been established by the constitution of modern scientific rationality” 
(Whitebook, 1999, p.34). Once again, we find in the reading of the Project an example of 
“Freud’s relationship with the natural sciences”: “ironical at best and, at times, even 
‘subversive’”(Friedman and Alexander, 1983, p.303). Starting from the honest attempt to 
describe psychology in a scientific language, Freud gave birth to a concept of the ego 
closer to Rimbaud’s “I is an other”23 than the Cartesian cogito. A concept of the ego, 
which “restored, in medical thought, the possibility of a dialogue with unreason….” 
(Foucault, 1965[1961], p.198). 
 
The model of the ego elaborated by Freud in the Project comes from the clinical 
observation of its failure. Dreams, because of the “unloading” of the ego, or hysteria, 
because “the ego would come in action too late” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.358) give rise to 
ideas of a hallucinatory nature. In the Project, Freud used a few names to designate those 
hallucinatory ideas: “excessively intense ideas”[überstarke Vorstellung] (Ibid., p.295); 
                                                        
23 From a letter written by Arthur Rimbaud to Georges Izambard dated the 13th of May 1871 and which 
constitutes the first of the so called Lettres du voyant (Rimbaud, 2009, p.454). 
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“imaginary idea” [Phantasievorstellung] (Ibid., p.325); and “hallucination” (Ibid., p.339). 
Freud inferred from the hallucinatory nature of the dream “that primary wishful cathexis, too, 
was of a hallucinatory nature” (Ibid., p.340). Thus, through the “experience of satisfaction” 
Freud made of the hallucinatory mode of thinking a sort of ontological bedrock.  
 
The initial way used by the mental apparatus to face a need is the wishful activation of 
the memory trace attached to the object that satisfied that need. In the same way the 
primary defence against an experience of pain is a form of negative hallucination: the 
“hostile mnemic image” attached to the object that was perceived as the cause of the 
pain “is regularly abandoned by its cathexis as soon as possible” (Ibid., p.322).24 At first, 
the endogenous stimuli are dealt with through “wishful activation”, which “produce the 
same thing as a perception – namely a hallucination.” (Ibid., p.319) Indeed, the ω (omega) 
neurones, which constitute the qualitative aspect of consciousness, furnish the same 
indication of reality for the object perceived in a hallucinatory manner and for an 
external perception:  
 
If the wished-for object is abundantly cathected, so that it is activated in a 
hallucinatory manner, the same indication of discharge or of reality follows 
too as in the case of external perception (Ibid., p.325).  
 
As Laplanche noticed: “the problem of hallucinations is the fact that there is already too 
much reality in the system” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.61). In fact, rather than a problem, 
this surplus of reality constitutes “the mainspring of the psychical mechanism” since it is 
the non-coincidence between these two forms of reality that “gives the impetus for the 
activity of thought, which is terminated once more with their coincidence” (Freud, 
1950[1895], p.328). 
 
In the Project, Freud provided an economical model for the hallucinatory mode of 
thinking. Freud distinguishes the primary function, which consists in bringing the level of 
energy in the neurones to zero, and the secondary function, that strives at maintaining a 
constant level of energy in the nervous system. The primary function is the outcome of a 
principle posited by Freud: the “principle of neuronal inertia” according to which 
                                                        
24 At this stage of his thinking, Freud is still describing a mental apparatus rather than the psychical 
apparatus he will describe in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams. In the former, Freud still did not 
have the concept of psychical reality and so did not distinguish the memory trace (or mnemic image) from 
the thing presentation that is created from this trace and which forms the atom of psychical reality. 
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“neurones tend to divest themselves” of energy (Ibid., p.296). The secondary function is 
an adaptation of the principle of neuronal inertia to “the exigencies of life”. Indeed, the 
survival of a living system whose energy would tend towards zero is hard to conceive. In 
order to think the actions necessary to its functioning, the nervous system must maintain 
a store of energy.  
 
It has been suggested that the secondary processes could be equated with the concept of 
homeostasis (Strachey, 1966, p.296, fn.1). The ego is “a group of neurones which is 
constantly cathected and thus corresponds to the vehicle of the store required by the 
secondary function” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.323): the ego is the instance that maintains the 
homeostasis of the nervous system. In the ψ (psy) neurones, psychical primary processes 
generate wishful cathexis to the point of hallucination. The ego is defined “as a network 
of cathected neurones” that “inhibit psychical primary processes” (Ibid., p.323-324).  
 
It is this inhibition that is described as psychical secondary process and by which the ego 
“makes possible a criterion for distinguishing between perception and memory” (Ibid., p.326). The ego 
operates a distinction between the ideas produced by a wishful psyche and perceptions 
from the external world. This crucial and vital function is a necessary condition for the 
functioning of rational thoughts: “The process of thought consists in the cathexis of ψ 
neurones accompanied by a change, brought about by side-cathexis from the ego”(Ibid., 
p.334). With some memories, however, the ego seems to fail in distinguishing between 
what is perceived and what is hallucinated. Freud named those memories: “the hysterical 
proton pseudos”. 
 
The Ontological Lies 
 
My hope in this part of my chapter will also be to show that it was through his attempt 
to understand the nature of ideas in which rationality gets lost that Freud would 
eventually redefine the concept of sexuality: a ‘polymorphously perverse’ sexuality built 
around infantile sexuality and which is at the core of psychical reality. 
 
In the second part of the Project, Freud tries to understand the nature of those memories 
that escape the control of the ego. According to him, what characterizes these 
reminiscences is sexuality. Some sexual reminiscences get around the ego defence 
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mechanisms and trigger in the mental apparatus pathological defences, in other words 
symptoms. Amongst the ideas that evoke a distressing affect in the ego, only sexual ideas 
seem to have the power to generate neurotic symptoms. What is this power contained in 
some sexual ideas? To answer this question, Freud proposed the theory of the proton 
pseudos.  
 
According to James Strachey, the term proton pseudos “occurs in Aristotle's Prior 
Analytics (…), a work dealing with the theory of the syllogism which was later included in 
what came to be called the Organon. The chapter deals with false premises and false 
conclusions, and the particular sentence asserts that a false statement is the result of a 
preceding falsity (‘proton pseudos’)” (Strachey, 1966, p.352, fn.1). Ola Andersson has shown 
that even though he had borrowed the term from Max Herz’s “critical psychiatry”, Freud 
had not been influenced by Herz’s views: “It seems likely that Freud found the 
conceptions of an “abuse” of normal psychic “mechanisms” and a “first lie” useful and 
illuminating for his own work, and on that account applied them quite apart from their 
framework in Herz’s reasoning” (Andersson, 1962, p.196-197). 
 
Proton pseudos could be translated from Greek into ‘first lies’. Andersson proposed that 
the “lie” was an indication of “the ‘false connection’ occurring between the affective 
state of the hysteric and the ‘symbol’ when a ‘sexual idea’ had been ‘repressed’” (Ibid., 
p.196). Indeed, at first glance the clinical exploration of hysteria showed that the 
connection between an idea and an affect appeared “(1) unintelligible, (2) incapable of being 
resolved by the activity of thought, (3) incongruous” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.348). Freud’s famous 
stroke of genius was to reveal, in the face of scientific prejudices, that what seemed 
unintelligible and incongruous – like the dream or the hysterical symptom – had its own logic, 
the logic of the primary process: “The pathological process is one of displacement, such as 
we have come to know in dreams – a primary process therefore” (Ibid., p.350). Hence, 
the logic of the hysterical lie would be that of the primary process.  
 
What excludes the hysterical lie from the secondary process, and therefore from the 
“process of thought”, is “the special psychical determinant from natural characteristic of 
sexuality” (Ibid., p.353). This natural characteristic of sexuality is the retardation of 
puberty. When he wrote the Project, Freud had not yet discovered infantile sexuality and 
so he assumed that “no sexual experiences produce any effect so long as the subject is 
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ignorant of all sexual feeling – in general, that is, till the beginning of puberty” (Ibid., 
p.333). In such a way that after puberty a sexual memory “arouses an affect which it did 
not give rise to as an experience” (Ibid., p.356). That some memories contain a hidden 
sexual charge constitutes the essence of the hysteric lie. On the 15th of October 1895, 
Freud had “revealed” to Fliess this “great clinical secret”: “Hysteria is the consequence 
of a presexual sexual shock” (Masson, 1985, p. 144). The proton pseudos is a sexual 
Trojan horse that deceives the control of the ego: ideas that “unexpectedly release 
unpleasure, and the ego only discovers this too late. It has permitted a primary process 
because it did not expect one” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.358). The power of the proton 
pseudos comes from the fact that they release a sexual affect similar to the one of an 
actual experience: the ego is not capable of distinguishing between what is perceived and 
what is hallucinated. Hence, the terrifying situation of the hysteric would be, that some 
ideas that are imprisoned in his inner life, act as an external sexual assailant. 
 
A way to understand the fact that Freud characterized the hysterical lie as proton, as a first 
lie could be that it is the primary process which produces those lies: “The retardation of 
puberty makes possible posthumous primary processes” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.359, my italics). 
Ideas produced by a primal mode of thinking disturb the process of thought. The 
hysteric is like a somnambulist whose waking thoughts are invaded by dream images: 
ideas of a hallucinatory kind barge in, in the middle of verbal ideas.25 As the proton 
pseudos are excluded from the process of thought, they are ideas that are not thought 
but enacted. With the proton pseudos, Freud described psychical presentations that 
escape the logos, ideas whose meaning escapes the mind but that are instead acted 
through the body, which becomes the scene of the hysteric’s private theatre.  
 
Precisely because of this theatricality of the symptom, hysterics have been accused of 
lying and many “thought that it was no disease at all but rather female subterfuge and 
fakery” (Makari, 2008, p.16). The other side of the same idea was to present hysteria as 
the only possible protest against patriarchy (Showalter, 1987). In fact from the angle of 
the hysterical proton pseudos, the first victim of the hysterical lie, or the one to whom 
the protests are addressed, is the hysteric himself. Indeed, as Jean Laplanche noticed, the 
proton pseudos is “something other than a subjective lie”, what is “at stake is a transition 
                                                        
25 “One shuts one's eyes and hallucinates; one opens them and thinks in words” (Freud, 1950[1895], p. 
339). 
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from the subjective to a grounding – perhaps even to a transcendental – dimension: in 
any event a kind of objective lie inscribed in the facts” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.34). 
The nature of the hysteric’s lie is ontological and it is the ontological nature of the proton 
pseudos that resolves the contradiction concealed in this term: the proton pseudos can be 
both lie and primary because it is inscribed in the psychic destiny of the subject.  
 
I believe that his hypothesis of a transcendental lie will reappear in Freud’s work with the 
notion of primal phantasies. This ontological dimension of the proton pseudos does not 
mean that hysteria is universal, but rather that the unconscious processes at stake in 
hysteria are universal. Juliet Mitchell has revealed how the “presence of male hysteria 
(along with an analysis of dreaming) enabled Freud to found psychoanalysis as a theory 
built on the observation of universally present unconscious processes (…) Through the 
awareness of male hysteria at the end of the nineteenth century it could be seen that the 
symptoms of hysteria were the writing large of ordinary and universal processes. The 
exaggeration of neuroses shows us the psychopathologies of everybody’s everyday life” 
(Mitchell, 2003, p.5). 
 
The ontological peculiarity of the proton pseudos rests on the nature of a psychical 
writing - a form of writing of the primary process made of facilitations - that lies to the 
metaphysics of presence in as much as it escapes it. The proton pseudos falls within this 
psychical writing: it is a form of memory that is not an archive and whose observation 
has always escaped, even the subject who owns it. A trace “that refers to an absolute past 
(…) because it obliges us to think a past that can no longer be understood in the form of 
a modified presence, as a present-past” (Derrida, 1976[1967], p.67). However, when he 
wrote the Project, Freud still believed in his neurotica: he held to the reality of the seduction 
scene, which was reawakened at puberty to produce a neurosis. He had not yet 
discovered the form of reality created by unconscious phantasies and their consequences, 
as beautifully summarized by Laplanche: “what is repressed is not the memory but the fantasy 
derived from it or subtending it” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.102). This is, I believe, the main 
reason for the impossibility of the text: the attempt to describe a trace as an archive. The 
tension of the Project exists because Freud had identified the strange nature of 
hallucinatory ideas that are the outcome of psychical reality but was obliged to translate 
them through the realm of material reality. 
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Conclusion: The Witch 
 
What is at stake in the shift from a representation of hysteria through the pictures taken 
at the Salpetrière, showing patients in all the postures of their delirium, to its 
representation through the diagram that Freud drew to illustrate the functioning of the 
proton pseudos (Freud 1950[1895], p.354, fig.16) – is Freud’s discovery that the bodily 
symptoms of hysteria were physical expressions of hallucinatory ideas. 
 
In the Project, Freud identified hallucinatory ideas that coexist with perceived ideas. In 
order to describe the functioning of those hallucinatory ideas, Freud proposed a model 
of the psyche: the system ψ whose functioning is enlightened by Derrida’s concept of 
trace. A psyche that is not made of objects-ideas observable in their positivity, but rather of 
facilitations-ideas, which exist only in their difference to other facilitations. It follows, that 
memory and the act of recollection is not the excavation of an archive but the 
transcription [Umschrift] of past facilitations from the activation of the present. It is from 
this understanding of memory that Freud’s concept of deferred action [Nachträglichkeit] 
stemmed and it is precisely this functioning that Freud described through the proton 
pseudos.  
 
The proton pseudos was, of course, a way to describe the seduction theory (or trauma 
theory as this hypothesis came to be called) but it also represented ideas that operate 
from an economical point of view beyond homoeostasis and from a descriptive point of 
view beyond self-presence. The hysteric lie would in fact be the expression of a more 
fundamental lie: the ontological lie of the psychic writing. This probably explains the 
universal character of hysteria: “every adolescent must carry the germ of hysteria within 
him” (Freud, 1950[1895], p.356) wrote Freud and what makes of hysteria “not a disease 
but the disease in its pure form, the one, which is nothing in itself but is likely to take the 
shape of every other disease” (Swain, 1994, p.53, my translation).26 Through this great 
plasticity of forms, the hysteric transcribes every other disease in the hallucinatory code 
of infantile sexuality, and in such a way that the hysteric continuously enacts the ideas 
that horrify him. Jacqueline Schaefer has compared this tragic destiny to that of the ruby: 
a stone that displays red, the only colour that it rejects (Schaefer, 1986).” 
                                                        
26 “L’hystérie n’est pas une maladie, elle est la maladie à l’état pur, celle qui n’est rien par elle-même mais 
susceptible de prendre la forme de toutes les autres maladies.”   
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“The mind of the hysterical patient is full of active yet unconscious ideas; all her 
symptoms proceed from such ideas”, Freud would write almost twenty years after the 
Project (Freud, 1912b, p.262). The failure of the Project resulted partly from the attempt to 
describe these active unconscious ideas in a model that ignored the dynamic 
unconscious. To speak in Derrida’s terms, the failure to represent a trace-idea in a topic 
made of signs-neurons. 
 
A few months after giving up his text, in a letter to Fliess dated the 13th of February 
1896, Freud coined the term metapsychology: “I am continually occupied with 
psychology – really metapsychology” (in Masson, 1985, p.172). Freud’s 
metapsychological endeavour will resume the question discovered in the Project: how to 
describe a form of psychical writing that operates beyond the logos? Freud will try to 
describe the ontological lie that the hysterics – that modern form of the witch – were 
enacting in their convulsions, in a kind of theoretical trance, which, enigmatically enough, 
he will name in one of his last texts, quoting Goethe’s Faust ‘the witch metapsychology’: 
“We can only say: ‘So muss denn doch die Hexe dran!’(We must call the Witch to our help 
after all!’)  - the Witch Meta-psychology” (Freud, 1937a, p.225). Hence, the other name of 
metapsychology is borrowed from a great literary work. Literature and metapsychology: 
two forms of knowledge alternative to the logos and the figure of the witch, who appears 
as the incarnation of the knowledge of hallucinatory processes as revealed by hysteria.   
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Chapter 4 
 
 
The Infantile Prophecy 
 
 
From the Hysterical Theatre to the Text of the Dream 
 
Serge Viderman wrote that, from a technical angle, “the discovery and the development 
of psychoanalysis was dominated by the attempt to recover memories through which the 
past could be reconstructed (Viderman, 1970, p.13, my translation)”.27 Along the path 
that led Freud from hypnosis to free association, the attempt to recover lost memories also 
incorporated Freud’s research to formalise them: to create a way to write memories. Indeed, I think 
that Freud’s technical discoveries were not only clinical but also formal: Freud invented 
new ways to write the psyche. Through the many forms that patients’ resistance took on, 
through the discovery of transference and through the impossibility of distinguishing 
between truth and fictional memories, Freud perceived that the faculty of memory did 
not operate like an archiving system28. By liberating his patients’ speech, Freud faced a 
memory whose functioning escaped the verbal means through which it expressed itself.  
 
This functioning raised obvious theoretical issues but also formal ones. I understand the 
Project’s failure as Freud’s discovery that the modes of thinking at the core of memory 
resist being transcribed into writing. The neurotic subject is suffering from this 
nonverbal memory, which to be understood, Freud had recognised, required a new 
psychology. Referring to the power of the hysterical unconscious memory, Freud wrote: 
“You see that the remainder of the problem lies once more in the field of psychology–
and, what is more, a psychology of a kind for which philosophers have done little to 
prepare the way for us” (Freud, 1896b, p.219). In this scientific communication, Freud 
named this new psychology of the unconscious: the “future psychology of the neuroses” (Ibid., 
p.219), but in the secrecy of his correspondence with Fliess, he had already forged the 
more esoteric name of metapsychology. 
 
                                                        
27 “L’histoire de la découverte et du développement de la psychanalyse est dominée théoriquement par la 
découverte de l’inconscient, techniquement par la récupération de la mémoire grâce à quoi le passé est 
reconstruit.”  
 
28 In his early psychoanalytic papers Freud thinks of resistance as a psychical force “opposed to the pathogenic 
ideas becoming conscious” (Freud, 1893-1895, p.268).  
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As the seduction theory was losing its theoretical capacity to describe the neurotic 
subject, it was gradually being replaced by a more ambitious ontological project: 
metapsychology. The iconic letter of the 21st of September 1897 – in which Freud 
announced to Fliess that he no longer believed in his neurotica – contains the shift from 
the one to the other: “In this collapse of everything valuable, the psychology alone has 
remained untouched. The dream [book] stands entirely secure and my beginnings of the 
metapsychological work have only grown in my estimation” (Masson, 1985, p.266). The 
seduction theory attributed the origin of neurosis to a real event, whereas 
metapsychology became Freud’s attempt to rethink the aetiology of neurosis within a 
universal question: the question of the genesis of memory. 
 
This “metapsychological work” would push Freud to hear the story associated with the 
symptom no longer as an archive but as the attempt to verbalize an unconscious wish. 
The hypothesis that neurotic symptoms are determined by psychical reality made of 
unconscious wishes allowed Freud to connect two of his fields of inquiry that hitherto 
seemed separate and independent: dreams and neurosis: like dreams, neurotic symptoms 
are wish fulfilments. In a letter dated the 19th of February 1899, Freud wrote to Fliess: 
“Not only dreams are wish fulfillments so are hysterical attacks. This is true of hysterical 
symptoms, but probably applies to every product of neurosis (…) Reality – wish 
fulfillments – it is from these opposites that our mental life springs” (Ibid., 1986, p.345). 
Thus, the study of dreams offers a new angle to both theorise and formalise 
psychoneuroses and the writing of a dream will become a new way to write the psyche. 
 
In his work on Freud’s self-analysis, Didier Anzieu pointed out that, even though “the 
field of psychopathology itself was becoming increasingly familiar to Freud, he did not 
know to what extent it overlapped the field of normal, general psychology (…). In order 
to clear up the problem, he needed to find a psychical phenomenon half way between 
the two fields which would enable him to establish how human beings move from a 
normal to a pathological state. He was becoming increasingly interested in a 
phenomenon that seemed to satisfy those requirements: the dream. The dream is at once 
a normal phenomenon (everyone has at least one dream every night) and a pathological 
phenomenon (the dream is a brief hallucination)” (Anzieu, 1986, p.124). The study of 
dreams was also a way to shift from a traumatic towards a metapsychological explanation 
of neurosis. 
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However, if the abandonment of the seduction theory is such an epistemological 
breakthrough, how must we understand the similarity between the proto-metapsychology 
put forward in the Project and the first metapsychology as it appeared in the last chapter 
of The Interpretation of Dreams? 
 
In his introductions to Freud’s writings, James Strachey pointed out that, the “general 
account of the working of the mind in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams still 
shows much resemblance to the Project” (Strachey, 1966, p. 292, fn.1). Strachey explained 
how the Project constitutes “a first approach to a coherent theory of dreams” 29  and, 
moreover, already gives “a clear indication of what is probably the most momentous of 
the discoveries given to the world in The Interpretation of Dreams-the distinction between 
the two different modes of mental functioning, the Primary and Secondary Processes” 
(Strachey, 1953, p.xv). The question I want to raise here is: what has changed between 
the Project and Chapter seven of the Traumdeutung? 30  
 
If the theoretical models described in these two texts share so many similarities, how is it 
that, on the one hand, Freud rejected the Project as a “kind of madness” and that later in 
his life “he seems to have forgotten it or at least never to have referred to it” (Strachey, 
1966, p.290) – when on the other hand, Chapter seven concluded a work that Freud 
described as “the most valuable” of all his discoveries, the outcome of an insight that 
“falls to one’s lot but once in a lifetime.”31 Through which evolutions in his thought and 
in his writing, has Freud transformed what appeared to him as an impossible text into a 
founding text, a ‘shibboleth’ of his theory? 
 
As noted by André Green, the answer to this question could not be univocal and the 
explanation of this evolution has to be found in a mix of “clinical, personal and 
                                                        
29 Strachey gives a list of the elements of Freud’s dream theory that are already in the Project: “(1) the wish-
fulfilling character of dreams, (2) their hallucinatory character, (3) the regressive functioning of the mind in 
hallucinations and dreams (…), (4) the fact that the state of sleep involves motor paralysis, (5) the nature of 
the mechanism of displacement in dreams and (6) the similarity between the mechanisms of dreams and of 
neurotic symptoms.” (Strachey, 1953, p.xv)   
  
30 For brevity’s sake, I will hereon refer to this key chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams merely as “Chapter 
seven”. 
 
31 Preface to the Third (Revised) English Edition written by Freud in 1931, S.E., 4, p. xxxii.  
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theoretical experiences” (Green, 1972, p.254, my translation).32 My aim in this chapter 
will not be to propose a general hypothesis to explain Freud’s evolution. Instead, I would 
like to propose a reading of Chapter seven in the light of the Project’s failure. I would like 
to show that behind the apparent continuity, what is at stake between these two texts is 
the emergence of a new question in Freud’s research: the question of the genesis and the 
formalism of the unconscious wish. I propose that it is through this question that in 
Chapter seven, Freud redefined his metapsychology as both a theoretical and formal 
endeavour. 
 
From a theoretical angle, Chapter seven is the birth of a new object of study. Rather than 
a memory perceived as an archive that would suffer from ‘unrepresentable’ traumatic 
experiences, the object of the first metapsychology will be that part of the psyche which 
can generate unconscious wishes. Thus, the scene of seduction is replaced, as a foundational 
experience, by the experience of satisfaction. The story of the symptom is not made of sexual 
ideas introduced by a familial object. Instead, the fiction of the symptom is built of 
hallucinatory sexual ideas created in the absence of the familial object. In the second part 
of this chapter, I will compare the experience of satisfaction as it is described in the 
Project and in Chapter seven. My aim will be to show that the experience of satisfaction in 
Chapter seven deals with a question that is absent from the Project: that of unconscious 
wishes formed of ideas that are inadmissible to consciousness. 
 
From a formal angle, the Traumdeutung corresponded to Freud’s attempt to transform 
images into a text: to make the visible readable – and also, to describe the psyche 
through a fiction. I believe that these two aspects were the main evolutions introduced in 
Chapter seven to the psychical writing that Freud had invented in the Project. 
 
The Emergence of a New Question 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will try to show how Freud’s repudiation of the 
seduction theory, as a general explanation for the aetiology of neuroses, led to the 
emergence of a new question. 
 
                                                        
32  “Il est clair que la réponse ne peut être univoque. Les plans s’enchevêtrent: expérience clinique, 
expérience personnelle, expérience théorique s’allient et se contrarient pour aboutir au grand œuvre.”  
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When he started describing the clinical work he was engaged in with his hysteric patients, 
Freud realised that the case histories he was writing, “read like short stories and that, as 
one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science” (Freud, 1893-1895, p.160). The 
reason for this, he argued, was not “any preference of his own” but rather “the nature of 
the subject”: the “intimate connection between the story of the patient’s suffering and 
the symptom of his illness” (Ibid., p.161). Hence, there is an “intimate connection” 
between the languages of the neurotic symptom and that of story telling. It is precisely 
this connection that Freud discovered when, on abandoning hypnosis as a way to obtain 
pathogenic recollections, he assured his patients that “they did know it” (Ibid., p.268). By 
travelling backwards into their past, “step by step, and always guided by the organic train 
of symptoms and of memories and thought aroused” (Freud, 1896a, p.151), Freud’s 
patients would try to remember the experiences that were at the origins of their 
symptoms.  
 
This origin, which Freud searched for in the memories of his patients, seemed to 
converge on one story: the story of “childhood scenes in which they were sexually 
seduced by some grown-up person”, with “female patients the part of seducer” being 
“almost always assigned to their father” 33 (Freud, 1925[1924], p.33-34). Freud would 
obtain from his neurotic patients, the same seduction story with such uniformity that “if 
the preconditions of these experiences” were not “always of the same kind” one could 
almost “believe that there were secret understandings between the various patients” 
(Freud, 1896b, p.205). In April 1896, Freud gave a lecture to the local Society for 
Psychiatry and Neurology in which he revealed his discovery: the solution to this 
psychiatric enigma, this “source of the Nile” that was the aetiology of hysteria, was in 
fact a story of a “surprising simplicity and uniformity”: “A passive sexual experience before 
puberty” (Freud, 1896a, p.152). 
 
Freud’s lecture was published the same year in the Wiener Klinische Rundschau and it 
subsequently appeared in the Standard Edition under the title The Aetiology of Hysteria 
(1896c). The reading of this paper helps to clarify what Freud meant by “seduction”. 
Indeed, the use of the term seduction can appear euphemistic or at least rather enigmatic. 
                                                        
33 Jean Schimek has stressed that in the published papers of the years 1896-1897 which describe the 
seduction theory, the “father does not play a major role, in fact is not even directly mentioned” (Schimek, 
1987, p.951). However in a letter of the 6th of December 1896, Freud clearly expressed to Fliess that, 
“heredity is seduction by the father” (in Masson, 1985, p. 212).     
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Thus, John Forrester starts his paper ‘Rape, Seduction, Psychoanalysis’ with this 
confession: “Around 1981, I began to ask myself the question: why did Freud 
characterise this theory by the term seduction rather than rape?” (Forrester, 1990, p.62). 
In fact, The Aetiology of Hysteria brings a clear answer to this question. It shows that 
Freud’s use of the term seduction designated the invasion of adult sexuality into the 
child’s life. However, this invasion is not necessarily a rape.  
 
From the eighteen cases that constituted his empirical material, Freud distinguished three 
kinds of invasions: first, the case of rapes “mostly practised on female children, by 
adults” (Freud, 1896b, p.208), secondly, a love relationship between an adult and a child 
and through which the adult “has initiated the child into sexual intercourse” (Ibid., p.208) 
and thirdly, “child-relationships proper–sexual relations between two children of 
different sexes” (Ibid., p.208). This last case would contradict the premise that Freud was 
still holding at the time, namely the absence of spontaneous infantile sexuality, but Freud 
specifies the reason for this “prematurely awakened libido”. It is caused by the fact that, 
“the boy - who, here too, played the part of the aggressor - had previously been seduced 
by an adult of the female sex” and it is under the pressure of this memory that, “he tried 
to repeat with the little girl exactly the same practices that he had learned from the adult 
woman” (Ibid., p.208). In such a way that the “foundation for a neurosis would (…) 
always be laid in childhood by adults” (Ibid., p.208-209). 
 
This invasion of sexual ideas in childhood, constitutes I believe, the most important 
aspect of the seduction theory. It seems to me that in this theory, it is not the traumatic 
aspect of the seduction that is to be found in the mechanism of hysterical symptoms.34 
Actually, on some occasions the traumatic aspect seems completely absent. For instance, 
Freud describes the case of a child who through accidental circumstances stimulated “the 
genitals of a grown-up woman with his foot”, which “was enough to fixate his neurotic 
attention for years on to his legs and to their function, and finally to produce a hysterical 
paraplegia” (Ibid., p.215). This patient’s legs seem to have become the canal (or rather the 
                                                        
34 One of the great advocates against Freud’s seduction theory in its perception as a theory of trauma is 
Jean Laplanche. Laplanche reads the seduction theory as a description of the unavoidable encounter 
between an infant and the messages generated by adult’s sexuality. In his so called “general seduction 
theory”, Laplanche (1999) has conceptualised this encounter as an ontogenesis of the psyche. I will return 
to Laplanche’s theory in my next chapter.   
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cannon) carrying threatening alien sexual ideas and, as a result, paralysis appeared to be 
the only possible defence against the terrifying question: ‘what are these enigmatic legs?’  
 
When they speak about their symptoms, Freud’s patients produce logical or associative 
connections that can be traced back to these scenes, which all contain feelings of 
invasion. Freud read the neurotic symptom as ‘a defensive effort’ against these invasions, 
hence the name, the ‘neuroses of defence’ to designate hysteria and obsessions. My point 
is that the mechanism of neurosis put forward by the seduction theory in 1896 is not so 
much the traumatic aspect of the seduction – even under the form of a trauma as a 
deferred action – but rather the invasion by unfamiliar sexual ideas. Since in many cases 
these ideas are linked with the father or a familial figure, I would be tempted to consider 
the seduction as unfamiliar familial ideas. The pathologic power of these ideas comes from 
the child’s passivity in the face of sexual representations. The neurotic subject is 
dominated by the reactivation of these antique ideas that have been stored without being 
associated with a network of presentations. 
 
Predictably the physicians who attended Freud’s lecture gave it “an icy reception” and 
one of the most famous amongst them, the psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing made 
this striking comment that Freud mentioned in a letter to Fliess: “It sounds like a 
scientific fairy tale” (Masson, 1985, p.184). Indeed, like a fairy tale, seduction stories 
display a remarkable homogeneity in their structure and like a fairy tale, the outcome 
seems always to be the same: the constitution of a couple. Moreover, Krafft-Ebing’s 
remark already forecast the fragile relationship between narratives of seduction and 
reality. Like Freud’s acknowledgement of the similarity of his work with that of a 
novelist, this remark highlights the link between neurotic symptoms and narratives. 
Freud’s insight, that “there are no indications of reality in the unconscious”, so that one 
cannot distinguish between truth and fictional memories that have been cathected with 
affect (Ibid., 1986, p.264), will provide this link with a completely new significance: both 
the symptom and the fiction associated with the symptom contain an unconscious wish. 
 
At this stage of the seduction theory, the ideas that threaten to take control, and against 
which symptoms develop, do not differ in their essence from the rest of the ideas that 
compose the psyche. They are linked to memories of real events and they are expressed 
in a verbal language. Hence, the ontology of the neurotic subject proposed by the 
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seduction theory remains within the frame of the logos. The challenge of the seduction 
theory led Freud to read neurotic symptoms and childhood memories as expressions – 
forms of writing – of ideas that differ in their essence from conscious ideas. They differ 
first of all, because they are linked with an unconscious reality of a wish and secondly, 
because they are expressed in a hallucinatory mode made of images. 
 
I would like to stress how the shift from the proton pseudos to the unconscious wish happened 
gradually in Freud’s work between 1895 and 1899 and how Freud’s concept of the latter 
appeared as an answer to a new line of thought. 
 
As long as he held to the seduction theory, Freud was trying to locate in the texture of 
the symptom the exogenous pathogenic ideas that an adult’s seduction would have laid 
down in the child’s memory. In the second part of the Project, Freud named those 
enigmatic ideas: the hysterical proton pseudos. He described how an incidental circumstance 
post-puberty could activate the pathological power of those pre-sexual sexual ideas. It is 
not the traumatic aspect of the seduction that makes the proton pseudos pathological but 
the fact that – because of the retardation of puberty – they generate a primary 
hallucinatory mode of thinking.  
 
A premise of the seduction theory was that memories of seduction were “excluded from the 
process of thought” (Freud, 1895b, p.351). The therapeutic hope was then to bring them 
back under the control of verbal thoughts. Hence, Freud was trying to identify seduction 
memories in the patients’ associations and, at times, he would try to help these ideas to 
emerge as an archive that could be dated. Yet, when he wrote his theoretical section of 
Studies on Hysteria, he had already communicated his doubts about the essence of the 
memories that appear in the analytic encounter: 
 
The ideas which are derived from the greatest depth and which form the 
nucleus of the pathogenic organization are also those which are acknowledged 
as memories by the patient with greatest difficulty. Even when everything is 
finished and the patients have been overborne by the force of logic and have 
been convinced by the therapeutic effect accompanying the emergence of 
precisely these ideas—when, I say, the patients themselves accept the fact that 
they thought this or that, they often add: ‘But I can't remember having thought 
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it.’ It is easy to come to terms with them by telling them that the thoughts 
were unconscious. But how is this state of affairs to be fitted into our own 
psychological views? Are we to disregard this withholding of recognition on 
the part of patients, when, now that the work is finished, there is no longer 
any motive for their doing so? Or are we to suppose that we are really dealing 
with thoughts which never came about, which merely had a possibility of 
existing, so that the treatment would lie in the accomplishment of a psychical 
act which did not take place at the time? It is clearly impossible to say anything 
about this—that is, about the state which the pathogenic material was in 
before the analysis—until we have arrived at a thorough clarification of our 
basic psychological views, especially on the nature of consciousness. (Freud, 
1895a, p.300) 
 
In this extract, Freud clearly raised the possibility that crucial early experiences revealed 
by the analytic treatment are not archive-memories of real past events but rather, are 
constructed memories of thoughts that had a possibility of existing. In fact, Jean Schimek 
has proposed in a convincing way that already during the years 1896-1897, infantile 
memories “were not directly reported by the patients but were (re)constructed by Freud 
on the basis of his interpretation of a variety of more or less disguised and partial 
manifestations and ‘reproductions,’ with the likelihood of a strong transferential 
element” (Schimek, 1987, p.944). Hence, there existed in these years a discrepancy 
between the neatness of the theoretical scheme and the strangeness of the clinical 
material.35 In the clinical encounter and in his self-analysis, what Freud was gradually 
discovering “on the nature of consciousness” was that childhood memories populating 
consciousness are constructed: they are fictional. It is important to stress that the 
proposal that memories are constructions does not imply that they are not genuine. 
 
The elaboration of this idea about childhood memories can be followed in the letters 
Freud wrote to Fliess a few months before he renounced the seduction theory. In May 
1897 he wrote: “Fantasies arise (…) according to certain tendencies. These tendencies are 
toward making inaccessible the memory from which symptoms have emerged” (Masson, 
1985, p.247) and in July 1897: “What we are faced with [in dreams and in the psychology 
                                                        
35 In this clinical material, Freud’s self-analysis played a paramount role. Indeed, as it has been stressed by 
Ernst Kris amongst others: “The first and perhaps most significant result of Freud’s self-analysis was the 
step from the seduction theory to full insight into the significance of infantile sexuality.” (Kris, 1954, p.33) 
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of the neuroses] are falsification of memory and fantasies” (Ibid., 1985, p.255). This idea 
of the fictional nature of memories will find a first real expression, and I would say 
radical formulation, in Screen Memories, a text published in 1899. This text shows how the 
hallucinatory nature of the unconscious wish is screened by the construction of a 
fictional memory: “You projected the two phantasies on to one another and made a 
childhood memory of them. (…) I can assure you that people often construct such 
things unconsciously – almost like works of fiction” (Freud, 1899, p. 315).  
 
The term ‘construction’ does not mean here that the memory is not genuine, as this 
memory could have been selected “from innumerable others (…) because, on account of 
its content (which in itself was indifferent) it was well adapted to represent the two 
phantasies” (Ibid., p.315). I believe it fruitful to push this text to its limits and to 
understand the use here of the term ‘screen memory’ not as a particular type of memory 
amongst others, but as the definition of a memory: the essence of childhood memory is 
to contain and to screen unconscious wishes. Freud is not far from such an idea when he 
writes: “It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our 
childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess” (Ibid., p.322). 
Fourteen years later, Freud would reiterate this astonishing statement that, in the analytic 
encounter, every conscious memory of childhood is a screen memory: 
 
In some cases I have had an impression that the familiar childhood amnesia, 
which is theoretically so important to us, is completely counterbalanced by 
screen memories. Not only some but all of what is essential from childhood has 
been retained in these memories. It is simply a question of knowing how to 
extract it out of them by analysis. They represent the forgotten years of 
childhood as adequately as the manifest content of a dream represents the 
dream-thoughts. (Freud, 1911-1915[1914], p. 148) 
 
The hypothesis that childhood memories told in analysis are constructions has been, I 
believe, widely misinterpreted by a range of historians and scholars. Frank Cioffi’s 1975 
article Was Freud a Liar? gives us access to a whole body of scientific literature that 
attacked Freud, claiming his observations to be worthless on account of his having 
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suggested the stories of seduction to his patients.36 I think such criticisms miss the point 
that what was at stake in Freud’s abandonment of the theory of seduction was precisely 
his discovery that memory is suggestible. The analytic situation activates the construction 
of childhood memories, which are fictional memories representing repressed sexual 
ideas.  
 
Freud’s confession to Fliess: “I no longer believe in my neurotica” is rightly understood as 
an epistemological breakthrough, because it changed the semiology of the psychoanalytic 
cure: from an archive-memory to a screen memory. Juliet Mitchell has shown how the 
“social realism of, amongst others, Reichian and feminist critiques” ignored the 
unconscious dimension of psychical reality in their criticisms of Freud and that they were 
“therefore, in this respect not so much anti-Freudian as pre-Freudian” (Mitchell, 1974, 
p.9).  Similarly, I think these historical criticisms read the abandonment of the seduction 
theory from a pre-Freudian paradigm that ignores or reifies the unconscious but also 
ignores the dimension of psychical reality. 
 
I would like to establish a parallel between the idea that childhood memories, as they 
appear in the analytic dialogue, are fictional and the phenomenon of post-hypnotic 
suggestion that Freud had witnessed in the summer of 1889 when he went to observe 
Hyppolite Bernheim’s work in Nancy. This phenomenon must have had a great impact 
on Freud, as half a century later he recalled it as an experimental proof of unconscious 
psychical acts: 
 
The doctor enters the hospital ward, puts his umbrella in the corner, 
hypnotizes one of the patients and says to him: ‘I'm going out now. When I 
come in again, you will come to meet me with my umbrella open and hold it 
over my head.’ The doctor and his assistants then leave the ward. As soon as 
they come back, the patient, who is no longer under hypnosis, carries out 
                                                        
36 Amongst the most important texts attacking Freud from this angle are: Borch-Jacobsen, M. (1996). 
Neurotica: Freud et la Théorie de la Séduction; Esterson, A. (2001). The Mythologizing of Psychoanalytic History: 
Deception and Self-Deception in Freud’s Accounts of the Seduction Theory Episode; Israël, H., and Schatzman, M. 
(1993). The Seduction Theory; Scharnberg, M. (1993). The Non-Authentic Nature of Freud’s Observations: Vol.1. The 
Seduction Theory. In a book called The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory, Jeffery 
Masson, the editor of the Freud-Fliess correspondence, addressed the exact opposite reproach to Freud. 
According to Masson, Freud gave up the seduction theory so as not to disturb the Viennese bourgeoisie 
that composed his clientele. Although these two reproaches are diametrically different, they both refuse the 
idea that at the level of psychical life “whatever the facts and figures of the situation, the desire was far 
more prevalent than the act” (Mitchell, 1974, p.9).   
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exactly the instructions that were given him while he was hypnotized. The 
doctor questions him: ‘What's this you're doing? What's the meaning of all 
this?’ The patient is clearly embarrassed. He makes some lame remark such as 
‘I only thought, doctor, as it's raining outside you'd open your umbrella in the 
room before you went out.’ The explanation is obviously quite inadequate and 
made up on the spur of the moment to offer some sort of motive for his 
senseless behaviour. It is clear to us spectators that he is in ignorance of his 
real motive. (Freud, 1940 [1938], p.285) 
 
The childhood memories verbalized in the ‘talking cure’ are equivalent to the 
explanations given by the ‘post-hypnotized’ subject. What is at stake in the collapse of 
the seduction theory is Freud’s discovery that memories are not remembered but are 
activated, they don’t “emerge” they are “formed”: “Our childhood memories show us our 
earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the 
memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as 
people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time.” 37  (Freud, 1899, p. 
322)  Just as a fiction is activated by both the hypnotic suggestion and the doctor’s 
questions, childhood memories are activated by both the unconscious wish and the 
analytical work. 
 
In California, at the end of the seventies, a researcher named Michael Gazzaniga 
conceived an experiment, which shared many similarities with that of post-hypnotic 
suggestion. 38 Gazzaniga conducted this experiment on a patient whose corpus callosum 
had been severed in an operation known as a corpus callostomy. This patient was 
suffering from epilepsy that was resistant to the treatments available at the time and the 
aim of the operation was to reduce the number and the severity of his epileptic fits. The 
corpus callosum is a structure that connects the left and the right hemisphere. After the 
removal of the corpus callosum, the two hemispheres of this patient’s brain could no 
longer communicate, thus forming a split-brain. Gazzaniga’s idea was to ask the patient 
to sit in a room where the message: “Walk” would appear on a screen. This message was 
                                                        
37 Later in the “Wolf Man”, Freud will affirm that the primal scene had not been remembered but 
activated [Aktivierung] (1918[1914], p.120).  
 
38 This experiment was described in a paper entitled Language, Praxis, and the Right Hemisphere: Clues to Some 
Mechanisms of Consciousness, published in the Journal of Neurology in 1977. 
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shown only to his left eye, and so would be processed by the right hemisphere of his 
brain. The right hemisphere is able to understand a short one-word message like “Walk”, 
but since the functions of language exist mainly in the left hemisphere, the patient would 
not have been able to verbalize the message.  
 
After seeing the message, the patient stood up and walked out of the room. When 
Gazzaniga asked the patient why he was leaving, the patient immediately came up with a 
fictional answer: “I am leaving because I am thirsty” or “I have to go home to check that 
I have switched off the gas”, and so on. Gazzaniga’s question had been posed to the left 
hemisphere of the patient’s brain, the one that processes language. The left hemisphere 
did not receieve the message on the screen and so had no idea why he was leaving the 
room. Rather than confessing his ignorance about the causes of his behaviour, the 
patient’s left hemisphere immediately invented a fictional answer.  
 
Many other experiments and the study of neurological diseases have empirically 
confirmed the importance of fictional interpretation for consciousness. In 2006, Lionel 
Naccache, a neurologist and researcher in cognitive neuroscience published a book 
entitled Le Nouvel Inconscient: Freud le Christophe Colomb des Neurosciences New Unconscious: 
Freud, the Christopher Columbus of Neuroscience in which he stressed that the fictional 
interpretation of reality is an aspect of consciousness that has remained unrecognised by 
most of the cognitive models of the mind. Naccache thinks that Freud’s discovery that 
memories are constructed is fundamental to the understanding of the mind and yet, 
Naccache refuses to link these constructions with an unconscious psychical reality. 
According to him, Freud, rather like Christopher Columbus who discovered America 
whilst thinking he had found a new route to the Indies, imagined he was discovering the 
unconscious when in fact he was revealing a crucial psychic continent of consciousness – a 
continent of fictional interpretations. 
 
Lionel Naccache argues that the most important aspect of Freud’s work was to use 
fictions built by the subject as material for the subject’s cure, and as a means to 
investigate a general understanding of the mind. It seems to me, that what escapes 
Naccache’s line of reasoning is that the analytical frame generates a very peculiar kind of 
narrative. A reading of the first clinical cases shows that, from the beginning of the 
talking cure, patients were surprised by the stories which appeared in their associations. As 
 95 
if the fictions constructed by the subject on the couch were alien to this very subject. In 
the same way that it is impossible to predict the content of a dream, it is also impossible 
to predict the content of an analytical session. Even though the analysand is awake, his 
associations operate beyond the realm of the cogito and fall under another psychical 
influence. Freud’s work rests on the hypothesis that the patients’ associations are 
produced under an unconscious psychical influence.  
 
I would argue that the question that the discovery of the fictional aspect of memory 
raised for Freud is not the one identified by Naccache. Indeed, Gazzaniga’s 
experiment,as well as the example of post-hypnotic suggestion, raises two main 
questions. The first is: why, in such situations, do we not admit ignorance about the 
reasons that motivate our actions, but rather give a fictional account in order to justify 
them? It is this first question on which Naccache focuses. However, it also raises a 
second question, which is: why does the patient or the person under hypnosis obey the 
suggestion presented to them? Strangely enough, Naccache never confronted or even 
identified the question of an unknown psychical influence of which we are ignorant and 
to which we are obedient.  
 
I believe that this second question is the Freudian question. In the intellectual movement 
that led Freud to abandon the seduction theory, the question of theorizing the 
unconscious impulses by which the subject is lived, became central to his work. The aim 
of the Freudian hermeneutic of the dream will be to decipher these impulses that lie 
behind the fiction of the spoken dream. The aim of the Freudian metapsychology in 
Chapter seven will be to propose a theory of the genesis of these unconscious forces and 
to imagine a language in which they could be formalized. 
 
The Mainspring of the Psychical Mechanism 
 
Reading The Interpretation of Dreams, one is struck by the fact that the seventh chapter 
appears to be of a different nature from the rest of the book. The function of this 
chapter – the questions that it raises but also the writing in which these questions are 
developed – seems to operate on another level. Chapters two to six are devoted to the 
hermeneutics of the dream. This hermeneutic explores two interpretative paths. Firstly, 
the interpretation of a dream, which begins with an account of the dream and the 
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associations linked with it, and moves on to the ideas that are hidden within it. 
Secondly,the reverse path which describes how the dream-work transforms ideas into 
both the dream and its account.  
 
Chapter Seven, on the other hand, does not deal with the hermeneutics of dreams. It 
starts with a dream “which raises no problem of interpretation and the meaning of which 
is obvious” (Freud, 1900-1901, p.510) and yet this dream remains an absolute 
psychological enigma. Indeed, it “is only after we have disposed of everything that has to 
do with the work of interpretation that we can begin to realize the incompleteness of our 
psychology of dreams” (Ibid., pp.510-511). In the same way that the abandonment of the 
Project challenged positivist readings of Freud, Chapter seven will be a spanner in the 
works to an exclusive hermeneutic reading of Freud. 
 
Beyond the problem of dream-interpretation, Freud introduced a new question: why are 
the mental processes involved in dreaming so strikingly different from the ones of 
waking life? Freud’s endeavour in Chapter seven, the precise title of which is: Psychology of 
the Dream-Processes, was to conceive of a psychological theory of the modes of thinking at 
stake in dreams. To me, it seems that “processes” is the crucial word here: the dream is 
not only an object for interpretation; it also reveals psychical processes that challenge the 
previous psychological knowledge. Freud’s study of the dream-machinery in Chapter 
seven would reveal hallucinatory modes of thinking which were irreducible to a 
psychology of the logos, making this study a perilous one.  
 
From the beginning of the chapter, Freud warned his readers that it would be a difficult 
enterprise: “the easy and agreeable portion of our journey lies behind us”, with the 
“mental process involved in dreaming every path will end in darkness”(Ibid., p.511). For 
us, as readers of the Traumdeutung, Chapter seven will be like the beginning of Dante’s 
Inferno: at this point of our journey into the phenomenon of the dream, we find 
ourselves “in a dark wood; for the straight way was lost”.39 The straight way of verbal 
language is lost/disappears/vanishes in the hallucinatory process of the dream. 
 
Freud explains the reason for this difficulty: 
 
                                                        
39 Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto 1. 
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There is no possibility of explaining dreams as a psychical process, since to 
explain a thing means to trace it back to something already known, and there 
is at the present time no established psychological knowledge under which we 
could subsume what the psychological examinations of dreams enables us to 
infer as a basis for their explanation. (Ibid., p.511) 
 
In his paper on The Aetiology of Hysteria, Freud had already touched on the same difficulty: 
 
It looks as though the difficulty of a present impression, the impossibility of 
transforming it into a powerless memory, is attached precisely to the character 
of the psychical unconscious. You see that the remainder of the problem lies 
once more in the field of psychology–and, what is more, a psychology of a 
kind for which philosophers have done little to prepare the way for us. (Freud, 
1896b, 218-219) 
 
The character of the psychical unconscious as it appears in dreams but also in the 
neurotic symptom cannot be ‘subsumed’ under a psychology of the logos. In fact, what is 
revealed by the psychology of the dream and by the psychology of neuroses is a faculty 
of memory irreducible to the logos. Hence, the attempt to create a new psychology of 
memory in which the object that is to be studied lies beyond the logos, both in terms of 
its theory and the writing of the theory: a beyond-psychology, a meta-psychology. A 
“psychology of a kind for which philosophers have done little to prepare the way for us” 
or a psychology for which “there is at the present time no established psychological 
knowledge under which we could subsume” (Freud, 1900-1901, p.511) it - are two 
definitions ‘ad absurdum’ of Freud’s metapsychology. They clearly show that 
metapsychology appeared as a new field of knowledge exploring a new question: the 
question of how to describe the functioning of an unconscious non-verbal memory. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I have tried to explain how the abandonment of the 
seduction theory played a key role in the appearance of this question. Indeed, the 
discovery that the talking cure could generate fictional memories showed that memory 
was not a ‘past-safe’ but on the contrary was an apparatus of great plasticity and creative 
power. If childhood memories are not archives of past events but constructions around 
past events, what internal force motivates those constructions? What is a memory made of 
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forces rather than a memory made of archives? The emergence of these metapsychological 
questions casts a new light on the intuitions that Freud had developed in the Project. 
Indeed, the neural apparatus that Freud imagined in this text seems to offer ideas 
concerning the question of memory’s determinism. I would like to examine these ideas 
and to show how they are transformed in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams. 
 
In my previous chapter, I used Derrida’s reading of the Project to show how the first part 
of this text already contains a model of memory functioning beyond the logos. I would 
like now to examine the consequences of such a model. Freud described memory 
through a non-verbal psychic writing: the writing of the difference of facilitations 
between the cathected memory-neurones.40 What activates this writing of the memory is 
the passage of energy coming from the external world and from the interior of the body. 
Freud divided the memory-neurones into two groups: “the neurones of the pallium which 
are cathected from” external stimuli through the perception-neurones41 “and the nuclear 
neurones which are cathected from the endogenous path of conduction” (Freud, 
1950[1895], p.315).  
 
Hence, the Project differentiates a memory of the perceived external reality and a memory 
of the body: a psychical writing triggered by perceptions of external reality and a 
psychical writing triggered by the drives. The external stimuli reach the memory-
neurones of the pallium through the protective screen of the perception-neurones. On 
the contrary, there is no mediation between somatic stimuli and the nuclear memory-
neurones. According to Freud, the fact that the nuclear memory-neurones are exposed to 
the passage of somatic energy without protection is “the mainspring of the psychical 
mechanism”(Ibid., p.316). 
  
Through the idea that the screen between endogenous stimuli and memory is absent, and 
that this absence is the “mainspring of the psychical mechanism”, Freud proposed a new 
concept of the psyche. To understand what is at stake in this concept of the psyche as it 
appears in the Project, it is necessary to clarify the protective role of the perception-
neurones. This protective role is two-fold. First of all they restrict the energetic amount 
                                                        
40 The neurones, that Freud named in the Project the psy (ψ) neurones. 
 
41 The neurones, that Freud named in the Project the phi (ϕ) neurones.  
 
 99 
of stimuli that can penetrate into the neurones’ apparatus to medium quantities: high 
amounts of excitation “are broken up (…) into quotients” and “below a certain quantity 
no effective quotient at all comes into being” (Ibid., p.313). Secondly, they act “as a sieve” 
on the qualitative characteristics of the stimuli so that only certain qualitative aspects of 
external reality are perceived. The qualitative stimuli’s passage from the perception-
neurones to the neurones of the pallium generates sensations in a third system of 
neurones: the neurones of consciousness.42 
 
The important point is that the perceptual apparatus randomizes (“sieves”) the 
qualitative stimuli from external reality in such a way that “quantitative processes” in the 
memory neurones “would reach consciousness (…) as qualities” (Ibid., p.312). Thanks to 
the qualitative screen of the “sense-organs” the stimulus from external reality can 
generate qualitative sensations. Indeed, as noticed by Filip Geerardyn in his reading of 
Freud’s Project: “we only have a limited number of senses, each one of which functions as 
a sort of receptor for vibrations located within a well-defined period” (Geerardyn, 1997, 
p.212). Hence, in Freud’s model the system constituted by the perception-neurones is 
“the part of the neuronal apparatus that is the least able to lay claim to the appellation 
‘psychical’” (Ibid., p.212). The system of the perception-neurones plays the role of a 
phenomenological apparatus that translates external reality into qualitative phenomena. 
 
On the other hand, the stimulus coming from the interior of the body does not 
encounter any quantitative or qualitative screen: “a direct path leads from the interior of 
the body” to the neurones of memory (Freud, 1950[1895], p.315) and as a consequence 
“psy is at the mercy of Q” (Ibid., p.317). In other words: memory is at the mercy of the 
drives. Indeed, already in this passage of the Project, Freud named this internal force 
‘drive’ [“Trieb”],43 whose psychological outcome is the will (Ibid., p.317). Strachey stressed 
                                                        
42 The neurones, that Freud named in the Project the omega (ω) neurones.  
 
43 I cannot resist voicing my complaint about what has been called the “Stracheysing” of Freud. There are 
two words in German: Instinkt and Trieb. Freud’s choice of using Trieb fits his desire to describe the human 
psyche. He reserves Instinkt in the sense of instincts in animals. For the Standard Edition, James Strachey 
translates Trieb by instinct instead of drive. This choice has been very much attacked and part of the 
justification Strachey adopted in the General Introduction does not seem convincing to me. His main 
argument is that drive used in this sense is not an English word and, in a slightly xenophobic way, he 
“suspects” his opponents to be “influenced by a native or early familiarity with the German language” 
(Strachey, 1966, p.xxv). The verb to drive had the advantage of sharing with the German verb treiben the 
notion of movement. I nevertheless understand the motivation of Strachey in remaining faithful to the 
Freudian idea of an articulation between psychoanalysis and biology. 
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that it is “one of the very rare appearance of the word ‘Trieb’ in Freud’s early writing” 
(Strachey, 1966, p.317, fn.2). Freud’s use of “drive” in the Project to denote a continuous 
bodily stimulus is, in fact, very close to the definition he will attribute to this concept in 
his first theory of the drives  
 
In a passage added to the Three Essays in 1915, he wrote of the drive as: “an endosomatic, 
continuously flowing source of stimulation as contrasted with a ‘stimulus’, which is set 
up by single excitations coming from without. “The concept of drive is thus one of those 
lying on the frontier between the mental and the physical” (Freud, 1905, p.168). In the 
same year, in Instincts and their Vicissitudes, he described it as a constant force operating 
“from within the organism” (Freud, 1915a, p.118). Hence, I think that what is described 
in the Project as the psychical consequence of the endogenous stimuli can be understood 
as the roots of Freud’s concept of the drive and I would follow Strachey when he writes 
in the introduction to Instincts and their Vissicitudes that, Freud’s notion of ‘endogenous 
stimuli’ that appears in the Project “had anticipated the idea” of the ‘drive’ “twenty years 
before” the writing of the 1915 paper. It seems to me legitimate and fruitful to force into 
the reading of this text the latter notion of the drive. 
 
From a quantitative angle, the absence of protection between the endogenous stimuli and 
the nervous system implies that the drives continuously put the psyche to work. The 
body constantly releases small quantities of energy through the nuclear neurones. Lina 
Balestriere clearly described the distinction between the stimuli emanating from the 
external world – which are dealt with by the neuronal system on the model of the reflex 
movement – and endogenous stimuli, that activate psychical mechanisms because they 
cannot be escaped: “what comes from the outside can easily be manipulated, since those 
stimuli can be discharged on the model of the reflex movement. As a consequence 
external stimuli do not disturb the psychical rest. Endogenous stimuli, on the other hand 
(…) cannot be discharged through reflex movement; they disturb the psychical inertia 
and oblige the psyche to work. Hence, at first the neuronal system would be armed to face 
exogenous stimuli and disarmed in front of endogenous stimuli” (Balestriere, 1998, p.42, my 
translation).44 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
44 “Au départ, ce qui vient de l’extérieur se manipule aisément, car tout stimulus peut être déchargé d’après 
le schéma de l’arc réflexe. Ce qui a comme conséquence que les stimuli externes n’entament pas le repos 
psychique. Par contre, les stimuli endogènes, exigeants, intarissables, ne peuvent pas être déchargés par des 
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From a qualitative angle this absence of protection implies that the drive is a non-
qualitative stimulus: the demand of the drive is enigmatic for the psyche. In the Three 
Essays, Freud maintained this idea that the drive is without quality: “The simplest and 
likeliest assumption as to the nature of” drive “would seem to be that in itself” a drive “is 
without quality” (Freud, 1905, p.168). Unlike the external stimuli, which have been sieved 
by the screen of perception, internal stimuli fill the nuclear neurones as non-qualitative 
forces that are experienced as a meaningless “urgency” that is discharged in the first 
“expression of the emotions”: the baby screams or kicks helplessly. In as much as those 
first expressions of emotion are the outcome of non-qualitative stimuli, in that they are 
not associated with a set of presentations, they can be described as meaningless. 
 
To answer the question of how these continuous and enigmatic stimuli would acquire 
meaning and how they would put the psyche at work, Freud proposed a conceptual 
experience that he named: The Experience of Satisfaction. The experience of satisfaction 
reappears at least five times in Freud’s texts. It was first foreshadowed in Draft E that 
Freud sent to Fliess with his letter of the 21st of May 1894 (in Masson, 1985, p.78) and in 
Freud’s first paper on anxiety neurosis published in January 1895 entitled: On the Grounds 
for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Desciption ‘Anxiety Neurosis’ 
(Freud, 1895[1894]). It then appeared explicitly in the first part of the Project written in 
1895, in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams in 1900 and finally in the 1911 paper: 
Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning.45 
 
At a phenomenological level the experience of satisfaction describes how the helpless 
infant’s need is satisfied by a specific action introduced through extraneous help. The 
most intuitive instance is the hungry baby satisfied by the breast of the mother. At the 
level of the phi/psy/omega apparatus, the experience of satisfaction describes how a link 
(a facilitation) is established between the memory of the body (constituted by the nuclear 
neurones) to the memory of external reality (constituted by the neurones of the pallium): 
“as a result of the experience of satisfaction, a facilitation comes about between two 
mnemic images and the nuclear neurones which are cathected in the state of urgency” 
                                                                                                                                                              
mouvements réflexes, troublent l’état de repos et obligent le psychisme à fournir un travail. Au départ donc, 
le système neuronique serait armé par rapport aux stimulations exogènes et désarmé par rapport aux stimulations endogènes.” 
 
45 Freud, 1911b. 
 102 
(Freud, 1950[1895], p.319). A facilitation is formed between the need felt in the nuclear 
neurones and the mnemic image of the object that brought satisfaction perceived in the 
neurones of the pallium.  
 
Through this facilitation, the non-qualitative endogenous stimuli will activate a 
presentation from the mnemic image of the satisfying object. The absence of the 
satisfying object is replaced by a psychical presentation triggered by the bodily energy of 
the drive. Hence, the drives activate psychical mechanisms in the absence of the object. 
The presentation of an object in memory necessitates the absence of the object: a 
hallucination replaces a perception. At the stage of the Project, Freud named this psychical 
writing, constituted by the facilitation between the need and the hallucination of the 
object: a “wishful activation”. Memories are the result of (such) wishful activations. 
 
Indeed, in the model of memory put forward by Freud in the Project, perceived external 
reality impinges on the neural apparatus through mnemic images [Erinnerung] but it does 
not generate any idea or presentation [Vorstellung]. In other words, perceived external 
reality alone does not “leave any memory behind it”: “The qualitative characteristic of the 
stimuli (…) generates sensation (…) represented by a particular period of neuronal 
motion (…) This period does not persist for long and disappears towards the motor side; 
nor, since it is allowed to pass through, does it leave any memory behind it” (Ibid., p.314). 
External stimuli produce facilitations between the neurones of the pallium but only the 
non-qualitative bodily stimuli (the enigmatic drives) can activate a memory in a 
hallucinatory way. External reality is represented in the psyche from “an internal pressure 
that strives for satisfaction” (Balestriere, 1998, p.42, my translation).46  
 
A memory arises from the internal pressure of the drive that activates perceived mnemic 
images. Because of the absence of protection between the endogenous stimuli and the 
nuclear neurones this internal pressure is not sieved. It is the equivalent of a non-
randomized signal: a non-qualitative noise. Memories activated by endogenous stimuli do 
not reproduce reality: the endogenous non-qualitative noise that follows the facilitations 
from the nuclear neurones to the pallium neurones will generate a presentation that 
deforms the mnemic image. Wishful activation does not produce the exact mnemic 
                                                        
46 “L’extérieur n’existe pas en tant que tel pour le psychisme (…) il ne se définit que sous la pression d’un « intérieur » 
qui cherche à être apaisé.”  
 103 
image of the object but it creates presentations derived from those mnemic images. 
Rather than an archive room, memory would be a scene on which a grimacing 
representation of perceived reality is played. 
 
The Hallucinatory Mode of Thinking 
 
I would like to describe the form of thinking at stake in the wishful activation as the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking. Hence, the hallucinatory mode of thinking is the facilitation 
that unites a bodily non-qualitative stimulus to the mnemic image of a perceived object. 
In the Project, the hallucinatory mode of thinking can be understood as a psychical writing 
that constructs from the non-qualitative noise of the body, a system of presentations 
derived from perceived external reality. It constitutes the primary mode of thinking. 
From a developmental angle, the demand made by endogenous stimuli is at first worked-
through by the neural apparatus in a hallucinatory way. Those hallucinations are the 
outcome of a mode of thinking because the perception of objects is transformed into “an 
imaginary idea” (an imaginary Vorstellung). 
 
The incompatibility between the functions of perception and the one of memory led 
Freud to distinguish the mnemic image [Erinnerung] generated by a perception 
[Wahrnehmung] of an object and the presentation [Vorstellung] hallucinated in the absence 
of the object. In the first part of the Project, memory is understood as a system of 
presentations, which are the result of a hallucinatory mode of thinking. Hence, memories 
are informative not so much of the past but rather of the wishes from the past. Freud’s empirical 
discovery that childhood memories produced in the clinical encounter were of a fictional 
nature led him to rewrite this intuition in The Interpretation of Dreams. In exploring his 
dreams, Freud also searched for a confirmation that what activates a memory is not 
external perceptions but the way non qualitative endogenous stimuli reconstruct the 
perceived reality: in other words the intuition that a memory is activated by a wish. 
 
The significant difference between Freud’s description of wishful activation in the Project 
and in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams is that in the latter, the fulfilment of 
wishes becomes the characteristic of the system unconscious. In this chapter, Freud 
proposed a dynamic definition of the unconscious as the system “whose activity knows 
no other aim than the fulfilment of wishes and which has at its command no other forces 
than wishful impulses” (Freud, 1900, p.568). The hypothesis of a primal hallucinatory 
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activity of the psyche that Freud had put forward in the Project becomes in Chapter seven 
the prototype of unconscious thinking. The aim of Chapter seven will be to understand 
the functioning of the dream as a product of this unconscious thinking. 
 
The evolution towards a dynamic unconscious is partly the theoretical consequence of a 
correction that Freud brought to his neural model. This modification of the ϕψω 
apparatus is to be found in a letter sent to Fliess on the 1st of January 1896. According to 
André Green the Project “died with this letter”, which would contain the main theoretical 
breakthrough that led from the neural apparatus to the psychical apparatus (Green, 1972, 
p.269). In this letter, Freud proposed to insert the neurones that generate consciousness 
(the omega neurones) between the neurones of perceptions and the neurones of the 
psyche. It follows that psychic processes are in the first place unconscious: “The ψ 
processes themselves would be unconscious and would only subsequently acquire a 
secondary, artificial consciousness through being linked with processes of discharge and 
perception” (in Masson, 1985, p.160). Neurones of perception transfer the qualitative 
stimulus to the neurones of consciousness, which in turn “transfers neither quality nor 
quantity to ψ but merely excites ψ” (Ibid., pp.160-161). In other words, perceived external 
reality activates unconscious thinking. 
 
In Chapter seven, Freud further developed this idea, describing how the thoughts of the 
preconscious-conscious system would stir up unconscious thinking. The dream is the 
result of such phenomenon: “an unconscious wish is stirred up by daytime activity and 
proceeds to construct a dream” (Freud, 1900, p.561). Psychical processes are not the 
product of consciousness. They are, in the first place, unconscious. Against the 
philosophical and scientific traditions, which equate the psyche with consciousness, 
Freud’s letter of the 1st of January 1896 gave birth to a model in which consciousness is 
an epiphenomenon of psychical processes. The conscious system (Cs.) is not part of the 
psychical apparatus that Freud conceived in Chapter seven: “The psychical apparatus 
(…) is itself the external world in relation to the sense-organ of Cs.” (Ibid., p.616). It 
receives excitation from the two peripheries of the psychical apparatus.  
 
In one direction, excitations are received from the perceived external reality, which 
generate psychical qualities. In the other direction, excitations are received from internal 
reality, which can only impart consciousness with the psychical qualities of pleasure and 
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unpleasure. Rather than the “omnipotent” organ of thoughts, consciousness becomes “a 
sense-organ for the perception of psychical qualities” (Ibid., p.615): a screen that would receive a 
combination of perceptions [Wahrnehmung] from perceived external reality and presentations 
[Vorstellung] from internal psychical reality.47 This sensitive perception of the world would 
play the role of a catalyst for psychical activity, whose functioning is unconscious. 
 
Taking into account the unconscious nature of the psyche, Freud rewrote the ‘experience 
of satisfaction’ in Chapter seven. In this new version, the hallucinatory mode of thinking 
is not understood as a ‘wishful activation’, as it was in the Project, but as an ‘unconscious 
wish’. In both the Project and in Chapter seven, the experience of satisfaction is a 
speculative experience at the origin of the psyche. It raises the question: what would be 
the genesis of the first presentation (of the first memory)? Freud’s intuition is that the 
apparition of memory is linked with the state of helplessness [Hilflosigkeit] of the newborn 
infant. This state of helplessness is for Freud “an essentially objective datum-the situation 
of impotence in which the newborn human infant finds itself” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1973[1967], p.189).  
 
From Freud’s perspective, if one conceives of an omnipotent infant capable of fulfilling 
all its biological needs, this imaginary infant would not have memories. Because of its 
lack of instincts – in the sense of the German word Instinkt i.e. a set of hereditary 
behavioural patterns specific to a species which enable the homeostatic maintainance of 
its physiological functions – the newborn is put in a state of physiological distress that 
can be resolved only through the aid of an external object. Freud conceived the 
experience of satisfaction to be the original experience through which the physiological 
demand is represented in psychical ideas. To describe the way physiological distress acts 
as a demand made upon the mind for work, Freud used the concept of the drive [Trieb]. 
In other words, drives are linked to biological needs for which there are no instincts. 
 
                                                        
47 In Learning from Experience, Bion commented on Freud’s definition of consciousness as the sense organ 
of psychic quality and he reused the distinction between the qualitative external excitation and the non-
qualitative internal one in a different terminology: “But there are no sense-data directly related to psychic 
quality, as there are sense-data related to concrete objects” and he adds this very enlightening clinical 
remark: “Hypochondriacal symptoms may therefore be signs of an attempt to establish contact with 
psychic quality by substituting physical sensation for the missing sense data of psychical quality.” (Bion, 
1962, p.53) 
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In the Project, Freud described the construction of the first presentation as the result of a 
link (a facilitation) between the non-qualitative memory of the body and the qualitative 
memory of perception. In Chapter seven, Freud used the experience of satisfaction to 
define the psychical nature of an unconscious wish. In this text, the first presentation is 
the result of the transformation of a somatic need into a psychical wish. Freud described 
how a link is established between “the memory trace of the excitation produced by a 
somatic need” and “the mnemic image” of the perceived object that helped satisfy the 
need (Freud, 1900, p.565). A wish is the psychical impulse that generates a psychical 
presentation from a somatic need. The most primitive way in which the psychical 
apparatus transforms a somatic need into a psychical presentation is through 
hallucination: “The first wishing seems to have been a hallucinatory cathecting of the 
memory of satisfaction” (Ibid., p.598). Unconscious wishes are these primitive wishes, 
which reconstruct a sensory image from a perceived mnemic image.  
 
In my work, I propose to name this reconstruction of a perceived mnemic image into an 
unconscious presentation, a hallucinatory mode of thinking. Hence, unconscious wishes operate 
through a hallucinatory mode of thinking. The thoughts generated by unconscious wishes 
represent reality in a hallucinatory form. At the level of the psyche, perceived external 
objects are transformed into unconscious presentations. The psyche does not perceive 
the external object but instead it hallucinates a presentation derived from this object. 
This hallucinatory mode of thinking, which “once dominated waking life, while the mind 
was still young and incompetent, seems now to have been banished into the night (…). 
Dreaming is a piece of infantile mental life that has been superseded” (Ibid., p.567). The discovery 
of “the concealed dream-thoughts” provided Freud with a sort of empirical evidence for a 
primitive mode of thinking. The hypermnesic power, which Freud attributed to dreams, 
finds an explanation in this idea that the dream reproduces an infantile mode of thinking.  
 
If the dream has a capacity to reach material from early childhood, it would be because 
dreams and primal memories are made of the same psychical material, one which is 
formed of sensory images in which “the thought is represented as an immediate situation 
with the ‘perhaps’ omitted” and in which “the thought is transformed into visual images 
and speech” (Ibid., p.534). As André Green put it: the unconscious wish replicates the 
experience of satisfaction and the dream replicates the unconscious wish (Green, 1972, 
 107 
p.283, my translation).48 Since a dream operates like the primitive psychical apparatus, 
through a hallucinatory mode of thinking, its motive force can be only an unconscious 
wish: “a wish which is represented in a dream must be an infantile one. In the case of adults it 
originates from the Ucs.” (Freud, 1900, p.553). 
 
A wish from the unconscious is the “capitalist” of the dream: it provides the necessary 
psychical impulse for the construction of a dream. During sleep, unconscious wishes 
impose their mode of thinking on the psychic apparatus to such an extent that in “so far 
as our thought-processes are able to become conscious in the normal way at night, we 
are simply not asleep” (Ibid., p.555). When conscious thought-processes are put to sleep, 
a hallucinatory mode of thinking is revealed. However, the hallucinatory mode of 
thinking is also active in daytime. Freud indicated that the clinical treatment of neurosis 
had shown him that “unconscious wishes are always on the alert, ready at any time to 
find their way to expression”(Ibid., p.553). 
 
As a product of the infantile psychic apparatus, the ideational content of unconscious 
wishes is not made of words but of “sensory images, to which belief is attached and 
which appear to be experienced” (Ibid., p.535). The hallucinatory character of 
unconscious wishes make them act like psychical orders, which have the power to 
generate dreams or neurotic symptoms: “the activity of the unconscious during the 
daytime (…) is the instigating agent of dreams no less than of neurotic symptoms” (Ibid., 
p.592). Freud’s use of the term, “purposive idea” [Zielvorstellung] describes this force of 
attraction, which is yielded by some presentations.49 Laplanche and Pontalis have pointed 
out that the term purposive idea “brings out what is original in Freud’s view of psychical 
determinism”. Indeed unlike “the doctrine of associationist psychology, according to 
which the stream of associations can always be accounted for in terms of juxtaposition 
and similarity alone, (…) in Freud's view associations are subordinated to a specific aim” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973[1967], pp.373-374).  
 
                                                        
48 “Le désir est la réplication de l’expérience de satisfaction, le rêve la réplication du désir.”  
 
49 The purposive idea shows, in a striking way, how Freud’s metapsychology offered paradigms to his 
clinic. Indeed, the fundamental rule that specifies the analytic treatment: the method of free association is 
motivated by Freud’s conviction that in the patient who free associates the conscious purposive ideas are 
replace by unconscious purposive ideas. The seemingly arbitrary lines of thought followed by the patient 
are determined by these unconscious purposive ideas. 
 108 
At a conscious-preconscious level this aim could potentially be verbalized. The conscious 
purposive idea would direct the flow of thoughts according to the secondary process in 
order to establish a thought identity. At the level of the unconscious, the purposive idea 
designates unconscious sensory images, which are the results of the infantile memory. 
They form “a wide sphere of mnemic material (…) inaccessible to preconscious 
cathexis” (Freud, 1900, p.604). This infantile memory is the outcome of unconscious 
wishes. It is not made of archive-memories but of wish-memories. Infantile memory is 
not formed from perceived external objects but from the hallucinatory presentations 
derived from these perceptions. The hallucinatory power of the infantile memory 
disturbs rational thought processes, which “even in normal mental life (…) remains 
exposed to falsification by interference from the unpleasure principle” (Ibid., p.603). 
During the daytime, thinking is partly determined by unconscious purposive ideas 
formed from infantile presentations. As such, unconscious purposive ideas resist being 
verbalized. 
 
If unconscious motivations generated by the hallucinatory mode of thinking are the 
source of mental conflicts, it is primarily because they are formed from psychical material 
that is irreducible to that of consciousness. As Sebastian Gardner notes: “Cs-Pcs and Ucs 
are not intrinsically antagonistic to each other; conflict occurs between them only because 
of the particular character of the content of Ucs and their consequent connection with 
repression” (Gardner, 1991, p.150). The text of dreams or the text of neurotic symptoms 
is constituted by the compromise between this psychical writing of infantile presentations 
and rational thought-processes. Dreams and neurotic symptoms reveal trains of rational 
thought that are submitted to an unconscious order: “a train of thought comes into being 
in the preconscious which is without a preconscious cathexis but has received a cathexis 
from an unconscious wish” (Freud, 1900, p.595). In other words, the logos is drawn into 
a pre-logos, a more archaic hallucinatory mode of thinking. Freud’s concept of the 
unconscious as it appears in Chapter seven is not an “unconscious consciousness” but a 
psychical system whose mode of activity operates beyond the logos: the system 
unconscious is “inadmissible to consciousness” (Ibid., p.615). 
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Conclusion: “How One Becomes What One Is” 
 
Philippe van Haute and Thomas Geyskens have pointed out a rare event in 
psychoanalytic literature: the event of a quasi-general consensus. 50  This consensus is 
“around the idea that the true birth of psychoanalysis coincided with Freud’s 
abandonment of the seduction theory as the cause of pathologies” (Van Haute and 
Geyskens, 2010, p.33, my translation).51 I believe that the abandonment of the seduction 
theory is such a foundational landmark because from there, Freud invented a new model 
of memory that is specific to psychoanalysis: an archaic memory that operates beyond 
the logos. In his paper on Freud’s notion of the unconscious, Sebastian Gardner wrote: 
“that the dynamic unconscious (…) is closely related to, as a failure and cause of 
disturbance of, the faculty of memory” (Gardner, 1991, p.137). Gardner seems to imply 
that memory is cheated by the unconscious, as if the ‘honest’ memory, in its cognitive 
capacity to recall the past, was falsified by the ‘dishonest’ deviant unconscious.  
 
However, I think that what Freud challenged in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of 
Dreams was the very existence of a pure faculty of memory. Infantile memory would not 
so much be a faculty to remember perceptions from the past, but rather, wishes from the 
past. Moreover, some of these wishes are written in a psychical material, which make 
them inaccessible to consciousness.  When Freud intuited that the infantile memories 
elaborated in the cure were fictional, he did not perceive them as falsifications of real 
memories. Such fictions are not intellectual errors but constructions that reveal the 
functioning of an infantile mode of thinking. There are similarities between infantile 
memories and the fictions invented by the post-hypnotized subject to justify a suggestion 
that his consciousness ignores. The constructions of memories in the analytic cure would 
act like a screen for an enigmatic determinism by which the subject is lived. The 
memories of seductions that Freud assembled with his neurotic patients don’t so much 
reveal the reality of an acted seduction, but rather the reality of perceptions deceived by 
an unconscious wish. Freud’s metapsychology stemmed from the question of this 
unconscious determinism. 
                                                        
50 They nevertheless indicate at least one exception to this consensus: Blass, R.B. (1992). ‘Did Dora have 
an Oedipus Complex? A Re-examination of the Theoretical Context of Freud’s “Fragment of an 
Analysis”’,  Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, n°47, pp.158-187.   
 
51  “Il semble qu’il y ait un consensus tant parmi les psychanalystes que parmi les critiques de la 
psychanalyse, autour de l’idée que la véritable naissance de la psychanalyse coïncide avec l’abandon par 
Freud de la théorie de la séduction comme cause de la pathologie.”  
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In Chapter seven, Freud proposed a model of unconscious determinism by which the 
subject is partly lived by its infantile memory. At the level of subjectivity, one is lived by 
the psychical writing of infantile presentations. Instead of being a contrivance to 
remember the past, infantile memory appears as an engine of unconscious wishes that 
prescribes a destiny. The vision of infantile memory as a well-ordered archive room is 
transformed into that of a hypnotizer whose hypnotic suggestions would be made of 
sensory images. The ‘Freudian subject’ hallucinates in the writing of these sensory 
images. 
 
To justify that Chapter seven did not give “any exhaustive treatment to the part played in 
dreams by the world of sexual ideas” Freud mentioned “the still unresolved problems of 
perversion and bisexuality” (Freud, 1900, pp. 606-607, fn.2). As pointed out by André 
Green, the intellectual inhibition of bisexuality might indicate that, at this stage, Freud’s 
transference to Fliess was not yet completely resolved (Green, 1972, p. 499, fn.36). In my 
next chapter, I will try to show how Freud’s discovery of infantile sexuality refined the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking and how ‘the Freudian subject’ hallucinates in the 
psychical writing of infantile sexuality. 
 
A year after the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud wrote: “One could 
venture (…) to transform metaphysics into metapsychology”. In a way, the model of infantile 
memory that Freud developed in Chapter seven somehow ‘transformed’ a metaphysical 
fate into a metapsychological unconscious. From this angle, infantile memory has as 
much to do with the future of the subject as with his/their past, its presentations being 
always on the alert, reshaping perceived reality into an enigmatic writing. Pindar’s line: 
“How one becomes what one is” could be a slogan for the metapsychological unconscious. In 
the symbols of the Oedipus myth, the hermeneutic unconscious could be compared to 
the sphinx that raises enigmas and the metapsychological unconscious would take the 
form of the infantile prophecy.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
A Hallucinatory Form of Writing 
 
 
Derrida’s Alliance 
 
In his book, Freud, la Philosophie et les Philosophes, published in 1976, Paul-Laurent Assoun 
explored Freud’s ambivalence towards philosophy. This ambivalence plays out on at least 
two different levels. First, at the level of Freud’s biography: the gap between Freud’s 
personal aspiration to philosophy, as it appears in his most intimate correspondence, and 
the repeated criticisms of philosophy as a discipline in his published work. Secondly, at 
the level of Freud’s texts: in the tension between the claim that the theory of 
psychoanalysis is based on observations of psychical phenomena and the necessity to 
anchor these observations in a set of speculative principles. 52  
 
Freud’s concept of the unconscious has a paradoxical empirical status since it is an object 
that cannot be directly observed and yet, in as much as it stems from a practice, it has, 
for Freud, the value of an experimental fact. Indeed, the unconscious cannot be directly 
observed, rather it is “something which we really do not know, but which we are obliged 
by compelling inferences to supply” (Freud, 1905, p.162). Freud gradually invented 
speculative hypotheses to map the empirical material collected in this practice. Mental 
phenomena observed by Freud – such as hypnosis, dreams, psychoneurosis etc. – 
couldn’t be objectivised since they escaped the control of the subject. What Freud tried 
to observe behind these mental phenomena were, “psychical processes which behave 
actively but nevertheless do not reach the consciousness of the person concerned” 
(Freud, 1907[1906], p.47). Thus, Freud was somehow obliged to conceptualize his 
observations. 
 
However, even Freud’s speculative research seemed to entertain ‘a dialogue of the deaf’ 
with the mainstream philosophy of his time. According to Assoun, the main obstacles to 
this dialogue were the concepts of consciousness as constructed by the prevailing 
western philosophical movements of the nineteenth century. The thesis of “the parity 
                                                        
52 Assoun noticed that it is precisely when Freud multiplied his critical and sarcastic remarks towards 
philosophers that his discourse seems the most influenced by philosophical references (Assoun, 1976, 
p.18). 
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[Gleichstellung] between the psyche and the conscious and the election of consciousness as 
the exclusive mode to define the psyche” (Assoun, 1976, p.23, fn. 1) is in direct 
opposition to Freud’s notion of the unconscious. This thesis of parity is precisely the 
main theoretical reproach that Freud addressed to philosophy: 
 
The physician can only shrug his shoulders when he is assured that 
‘consciousness is an indispensable characteristic of what is psychical’, and 
perhaps, if he still feels enough respect for the utterances of philosophers, he 
may presume that they have not been dealing with the same thing or working 
at the same science. (Freud, 1900, p.612) 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty proposed that subjectivity was a philosophical event, a 
philosophical discovery. According to him, this discovery took place through very 
diverse movements of thought from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Merleau-
Ponty spoke of “discovery”, not in the sense of the discovery of America or of the 
discovery of potassium, but in the sense of a common construction that, once 
introduced, could not be ignored. From Montaigne’s essays to the transcendental 
Kantian subject or from Descartes’ cogito to Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity, the 
construction of a common paradigm exists, which tends towards founding the being on 
self-consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p.616).  
 
The point defended by Paul-Laurent Assoun, is that the Freudian unconscious raised the 
question of subjectivity in a totally new way: a way that radically confronted the model of 
the introspective subject. The Freudian subject cannot be founded on self-consciousness 
because in “psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes 
are in themselves unconscious and to liken the perception of them by means of 
consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs” and 
so “psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with 
the unconscious mental processes which are their object” (Freud, 1915c, p.171).  
 
With Freud’s notion of the dynamic unconscious the subject is wider than his/her 
consciousness. In other words, at the level of subjectivity, one is lived by unconscious 
processes. Subjectivity rests on mental processes that escape consciousness. It is this 
radical novelty that André Green stressed when he wrote: “it will be necessary one day to 
 113 
finally recognise that the most subversive aspect of Freud’s thought was to drastically 
change the theory of subjectivity by putting at its foundation the myth of the drive, by 
transforming the subject into the subject of the drive” 53  (Green, 1995, p.16, my 
translation). 
 
Freud’s new conception of the subject was, at first, what limited the dialogue between 
psychoanalysis and philosophy but subsequently it is what fed this dialogue. Indeed, it is 
around the question of a new concept of the subject that psychoanalysis became a 
privileged interlocutor of the “French philosophical moment of the 1960’s” (Badiou, 
2012, p.19). The term ‘philosophical moment of the 1960’s’ was coined by Frédéric 
Worms to name a period of French intellectual history which began with Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ publication of The Savage Mind in 1962 and ended with Jean-François Lyotard’s 
book, Discourse, Figure in 1971 (Worms, 2009).54  
 
This idea of a ‘philosophical moment’ stresses the existence of a common philosophical 
program during these ten years. The unity expressed by this term does not reflect a 
common thesis, nor a similar methodology or argumentative line, but rather a set of 
shared problems. The same type of questions pushed this group of philosophers to think 
through a great diversity of voices. According to Patrice Maniglier, “the problems, which 
constitute the divergent matrix” of this philosophical moment come “from practice or 
fields that are not intrinsically philosophical (...) the refusal to think of philosophy as a 
discipline, which would receive from itself its own questions”55 (Maniglier, 2011, p.19, 
my translation). Rather than exploring the ‘eternal philosophical questions’, the writers of 
this ‘moment’ incorporated interrogations borne from practices external to philosophy. 
Amongst these practises, psychoanalysis played a central role: “to discuss with 
psychoanalysis, to compete with it and to do as good if not better on the capacity to 
                                                        
53 “Car il faudra bien qu’un jour on se résolve à admettre ce qu’il y a sans doute de plus subversif dans la 
pensée freudienne, à savoir qu’elle bouleverse la théorie de la subjectivité en installant à son fondement le 
mythe de la pulsion, en faisant du sujet le sujet de la pulsion.” 
 
54 The main works that constitute this philosophical moment are: Claude Lévi-Strauss: The Savage Mind 
(1962); Louis Althusser: For Marx and Reading Capital (1965); Jacques Lacan: Ecrits (1966); Michel Foucault: 
The Order Of Things (1971[1966]); Jacques Derrida: Speech and Phenomena, Of Grammatology, Writing and 
Difference (1967); Gilles Deleuze: Difference and Repetition (1968), The Logic of Sense (1969); Jean-François 
Lyotard: Discourse, Figure (1971).   
  
55 “Les problèmes qui constituent la matrice divergente de ses inventions sont posés à la philosophie par 
des pratiques ou des disciplines qui ne sont pas intrinsèquement philosophiques (…) le refus de concevoir 
la philosophie comme une discipline qui recevrait d’elle-même ses propres problèmes.” 
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think a subject irreducible to consciousness, hence a subject irreducible to psychology” 
(Badiou, 2012, p.23).56 
 
Within this scene of interaction with psychoanalysis, it seems to me that Jacques Derrida 
occupied a very peculiar position. Indeed, rather than a philosophical reading of Freud, 
Derrida proposed a Freudian reading of philosophy: “not a psychoanalysis of 
philosophy” but “the most daring way of making the beginnings of a step outside of 
philosophy” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.359). According to Derrida, Freud’s concepts 
belonged to the history of metaphysics, however I think that Derrida also perceived that 
Freud’s attempt to think the psyche led him to go beyond metaphysics. Derrida used 
Freud’s texts as a tool to differentiate himself and to challenge the ‘prejudices of 
philosophy’ and especially of the two major contemporary philosophical currents: 
phenomenology and structuralism. Derrida’s reading of Freud occupies such a central 
place in the strategy of his work, that in a 1971 interview he asked: “is it entirely useless 
to recall first that since Of Grammatology and Freud and the Scene of Writing all my texts have 
inscribed what I will call their psychoanalytic import?” (Derrida, 1981[1972], p.83). 
 
With Of Grammatology, Derrida undertook one of his main philosophical endeavours: to 
challenge what makes objectivity possible, “the originary constitution of objectivity” 
(Derrida, 1976[1967], p.88). Derrida searched for an alternative to a philosophy of 
consciousness and intentionality, in which philosophers “from Descartes to Hegel” 
apprehend “presence as consciousness, self-presence conceived within the opposition of 
consciousness to unconsciousness” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.248). But in his escape from 
the cogito, Derrida’s aim was also to overcome structuralism. In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
argued that notions of sign and signifier have a fundamental link with Western 
metaphysics of presence. By using the sign to reach objectivity, structuralism limits “the 
sense of being within the field of presence” under “the domination of a linguistic form” 
(Derrida, 1976[1967], p.23).  
 
In structuralism’s view objectivity becomes that which, in the object, subjects itself to the 
sign. In his criticism of an objectivity defined around reason or defined around linguistic 
structures, Derrida identified Freud as an ally. Derrida found in Freud’s model of the 
                                                        
56 “Discuter avec la psychanalyse, rivaliser avec elle et faire aussi bien qu’elle, sinon mieux qu’elle, en ce qui 
concerne la pensée d’un sujet irréductible à la conscience, donc à la psychologie.”  
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dynamic unconscious, intentional processes beyond consciousness, which seem to play a 
part in the constitution of objectivity. Contrary to Lacan, and in a way against him, 
Derrida thought that these unconscious processes could not be apprehended through 
structuralism. In Derrida’s view, the language of the unconscious described by Freud 
isn’t organized around the notion of the sign.  
 
To describe this language of the unconscious, Derrida invented the term psychical writing. 
This psychical writing “cannot be read in terms of any code”. Moreover, the “absence of 
an exhaustive and absolutely infallible code means that in psychic writing, which thus 
preﬁgures the meaning of writing in general, the difference between signiﬁer and 
signiﬁed is never radical. Unconscious experience (…) does not borrow but produces its 
own signiﬁers; does not create them in their materiality, of course, but produces their 
status-as-meaningful (signiﬁance). Henceforth, they are no longer, properly speaking, 
signiﬁers” (Derrida, 1978[1967], pp.262-263). Thus, objectivity would have its roots in 
“psychical writing”, a writing that functions beyond the sign and beyond self-presence. 
This use of Freud comes from a reading that Derrida summarized very clearly at the 
beginning of Freud and the Scene of Writing: “Our aim is limited: to locate in Freud’s texts 
(…) those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within 
logocentric closure” (Ibid., p.249). 
 
It is this aim of Derrida’s that I would like to incorporate under the form of a question - 
the question of what escapes the logos in Freud’s work? I think that this question has a 
great significance beyond the use that Derrida made of it for his own research. My aim is 
to use this question to understand what is at stake in Freud’s 1915 papers on 
metapsychology. I would like to propose that Freud’s metapsychological papers describe 
the evolution from a mode of thinking that cannot be reduced to the logos towards a 
verbal mode of thinking. According to this hypothesis, metapsychology would provide a 
model of the genesis of the mental apparatus and its functioning through the 
cohabitation of two modes of thinking: a primary hallucinatory mode of thinking and a 
secondary verbal mode of thinking and would thus give the basis for an understanding of 
objectivity. 
 
In my previous chapter, I tried to identify a hallucinatory mode of thinking in the Project 
and in Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams. The hallucinatory mode of thinking 
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appeared in the Project as a primal mode of thinking that would generate infantile 
presentations [Vorstellung]. In Chapter seven, the hallucinatory mode of thinking also 
became the prototype for unconscious thought. The objects of study in this chapter will 
be Freud’s 1915 papers on metapsychology. I would like to read these papers in the light 
of Jacques Derrida’s concept of ‘psychical writing’ in order to describe ‘the hallucinatory 
mode of thinking’ as a psychical writing made of infantile sexual ideas. What sustains this 
reading is the belief that the philosophical echo, which Derrida found in Freud, opens the path for an 
original reading of Freud’s metapsychology. 
 
Vannina Micheli-Rechtman listed three main contemporary categories that approach 
Freud’s metapsychology from an external epistemological perspective: a psychological 
reading, that refuses the dynamic unconscious and therefore “excludes the radicalism of 
a subjective singularity” (Micheli-Rechtman, 2010, p.13, my translation);57 a hermeneutic 
reading, whose consequence would be to subsume the manifestations of the unconscious 
under a regime of meanings and a positivist reading, that reduces the unconscious to its 
observable dimensions. Unlike approaches inspired by psychology, philosophy or 
science, I think that a reading, which would stem from Derrida’s reflections on writing, 
could reveal Freud’s metapsychology as both a theoretical and formal writing performed 
by the unconscious. On a theoretical level, the purpose would be to understand 
unconscious thought as a form of archaic writing. On the formal level, the purpose 
would be to invent a way of writing that could evoke this archaic writing.  
 
From this angle, Freud’s metapsychology would be an event of great epistemological 
subversion. This metapsychological project challenges the limits of two classical forms of 
access to knowledge: rationalism and empiricism with the hypothesis of an unconscious 
mode of thinking that would not have a sensory existence and that could not be reached 
through rational introspection. Hence, a Derridean reading of Freud’s metapsychology 
leads us to think “that the event of psychoanalysis was the advent, under the same name, 
of another concept of analysis. Of a concept different from the one that has held sway in the 
history of philosophy, logic, science. And at the same time a total displacement would 
have occurred in all the concepts that form a system with it. Beginning with the concept 
of truth” (Derrida, 1998[1996], p.19). 
                                                        
57 “La psychologisation contemporaine de la psychanalyse vise à vider l’inconscient de sa dynamique et 
exclut de ce fait la radicalité de la singularité subjective.” 
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“The central concepts of” the first part of Freud and the Scene of Writing “were those of 
presence and of archi-trace” wrote Derrida in his introduction to the text (Derrida, 
1978[1967], p.246). This first part is indeed a demonstration that Freud’s model of the 
psyche apprehends its objects not as the sign of a presence but through the archi-trace of 
an archaic writing in their absence. The alliance that Derrida formed with Freud rests on 
a reading of the psychic apparatus that does not experience objects in the mode of a 
presence but in the mode of an archaic writing: an archi-writing before speech. Derrida 
used this model of the psychic apparatus to analyze “a historical repression and 
suppression of writing since Plato. This repression constitutes the origin of philosophy as 
episteme, and of truth as the unity of logos and phone” (Ibid., p.246). Hence, Derrida did 
not propose another philosophical reading of Freud, but rather, he resumed Freud’s 
critical work towards philosophy.  
 
For this reason, I feel that Derrida’s use of Freud is faithful to the part of Freudian 
metapsychology that operates beyond a Weltanschauung of the logos. The basis of this 
Freudo-Derridian deconstruction of the logos stems from the hypothesis that “a 
lithography before words: metaphonetic, nonlinguistic, alogical” (Ibid., p. 259) would be 
at the core of subjectivity. As noticed by Alain Badiou, Derrida uses “writing” as “an act 
of thinking” (Badiou, 2008, p.123). From this angle, the archaic form of psychical writing 
is closely akin to Freud’s concept of the unconscious as it appears in the 1915 
metapsychological papers. In this chapter, I wish to extract three points from a reading 
of these metapsychological papers. First, I would like to show the hallucinatory 
dimension of the psychical writing. Secondly, I want to indicate the infantile sexual 
nature of this archaic writing. Thirdly, I will try to think of primary repression not as a 
moral censorship but as the irreducibility between psychical writing and a verbal mode of 
thinking. 
 
A Hallucinatory Writing 
 
In the last part of his paper The Unconscious, Freud proposed that the character of 
strangeness attributed to schizophrenic symptoms in comparison with those found in 
transference neurosis comes from the schizophrenic’s use of words (Freud, 1915c, 
p.200). The words that compose the speech of the schizophrenic are used in the 
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hallucinatory grammar of dreams: the primary psychical process made of condensations 
and displacement. Hence, the impression of strangeness comes from the hybrid nature of 
the schizophrenic language that hallucinates words or, to use Freud’s metapsychological 
terminology, that treats “word-presentations” like “thing-presentations”. In 
“schizophrenia object-cathexes are given up” but “the cathexis of the word-presentation 
is retained” (Ibid., p.201) and therefore words seem invaded by an unconscious mode of 
functioning: “all observers have been struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal 
is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be shown to 
be present in the Ucs. by psycho-analysis” (Freud, 1915c, p.197). 
 
The words of the schizophrenic are not in the service of the reality principle, but rather, 
in the service of the drives. Hence, words acquire a sort of magical power through which 
they incarnate what they represent. The psychotic is led “to feel that words are the actual 
thing” wrote Bion in his paper on the Differentiation of the Psychotic from the Non-Psychotic 
Personalities (Bion, 1967[1957], p.48). Because word-presentations appear as hallucinations 
of what they represent, the schizophrenic uses an “organ speech”: a speech in which 
language is divested of its symbolic function. Hanna Segal described this confusion as a 
use of speech in which the patient equates but does not symbolize (Segal, 1957): “The 
symbol does not represent the object, but is treated as though it was the object” (Segal, 
2001, p.150). 
 
In these ‘schizophrenic’ utterances or in the way “the dream-work occasionally treats 
words like things” the verbal language is invaded by an unconscious mode of thinking. 
This led Freud to the idea that “the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of 
things plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious 
presentation is the presentation of the thing alone” (Freud, 1915c, p.201). Bion argued 
that the psychotic does not live in a dream world but rather in a world in which objects’ 
presentations are used in a way equivalent to a dream (1967[1957]). Thus, the use of 
words, both in dreams and in the psychotic’s speech, reveals that word-presentations are 
haunted by thing-presentations. Derrida wrote: “It must be seen that insofar as they are 
attracted, lured into the dream, toward the ﬁctive limit of the primary process, words 
tend to become things pure and simple” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.275). Derrida wanted to 
show that dream-work, or the psychotic, puts “speech back in its place” because they 
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demonstrate the presence of a form of writing, which “exceeds phonetic writing” (Ibid., 
p.274).  
 
In his work, Derrida often refers to Artaud and, in particular, in Freud and the Scene of 
Writing, he stressed that Artaud resumed Freud’s attempt to identify how speech can be 
subordinated to a mode of thinking beyond the logos: “In point of fact, Freud, like 
Artaud later on, meant less the absence than the subordination of speech on the dream-
stage”(Ibid., p.274). What has been repressed “by so-called living, vigilant speech, by 
consciousness, logic, the history of language, etc.” is the hallucinatory dimension that is 
at work in the very “materiality” of words: “their scenic capacity, their Darstellbarkeit 
[their ‘representability’: their capacity to be represented] and all the forms of their 
spacing” (Ibid., p. 275). 
 
This conception of the system unconscious, populated by ‘thing-presentations’ 
functioning in a hallucinatory mode of thinking, goes way beyond a reductionist 
hermeneutic view of the unconscious. A hermeneutic model would reduce the 
unconscious to a container of hidden meanings: an unconscious understood as a psychic 
store of repressed mental contents that would only be accessible through the analytical 
process. Against such a view, Freud’s 1915 metapsychology papers present the 
unconscious as a system that generates a hallucinatory mode of thinking. 
 
In a letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé on the 1st of April 1915, Freud wrote that his paper 
The Unconscious “will contain a new definition of the term, which is really tantamount to 
an ‘agnostization’ [Agnoszierung]” (Andreas-Salomé, 1970[1912-1913], p.38). As Prado De 
Oliveira explained, ‘agnostization’ is a neologism, which “based on the German 
Agnoszierung, suggests a religious or sacred character, marked by a strong belief, linked to 
the unconscious beforehand. Freud intends to propose a new definition, agnostic. A 
keen study of his text allows us to conclude in which sense his definition was a new one, 
not as much concerning the thesis of his times on the subject, but mainly concerning the 
Freudian approaches themselves” (Prado de Oliveira, 2005, p.109).  
 
The concept of the unconscious had been mainly described through its symbolic 
expression: the discovery that the neurotic symptom had an unconscious meaning. 
Beyond the ‘exegesis’ of the symptom and the ‘religious’ quest for the hidden meaning, 
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Freud’s new approach in his metapsychological papers is to apprehend the concept of the unconscious 
through its mode of functioning. Rather than the unconscious meaning of a symptom, the 
question becomes: how can an unconscious idea trigger a symptom? What is the nature 
of unconscious thinking if it can generate a dream or a symptom? 
 
At the core of the description of this unconscious mode of thinking we can find the 
paradoxical notion of ‘unconscious presentation’. The German word for ‘presentation’ is 
‘Vorstellung’. In the Standard Edition, James Strachey has translated it by ‘idea’ or by 
‘presentation’. Here I will translate ‘Vorstellung’ only by ‘presentation’, which seems to me 
more faithful to the philosophical origins of the word. Indeed, ‘Vorstellung’ is a key 
concept of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Ola Anderson pointed out the 
possible influence that the notion of a ‘mechanic of presentations’ [Vorstellungsmechanik] 
developed by Johann Friedrich Herbart may have had on Freud: “Herbartianism was the 
dominant psychology in the scientific world in which Freud lived during the formative 
years of his scientific development. During that time psychological discussion in Austria 
was almost exclusively conducted in terms of “Vorstellungsmechanik” (Anderson, 1962, 
p.224).  
 
The notion of presentation also came to Freud through the work of Franz Brentano. 
Freud absorbed his philosophical assumption “that every mental state can be analyzed 
into two components”: a presentation and its charge of affect (Wollheim, 1971, p.35). 
However, Freud would propose that the concept of presentation also has a latent 
content. Freud would show the ‘unobservable’ side of Brentano’s presentation. 58  In 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, published in 1874 while Freud was studying with 
him, Brentano developed a view in which a ‘presentation’ is not a psychical content, nor 
the idea derived from an object, but the perception of the object in its actuality: the 
‘presentation’ is not the colour but the vision of the colour. Hence, Brentano’s concept 
remains empirical since a presentation is the outcome of the world as perceived by the 
senses.  
 
This understanding of presentation is at the root of Brentano’s rational psychology. 
Everyone has private access to one’s own presentation and by “introspection, properly 
                                                        
58 Freud often takes over major philosophical concepts in a curious way. To paraphrase Gilles Deleuze, it is 
as if he was making illegitimate children with the philosophers from whom he borrows concepts.   
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conducted, everyone can collect facts about one’s own mental life”. As explained by 
Clark Glymour, Brentano thought “there must be regularities revealed in any one 
person’s mental life, and the regularities will be the same from person to person. Those 
regularities are the laws of mental life, and to find them is the proper goal of empirical 
psychology” (Glymour, 1991, p.47). In fact, Brentano’s concept of presentation 
prefigures Husserl’s phenomenology more than Freud’s metapsychology. 
 
Indeed, Freud used the concept of ‘presentation’ in an original way that led him to this 
specifically Freudian notion of ‘unconscious presentation’: not a mental phenomenon 
that can be observed through inner perception but a mental process that is both active 
and unconscious at the same time. A mental process that is not a perception but a 
transformation of the object and whose functioning draws the outlines of psychical 
reality. Unlike Brentano, Freud’s concept of presentation does not rest on the subject’s 
sensitive presence to the world. On the contrary, it describes a psyche, which experiences 
the object in its absence. 
 
The unconscious ‘thing-presentation’ does not consist in the cathexis of the direct 
memory-image of the thing, but “of remoter memory-traces derived from these” (Freud, 
1915c, p.201). In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud gets more specific: the “unconscious 
(thing-) presentation of the object (…) is made up of innumerable” unconscious traces 
derived from single impressions (Freud, 1917[1915]b, p.256). To describe ‘an 
unconscious presentation’ as ‘a cathected memory-trace’ puts us on the trail of the 
Freudian unconscious functioning as a psychical writing that cannot be subjected to 
consciousness. The ideational content of a memory-trace is registered under the force (or 
cathexis) of a hallucinatory wish. It is a hallucinatory impression that has never been 
perceived. Derrida describes it as a “subterranean toil of an impression. This impression 
has left behind a laborious trace which has never been perceived, whose meaning has 
never been lived in the present, i.e., has never been lived consciously” (Derrida, 
1978[1967], p.269).  
 
Freud distinguished memory-traces in which the experiences of the Ucs. are fixed from 
conscious memory. Memory-traces do not correspond to memories of past events but to 
the recollection of past wishes: rather than pictures of objects from the past they are 
hallucinations in the absence of the objects. The external object becomes a psychical 
 122 
content through the trace that is hallucinated in its absence. Hence, at the level of 
memory an external object is hallucinated before being perceived. It is this 
metapsychological paradox that Derrida translated into the language of ontology: “Life 
must be thought of as trace before Being may be determined as presence”(Ibid., p.255). 
 
The experiment of ‘post-hypnotic suggestion’ illustrates a situation in which an 
intentional content is received without being perceived. The post-hypnotic suggestion 
was used by Freud throughout his work as “a laboratory production” to demonstrate 
that a presentation can be “active and unconscious at the same time” (Freud, 1912b, p.261). 59 
The trace of the hypnotizer’s suggestion is first inscribed into the mind of the 
hypnotized, in a condition of latency and secondly, the post-hypnotized subject 
consciously fulfils the suggestion, though the motivation remains unconscious. Hypnotic 
suggestion is an unconscious presentation – an unconscious intentional content – that 
has never been present to consciousness.  
 
What makes the hypnotic suggestion active is its hallucinatory nature. The hallucinatory 
mode of thinking is performative, what is thought is created: “unconscious processes 
(…) equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with their fulfilment 
(Freud, 1911b, p.225). Monique David-Ménard described how the hysterical symptom 
organizes the body in an hallucinatory “regime of desire”: the “hysteric posits the object 
of her desire in the element of presence – as if it were there” (David-Ménard, 
1989[1983], p.110). To stress the performative aspect of the hysterical symptom, David-
Ménard coined the translation “presentification” for the German notion of Darstellung.60 
The hysterical symptom is a “presentification” of a hallucinatory mode of thinking 
of/through the body. 
 
Thing-presentations created by the hallucinatory mode of thinking generate a reality: the 
psychical reality. Hence, those presentations have a psychical truth-value. To an extent 
we “submit ourselves to material reality out of obligation. We have to in order to survive 
and even to live. However, what drives us, in our self is the unconscious thing-
                                                        
59 Freud had originally witnessed the experiment of post-hypnotic suggestion in the summer of 1889 when 
he went to observe Hyppolite Bernheim’s work in Nancy. He mentioned it in Psychical (or Mental) Treatment 
(1905 [1890]); A Note on the Unconscious (1912b); The Unconscious (1915c); Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-
Analysis (1940[1938]c).   
60 In the conclusion of chapter 6, I discuss the various translations that have been proposed for 
‘Darstellung’. 
 123 
presentation of psychical reality” (Green, 1995, p. 116, my translation).61 For that very 
reason the presentations produced by the hallucinatory mode of thinking are similar to 
the suggestions that the hypnotized receives from the hypnotist. 
 
In a pre-analytic paper written in 1890 for a collective work on medicine entitled Health 
[Die Gesundheit] Freud had noticed that the hypnotic subject “has been seeing and hearing 
just as we see and hear in dreams–he has been ‘hallucinating’” (Freud, 1905[1890], 
p.296).62 Moreover, he concluded this paper with the intuition that will remain at the core 
of his metapsychological work: “the beginnings of [mental life] are based precisely on 
hypnotic experience” (Ibid., p.302). The state of hypnosis puts forward a hallucinatory 
mode of thinking and the hypnotized understands the messages from the hypnotist as 
orders. It is as if, at the core of the self, a hypnotist was to be found who produces 
suggestions. Except that this hypnotist would use the enigmatic language of unconscious 
presentations. 
 
Freud’s metapsychological texts propose a “fiction” that describes the genesis of the 
structure and function of the mental apparatus. In this fiction, “at the beginning of our 
mental life we did in fact hallucinate the satisfying object when we felt the need for it” 
(Freud, 1917[1915]a, p.231). Hence, according to Freud, the hallucinatory perception of 
reality that appears in dreams or in hypnosis is also the way through which psychic life 
begins, with “the constitution of a scene below any distinction between the subject and 
the object” (Safatle, 2011, p.402). 
 
Through this primary hallucinatory mode of thinking a biological need is transformed 
into a psychical wish. The mnemic image linked to the object subjectively perceived in 
‘the experience of satisfaction’ (of a need) is reinvented under the form of a presentation 
in the hallucinatory experience of the wish. As a consequence, psychical reality must be 
distinguished from the subjective perception of material reality. Jean Laplanche proposed 
to name the latter ‘psychological reality’ (Laplanche, 1999, p.77). Freud usually 
distinguishes two levels of reality: psychical reality and material reality. To add this third 
                                                        
61 “Nous nous soumettons à la réalité matérielle par force. Il le faut bien pour survivre et même pour vivre. 
Mais ce qui nous meut, en notre for intérieur, c’est la représentation-chose inconsciente de la réalité 
psychique.” 
 
62  This paper was first dated 1905, which is in fact the date of the third edition of this collective work. Saul 
Rosenzweig, Professor at Washington University corrected the mistake in 1966. 
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level of ‘psychological reality’ clarifies the specificity of psychical reality. The ‘object’ 
belongs to material reality. The subjective ‘mnemic image’ attached to the perception of 
the object belongs to psychological reality. The ‘presentation’, which is the result of the 
‘mnemic image’ reinvented through a hallucinatory mode of thinking, belongs to 
psychical reality.  
 
Psychical reality transforms the subjective perception of material reality into a 
hallucinatory unconscious reality. It is the outcome of a hallucinatory mode of thinking 
that escapes consciousness and can be understood as a psychical writing made of 
‘unconscious presentations’. An unconscious presentation is a cathected memory-trace: it 
results from a hallucinatory act that has never been present to consciousness. In 
Derrida’s view, in as much as a memory-trace differs from the material of consciousness, 
it can be described as a “psychical writing”: a form of psychical registration that cannot 
be linked to words. Thus through his reading of Freud, Derrida can describe memory as 
the interpretation of a text that has never been present to consciousness. 
 
To understand Derrida’s idea, it is necessary to go back to a question put forward by 
Freud in his paper The Unconscious. When he approached the system Ucs. from a 
topographical point of view, Freud raised the question of how a presentation “is 
transposed from the system Ucs. into the system Cs.” (Freud, 1915c, p.174). Freud 
considered two hypotheses. First, the topographical hypothesis that implies a topographical 
change: the conscious presentation is a fresh registration of the unconscious one in a 
new localization of the psychic apparatus. Secondly, the functional hypothesis according to 
which “the transposition consists” of a functional change in the state of the presentation, 
“a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality” (Ibid., p.174). 
To sum up: from the viewpoint of the first hypothesis, the difference between the system 
Ucs. and Cs. would be a topographical separation and from the viewpoint of the second, 
the difference would be a functional change of state.  
 
The analysis of schizophrenia in the last chapter of the paper leads Freud to refute both 
the topographical and the functional hypotheses. In this chapter, Freud proposed that, 
“the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the 
presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the 
presentation of the thing alone” (Ibid., p.201). Therefore a presentation is transposed 
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from the system Ucs. into the system Cs. by the “thing-presentation being hypercathected 
through being linked with the word-presentation corresponding to it” (Ibid., p.202). 
Thus, the conscious presentation acquires a new qualitative registration.  
 
The difference between the system Ucs. and Cs. is not topographical nor is it functional 
but rather qualitative and I propose to name this third hypothesis, which has Freud’s 
blessing, the qualitative hypothesis. Thing-presentations are “in themselves without quality 
and unconscious, and (…) they attain their capacity to become conscious only through 
being linked with residues of perceptions of words” (Ibid., p.202). The system Ucs. can be 
described as a non-qualitative registration system: a system made of traces, which is 
absent from the registration system made of words. The subject is lived by the 
hallucinatory cathexis of a text made of non-qualitative traces and, following Derrida, the 
act of memory can then be described as the attempt to interpret this non-qualitative text, 
a text that resists the logos. 
 
An Aboriginal Population in the Mind 
 
When reading Writing and Difference, one can have the impression that Derrida’s intention 
was to put the structuralist endeavour into brackets: to pause in front of its intellectual 
mechanics in order to question its presuppositions. The first sentence of Force and 
Signification, the text opening Writing and Difference, presents structuralism as a past-
artefact: “If it recedes one day, leaving behind its works and signs on the shores of our 
civilization, the structuralist invasion might become a question for the historian of ideas, 
or perhaps even an object”(Derrida, 1978[1967], p.1). Derrida wrote this text in 1963, 
three years before the public peak of structuralism, and yet it seems that he already tried 
to grasp its breaking point. Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences – the 
text closing Writing and Difference – was a paper given by Derrida in the autumn of 1966 at 
the symposium organised in Baltimore to introduce structuralism in America. However, 
this text again put into question the system by which structuralism operates. In an 
interview, David Carroll gave to Derrida’s biographer Benoit Peeters, he remembers: “we 
were just discovering structuralism and yet he was already challenging what we were 
beginning to learn” (Peeters, 2010, p.210-211). 
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Derrida takes up the structuralist critique of language, but beyond that, he tries to locate 
the premises that are both inherited by this critique and against which the critique was 
built. It is, in a way, the tragedy of critical discourse that it “borrows from a heritage the 
resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself” (Derrida, 1978[1967], 
p.357). Derrida’s term “différance” that appears in the last paragraph of the text, points 
towards this ‘vanishing point’ within the structuralist critical discourse. As Alain Badiou 
points out, it is principally this idea of a vanishing point through which Derrida detaches 
himself from structuralism (Badiou, 2008, p.124). This is the idea that, for any form 
through which a discourse articulates itself, there is a point that escapes its articulation.  
 
In his writing, Derrida attempted to map those points that resist the logic of discourse, 
which “escape the order of the sign” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.369). This aspect of 
Derrida’s research did not aim to decipher the true meaning of a discourse but rather to 
locate the moments in a discourse that cannot be brought back toward its truth or an 
origin. In fact, such vanishing points can never be observed in their full presence: they 
“must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence” (Ibid., p.369). 
They are the type of objects that resist being observed in their positivity, in as much as 
they are always, so to speak, traces ‘on the run’. 
 
In accompanying Derrida in this approach, we can perceive how Freud’s 
metapsychological concept of the unconscious resists both direct observation and 
transparent interpretation, but manifests itself through vanishing points: a “sort of 
fatalism or pessimism” of the metapsychological unconscious “that reckons with a 
portion of darkness and situates the unanalyzable as its very resource” (Derrida, 
1998[1996], p. 16). In Derrida’s reading of Freud the system Ucs. is not a neural organ 
nor a metaphysical entity but an archi-text. The psychical writing of this text is not made 
of signs but of “archi-traces” or of an “archi-writing”. An “archi-writing” cannot be 
compared with the various graphic systems that have been invented to represent speech. 
It is rather an archaic writing that precedes speech and makes it possible. Derrida’s 
intuition is “that the generally admitted relations between speech and writing (and the 
traditional primacy of speech) rest on a dubious argumentation, to the extent that these 
relations must draw their possibility from an earlier root: we call this root (…) “archi-
writing” ”(Bennington, 1993[1991], p.60). 
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The archi-traces that compose the unconscious psychical writing are not signifiers 
referring to other signifiers. The trace is not, for instance, the internal presentation of the 
breast referring to the external breast-object, but is rather the way the perception of the 
breast-object is replaced by its hallucination. In the hallucinatory creation of the trace, 
the reference to the external object is scrambled. Jean Laplanche explained that he could 
speak of a “realism of the unconscious” (1999, p.76) precisely because, in the shift 
towards an unconscious status, the idea loses its direct reference to an external thing: an 
unconscious presentation has its own hallucinatory reality that is detached from 
perceived reality. Bion would describe how the primitive hallucinatory thought is in fact 
forced by a perceptual void: “primitive thought springs from experience of a non-
existence object, or, in other terms, of the place where the object is expected to be, but is 
not” (Bion, 1965, p. 51). Hence, in their practical attempts to read Freud’s 
metapsychology, both Laplanche and Bion conceive a primitive hallucinatory idea that 
would have lost its reference to the object. 
 
It seems to me that this proposal raises a question: how to conceive of a primitive 
thought detached from perceived reality? Indeed, a primitive thinking detached from 
reality would suppose a set of presentations that pre-exist the existence of the subject. 
What would the mental code of such a primitive mode of thought be? To conceive of 
primitive thought as formed of archi-traces also provides an answer to this question 
because it indicates a thought that rewrites perception beyond the scene that gave birth 
to those perceptions. Derrida built the concept of archi-trace from the intuition that a 
system of writing was a necessary condition of speech. Consequently, the concept of 
archi-trace is operational beyond the empirical manifestation of language, beyond the 
origins of what it makes possible. Derrida therefore describes the archi-trace as a “quasi 
transcendental” concept, a concept “more ‘ancient’ than the origin” (Derrida, 
1998[1996], p. 29). A memory made of trace would have resources that pre-exist its 
origin. 
 
In a paper that aims at explaining the Freudian roots of Derrida’s concept of memory, 
Vladimir Safatle pointed out that, from the concept of the unconscious memory-trace, 
Derrida discovered in Freud an understanding of “temporality very similar to the one 
that ‘deconstruction’ discovers through its own means” (Safatle, 2011, p.403). If 
Derrida’s deconstruction “is also the interminable drama of analysis” (Derrida, 
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1998[1996], p. 29) it is because it raises the question of an absolute past. The 
impossibility for the memory-trace “of re-animating absolutely the manifest evidence of 
an originary presence refers us (…) to a past that can no longer be understood in the 
form of a modified presence, as a present-past” but “refers to an absolute past” (Derrida, 
1976[1967], p.67).  
 
The psychic writing of the system unconscious would, therefore, be a primary form of 
thinking that does pre-exist speech and whose presentations do pre-exist the history of 
the subject. The unconscious text “is not a past present text, a text which is past as 
having been present. The text is not conceivable in an originary or modified form of 
presence. The unconscious text is already a weave of pure traces, differences in which 
meaning and force are united – a text nowhere present, consisting of archives which are 
always already transcriptions”(Derrida, 1978[1967], p.265-266).  
 
The unconscious text confronts the subject with presentations that are both 
transcendental archives and immanent transcriptions. Through its developmental history, 
each subject reinvents presentations that do not correspond to any past-events, 
“repositories of a meaning which was never present, whose signiﬁed presence is always 
reconstituted by deferral”(Ibid., p.266). Psychic writing can thus be described as a ‘quasi-
transcendental’ and ‘supra-temporal’ text that forces its way into the subjective 
perception of the external object.  
 
From this angle, the system unconscious is not “a vestigial organ, a residuum from the 
process of development” (Freud, 1915c, p.194) that would preserve repressed past 
memories, but a dynamic mode of thinking through which perceptions are transformed 
into a psychic writing made of archaic traces. Unconscious traces can be thought of as 
archaic not only because they are preverbal, but also because they are irreducible to a 
point of origin in the subject: they manifest themselves through an exteriority to the 
subject. When he compared the content of the system unconscious “with an aboriginal 
population in the mind” (Ibid., p.195), Freud described this irreducible otherness of 
unconscious traces, which creates a mode of thinking beyond the function of the logos. 
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Unconscious thinking operates through presentations that are in a position of otherness 
from the inside: both primary and non-assimilated by the mind. 63 
 
What motivates the transformation of perceptions into unconscious traces is the internal 
psychical force that Freud named the drive [Trieb]. Because they, “maintain an incessant 
and unavoidable afflux of stimulation” which “originate from within the organism” the 
drives “oblige the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli” 
(Freud, 1915a, p.120). In other words, drives threaten the homeostatic function of the 
nervous system. 
 
In her reading of Freud’s metapsychology, Catherine Malabou explains how this 
psychical energy that the nervous system fails to regulate, gives birth to another system, 
which is “in a sense external to the nervous system”: the psychic apparatus (Malabou, 
2012, p.32).64 Such a proposal is not equivalent to the hypothesis of a psychic energy that 
would be separated from nervous energy. As Malabou notes, “there are not two types of 
energy but rather a differentiated organization of energy that is implemented in order to 
address the problem of compatibility of the inside with itself” (Ibid., p.32). The psychic 
apparatus is this “other inside” that strives to contain this form of ‘aboriginal’ nervous 
energy: an energy, which operates in a mode of externality from the inside. 
 
In a paper written in 2000, that strives to understand the breaking point between 
attachment theory and infantile sexuality, Jean Laplanche explained that only sexual 
drives would challenge a homeostatic functioning of the mind (Laplanche, 2007[2000]b). 
Laplanche stressed that in Freud’s first drives dualism, the economy of the self-
preservation drive is adaptive and regulated by the principle of constancy, when, on the 
other hand, the economy of the sexual drive operates beyond any optimal level. To 
explain the articulation between attachment and the manifestation of infantile sexuality, 
                                                        
63 An unconscious “presentation is made up of innumerable single impressions (or unconscious traces of 
them)” (Freud, 1917[1915]b, p. 256).   
 
64 “The only way to engage the drive through its aim, which is to achieve satisfaction and to maintain 
excitation at the lowest possible levels, is to divert the urgency of the drive from the inside, to deport the 
inside of the drive itself into another inside than that of the nervous system–another inside that thereby 
becomes, in a sense, external to the nervous system. This other inside is constituted by the psychic 
apparatus.” (Malabou, 2012, p.32) 
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Laplanche uses Freud’s notion of anaclisis [Anlehnung]: the infantile sexual non-
homeostatic energy leans on the attachment adaptive energy. 65  
 
In as much as the psychic apparatus is understood as the system that deals with infantile 
sexual energy, I propose that there would be an anaclitic relationship between the 
nervous system and the psychic apparatus: the psychic apparatus leans on the nervous system. 
From an infantile sexual energy that functions beyond homeostasis, the psychic 
apparatus generates thoughts that operate beyond the logos. In correspondence with an 
economy of psychical energy that exhausts the mind there is a production of forms 
“which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric closure”: an aboriginal 
population in the mind. 
 
In 1915, Freud would speculate about two forms of unconscious presentations generated 
by the drives. The first were “inherited mental formations (…) something analogous to 
instincts [Instinkt] in animals–these constitute the nucleus of the Ucs.” and the second 
were “what is discarded during childhood development as unserviceable” (Freud, 1915c, 
p.195). I would like to explain how the first of these two forms could be read as the core 
of unconscious phantasies and the second as auto-erotism. Thus, I hope to show that the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking appears through infantile sexuality. 
 
Behind the hypothesis of “inherited mental formations” one can sense the notion of 
‘primal phantasies’. During the following years, in Lecture XXIII of the Introductory 
Lectures (1916-17[1915-1917) and in the ‘Wolf Man’ case history (1918[1914]), Freud 
would develop his speculations about primal phantasies. The concept had already been 
foreshadowed in Totem and Taboo (1913[1912-1913), which “was the first stage towards 
overcoming a strictly ontogenetic causality that witnessed the introduction of a second 
pole of memory, collective rather than individual, anthropological and socio-historical 
rather than bio-psychological, hereditary rather than acquired” (Green, 2007, p.10). 
However, at the stage of Totem and Taboo, the question of an inheritance from the earliest 
time of the species “was confined to the anthropological pole”(Ibid., p.13). At the time of 
                                                        
65 The notion of anaclisis was central to Laplanche’s reading of Freud from the elaboration of The Language 
of Psychoanalysis with Jean-Bertrand Pontalis in 1967 and his work Life and Death in Psychoanalysis in 1970. It 
also plays a key role in Laplanche’s general theory of seduction. In his translation of Life and Death in 
Psychoanalysis, Jeffrey Mehlman, used the term Propping to render Laplanche’s notion of Etayage.   
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the metapsychological papers, the hypothesis of phylogenetic patterns began to be 
formulated through the question of the aetiology of neurosis.66 
 
Freud first used the notion of primal phantasies in a published text in, A Case of Paranoia 
Running Counter to the Psycho-Analytic Theory of the Disease (1915d). This text describes the 
paranoic delusion of a young woman:67 
 
Lying partly undressed on the sofa beside her lover, she heard a noise like a 
click or beat. She did not know its cause, but she arrived at an interpretation 
of it after meeting two men on the staircase, one of whom was carrying 
something that looked like a covered box. She became convinced that 
someone acting on instructions from her lover had watched and 
photographed her during their intimate tête-à-tête. (Freud, 1915d, pp.268-269) 
 
Freud makes clear that if the “unlucky noise” had not occurred, the delusion would have 
been built around another accidental event. In the same way that the post-hypnotized 
subject would always find fortuitous elements to explain why he enacts a suggestion he 
ignores, the young woman elaborates a fiction to justify the suggestion of an unconscious 
phantasy: as Freud presents it, the phantasy of watching sexual intercourse between the 
parents. The intimate situation perceived in her adult body “activated” an infantile 
phantasy around which she elaborated the conscious fiction of being watched.  
 
To my reading, the crucial point is the link between sensations of the body and 
unconscious thinking. In the perspective of this link, Freud goes very far in this text 
since he speculated that there was not any noise to be heard at all but that it could have 
been “a sensation of a knock or beat in her clitoris (…) that she subsequently projected 
                                                        
66 The discovery in 1985 by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis of a manuscript that Freud had written in 1915 and sent 
to Ferenczi, confirmed Freud’s interest in the link between phylogenetic phantasies and neuroses at this 
stage in his work. The manuscript was published in English in 1987 under the title A Phylogenetic Fantasy: 
Overview of the Transference Neuroses.  
 
67 In the Schreber Case (1911a), Freud had put forward the view that patients suffering from paranoia were 
“struggling against an intensification of their homosexual trend–a fact pointing back to a narcissistic 
object-choice” (Freud, 1915d, p.265). The question raised by this later paper is whether this view should be 
challenged by the observation of a case in which a “girl seemed to be defending herself against love for a 
man by directly transforming the lover into a persecutor” with “no trace of a struggle against a homosexual 
attachment”(Ibid., p.265). Through the analysis of “the development of the delusion” Freud shows that the 
delusion was “at first aimed against” a woman and how “on this paranoic basis, the advance from a female to a 
male object was accomplished” (Ibid., p.271). 
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as a perception of an external object” (Ibid., p.270). In other words, a bodily sensation 
created an auditory presentation, which is a component of the phantasy of overhearing 
sexual intercourse between the parents. What I name the hallucinatory mode of thinking 
is an unconscious thinking - an unconscious production of presentations - created by the 
“erotogenic zones” of the body, which is to say, created by the whole body and its 
internal organs. Indeed, in his introduction to On Narcissism written the year before, 
Freud had redefined the erotogenic zones as the parts of the body, which “may act as 
substitutes for the genitals and behave analogously to them” but also “we can decide to 
regard erotogenecity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then speak of an 
increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body”68 (Freud, 1914c, p.84). 
 
In the introduction to the Schreber Case, Freud had written that the paranoiac patient 
possesses “the peculiarity of betraying (in a distorted form, it is true) precisely those 
things which other neurotics keep hidden as a secret” (Freud, 1911a, p. 9). The secret 
revealed by the young woman’s paranoiac delusion is the manifestation of an infantile 
mode of thinking in her adult mind: erotogenic zones ‘think’ through a hallucinatory mode. The 
forms created by this primary thinking would draw unconscious categories that predate 
them: the primal phantasies. The beat in her clitoris becomes the noise of the primal 
scene: “the sounds which betray parental intercourse or those by which the listening 
child fears to betray itself” (Freud, 1915d, p.269). 
 
Freud forged the concept of primal phantasy because he found it “necessary to postulate 
an organization” made of presentations “anteceding the effect of the event and the 
signified as a whole” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 2003[1964], p.122). In A Case of Paranoia, 
Freud mentioned three primal phantasies that would belong to “the store of unconscious 
phantasies of all neurotics, and probably of all human beings”: the phantasy “of the 
observation of sexual intercourse between the parents”, the one “of seduction” and the 
one “of castration” (Freud, 1915d, p.269). Laplanche and Pontalis pointed out that in 
“their content, in their theme” these three primal phantasies “relate to the origins. Like 
myths, they claim to provide a representation of, and a solution to, the major enigmas 
which confront the child”: “the primal scene pictures of the origin of the individual; 
                                                        
68 In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud would write: “The most prominent of the parts of the body from 
which this libido arises are known by the name of ‘erotogenic zones’, though in fact the whole body is an 
erotogenic zone of this kind” (Freud, 1940[1938]a, p.151).  
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phantasies of seduction, the origin and upsurge of sexuality; phantasies of castration, the 
origin of the difference between the sexes” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 2003[1964], p.124).  
Beneath the diversity of individuals, primal phantasies would be the way through which 
the subject is inhabited by the question of origin that escapes his/her own origin: the 
experience of being haunted by questions that come from a virtual memory. Hence, I 
propose that the hallucinatory mode of thinking would be a primary infantile mode of 
thinking that survives in the adult’s subjectivity as an unconscious thinking, which would 
be written in the text of the erotogenic zones and the text of the primal phantasies. We 
hallucinate what we perceive through a text made of erotogenic zones that confront us with the meaning of 
the virtual memory of the ones who have preceded us.  
 
The hallucinatory mode of thinking escapes any metaphysic of presence since a text 
made of erotogenic zones or primal phantasies cannot be brought back to any primary 
starting point. The subject hallucinates forms that have never been present to its 
consciousness: in the play of presentations generated by the hallucinatory mode of 
thinking, the points of origin become ungraspable. The origins of the hallucinatory mode 
of thinking are ungraspable because they escape the history of the subject. The process 
of thoughts starts with ideas that contain an externality to the subject.  
 
Rather than locating consciousness at the centre of mental life, Freud’s metapsychology 
suggests that thought is determined by unconscious ideas whose foundations seem alien 
to the subject who experiences them. The hallucinatory mode of thinking creates 
presentations that belong to the past of the human species (to the ‘human animality’) and 
to the enigmatic past of infantile sexuality. 69 
 
The difficulty raised by the aetiology of psychoneurosis comes precisely from the fact 
that it cannot be explained through causality internal to the subject’s history. 
Manifestations of psychoneurosis reveal ideas that belong to an ‘absolute past’ and that 
proceed from an ‘insuperable enigmatic’. In the ontogenesis imagined by Freud, there are 
vanishing points towards irreducible otherness. A historical otherness: the otherness of 
the species in the case of the primal phantasies and a bodily otherness: the otherness of 
infantile sexuality in the case of the erotogenic zones. 
                                                        
69 With the introduction of the death drive in Freud’s metapsychology, this is a past, which is beyond even 
that of the species: a sort of cosmological past that participates in the genesis of human subjectivity.   
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Let us try to understand how the erotogenic zones could constitute an otherness of the 
body. Erotogenic zones emerge from the hallucinatory rewriting of the absent object 
[Objektlösigkeit]. The autoerotic functioning of erotogenic zones corresponds neither to a 
primary state of total absence of the object, nor to the presence from the beginning of a 
sexual object, but to the reinvention of the object in its absence. As explained by Jean 
Laplanche in the first chapter of Life and Death in Psychoanalysis: 
 
there is from the beginning an object, but (…) on the other hand sexuality does not have, 
from the beginning a real object. It should be understood that the real object, milk, 
was the object of the function, which is virtually preordained to the world of 
satisfaction. Such is the real object which has been lost, but the object linked 
to the autoerotic turn, the breast–become a fantasmatic breast (…). Thus the 
sexual object is not identical to the object of the function, but is displaced in 
relation to it(Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.19-20). 
 
In its absence, the object of the function is displaced into a fantasmatic object. This 
displacement is operated through a writing of the body and the erotogenic zones are the 
outcome of this bodily writing. Ana-Maria Rizzuto has shown that from On Aphasia 
(1953[1891]), Freud recognized that all object presentations [Objektvorstellung], “however 
removed from real objects they might be, are related to bodily representations. The mind 
is the body in representation and its later elaborations” (Rizzuto, 1990, p.246).  
 
I propose that infantile sexuality emerges in this representation of the body. The infantile 
body is a territory on which the infant hallucinates objects or partial objects: breast, penis 
and other components of bodily life. The infantile body is a sort of palimpsest and 
infantile sexuality “can thus be thought of as a history of the semiotic body, a history of 
the meaning the body acquires over time, rather than as a history of the body that is 
independent of semiosis” (Golomb Hoffman, 2006, p. 400). Julia Kristeva has proposed 
naming this pre-verbal semiotic of the infantile body “le semiotique” as opposed to 
semiotics proper (“la semiotic”). She argues that it can be found in any given linguistic 
code where it does not represent the drives but is a manifestation of the drives and 
therefore acts as a threat to the symbolic capacity of language (Kristeva, 1982). 
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The peculiarity of this semiotic of the infantile body is that it is made of hallucinatory 
traces whose characteristics are well described by Golomb Hoffman: “body-images that 
precede language and locate the body in the realm of pictorial thought. Later in life, 
associations supply the pathway through which one regains access to early images and 
sensations by connecting unconscious memories or memory-traces to words and 
enabling them to reach consciousness” (Ibid., p409). Thus, the object at the origin of the 
hallucinatory trace is ‘refound’ from the hallucinatory trace or, as in Freud’s famous 
expression: “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (Freud, 1905, p.222). At 
the level of infant subjectivity, the real object of self-preservation is constituted 
reciprocally from the sexual object hallucinated onto the body. The hallucinatory trace 
becomes the origin of the origin and precisely for that reason can be described through 
Derrida’s concept of the archi-trace: a concept that wrenches “the concept of the trace 
from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary 
nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an 
originary trace or archi-trace” (Derrida, 1976[1966], p.62). 
 
To Verbalize is to Repress 
 
In the last part of this chapter, I would like to think of the concept of repression as the 
impossibility of an exhaustive transcription of hallucinatory traces into word-presentations. 
 
The knowledge drawn upon by Freud from dreams, infancy and madness demonstrates 
the hallucinatory core of the psychic apparatus. The first kind of mental process is the 
unconscious mental process. In Freud’s metapsychological account, in the beginning was 
the unconscious, primary consciousness being reduced to the sense organs monitoring 
the psychical qualities of pleasure and unpleasure: it “is probable that thinking was 
originally unconscious (…) and that it did not acquire further qualities, perceptible to 
consciousness, until it became connected with verbal residues” (Freud, 1911b, p.221). A 
mode of thinking of consciousness emerges from a verbal mode of thinking: the capacity for 
an idea to be connected with verbal presentation “whose residues of quality are sufficient 
to draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process of thinking 
with a new mobile cathexis from consciousness” (Freud, 1900, p.617). 
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I would like to put forward the hypothesis that this verbal mode of thinking specific to 
consciousness covers and hides the hallucinatory mode of thinking specific to the system 
unconscious. I propose to consider repression in the light of this hypothesis. In his paper 
on Repression, Freud indicated, “repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present 
from the beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred between 
conscious and unconscious mental activity” (Freud, 1915b, p.147). Since conscious 
mental activity is characterized by a verbal mode of thinking, Freud’s statement can be 
rewritten: repression cannot arise until the acquisition of a verbal mode of thinking.70 
Hence, primal repression: the first phase of repression, which consists of the psychical 
representative of the drive being denied entrance into the conscious, corresponds to 
thoughts that cannot be connected with verbal presentations and as a consequence these 
thoughts exist only in a hallucinatory form. 
 
A primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal mode of thinking 
cohabit in the human psyche, but these two modes of thinking are not in a one-to-one 
correspondence. The censorship exercised by primal repression would not be a moral 
matter but rather the outcome of the irreducibility of two modes of thinking: because of 
the limits of language, some thing-presentations are caught in a hallucinatory mode of 
thinking. Presentations that cannot be expressed in the language of consciousness 
establish ‘fixations’ to very primitive thoughts in the mental apparatus – primitive, not 
only because of the hallucinatory mode of thinking that produced them, but also because 
of the bodily aspect of these thoughts. Infantile fixations in the unconscious are 
hallucinations produced by the anus, the mouth, the genitals and any regions of the body 
that can operate as an erotogenic zone. The various libidinal stages would correspond to 
the erotogenic zones through which thing-presentations are hallucinated. The infant 
would create presentations from memory traces of the external objects through specific 
erotogenic parts of its body.  
 
Hence, the hallucinatory mode of thinking is closely linked with infantile sexuality 
because it is produced from parts of the body that are capable of producing sexual 
excitations. The connection between the primitive hallucinatory mode of thinking and 
infantile sexuality also has an exogenous origin. Through the care carried out by the 
                                                        
70 Before this stage, the defensive mechanisms have a hallucinatory nature whose complexity was first 
explored by Melanie Klein.  
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adult, the infant also receives elements of the adult’s sexuality. Not only a set of 
erotogenic stimuli (rubbings, quivering, smells, warmth…) but also, in a more enigmatic 
way, the infant receives something of the conscious and unconscious fantasies through 
which the adult invests his/her own body. The hallucinatory presentations created from 
parts of the adult body involve (in a complex way) the different stimuli and messages 
received from the adult. 
 
Jean Laplanche has explored the enigmatic dimension of infantile sexuality in his general 
theory of seduction (Laplanche, 1999). Laplanche defends the idea that infantile sexuality has 
an exogenous origin. The adult, in the primary relationship between the adult and the 
infant, introduces infantile sexuality into the infant. The messages sent by the adult to the 
infant are compromised by the sexual unconscious of the adult. As a consequence, part 
of the adult’s message remains enigmatic for the infant. Laplanche understands the 
process of repression as a repeated attempt to translate this enigmatic message. 
 
Laplanche’s general theory of seduction evokes the controversial paper on the Confusion of 
Tongues Between Adults and the Child presented by Sandor Ferenczi in 1932 at the IPA 
congress. However, I would like to stress an essential difference that exists between the 
two. In his paper, Ferenczi describes a pathological situation in which the child is a 
victim of a true sexual assault.71 On the contrary, in Laplanche’s view it is not that the 
adult consciously seduces the infant, and this seduction is neither contingent nor 
pathological. 
 
As with all translation, the entirety of meaning from one form (the message of the adult 
in this case) can never be transferred to the form into which we are translating (in this 
case the presentation which is wished), and part of the message remains enigmatic. In 
insuring the vital functions of the infant, the adult suggests satisfactory objects, and these 
suggestions are contaminated by the adult’s sexuality. The enigmatic part of the 
suggestion is linked with the sexuality of the adult. Not only the genital sexuality of the 
adult but mainly the fact that the adult has a sexual unconscious. The mother’s breast is 
                                                        
71 “Even children of very respectable, sincerely puritanical families, fall victim to real violence or rape 
much more often than one had dared to suppose. Either it is the parents who try to find a substitute 
gratification in this pathological way for their frustration, or it is people thought to be trustworthy such as 
relatives (uncles, aunts, grandparents), governesses or servants, who misuse the ignorance and the 
innocence of the child. The immediate explanation—that these are only sexual fantasies of the child, a kind 
of hysterical lying—is unfortunately made invalid by the number of such confessions, e.g. of assaults upon 
children, committed by patients actually in analysis.” (Ferenczi, 1988, p.201) 
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not only a milk factory. It is also an attribute of her sexuality, whose contact can arouse 
libidinal excitement. This breast as suggested to the infant is also the breast that holds a 
place in the phantasised relationship that the mother maintains with her body. One could 
think of many other examples in which the object suggested to the infant carries an 
enigmatic sexual meaning. Winnicott, for instance, described with astonishing lucidity:  
 
some of the reasons why a mother hates her baby, even a boy: 
 
The baby is not her own (mental) conception. 
The baby is not the one of childhood play, father's child, brother's child, etc. 
The baby is not magically produced. 
The baby is a danger to her body in pregnancy and at birth. 
The baby is an interference with her private life, a challenge to preoccupation. 
To a greater or lesser extent a mother feels that her own mother demands a baby, 
so that her baby is produced to placate her mother. The baby hurts her nipples 
even by suckling, which is at first a chewing activity.  
(…) 
He excites her but frustrates—she mustn't eat him or trade in sex with him. 
(Winnicott, 1958[1947] p.201) 
 
Most of the thoughts described by Winnicott are a consequence of the mother’s sexual 
unconscious. It is this kind of unconscious idea that contaminates the mother’s message 
toward the infant and that makes her suggestion enigmatic. It is perhaps worth noticing, 
that if the sexual unconscious of the adult scrambles the message of the suggestion, the 
adult’s unconscious is itself the result of an enigmatic suggestion. As a result, something 
of infantile sexuality is epigenetically transmitted through the enigmatic suggestion. 
 
It would seem that Laplanche is supporting the view that, where usually the infant 
creates what he finds, in this area of the sexual, the infant finds without creating. I 
understand Laplanche’s concept of seduction as the fraction of the idea representing the 
satisfactory object that is contaminated by the sexual unconscious of the adult. The adult 
suggests to the infant that it wishes for this enigmatic fraction of the object. Therefore 
the suggestion is enigmatic because the infant does not know what it wishes for. 
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According to Laplanche the suggestion contaminated by the seduction constitutes the 
bedrock of infantile sexuality. 
 
However, I would like to balance this view of the exclusive exogenous origin of infantile 
sexuality. Indeed, the wished-for object is not only suggested - the infant also plays a part 
in its elaboration. The fraction of the perceptions that have been scrambled by the sexual 
unconscious of the adult - the enigmatic suggestion - is also used by the infant to form a 
presentation. Of course, since the suggestion is enigmatic, the presentation derived from 
it will also be enigmatic. I think that at the root of infantile sexuality is the wish for these 
enigmatic presentations. As a consequence, infantile sexuality does not bear an 
exclusively exogenous origin. It is, rather, the encounter between a suggestion 
contaminated by the adult’s unconscious and the infant in the reality of its being. The 
point I am raising is in disagreement with Laplanche’s general theory of seduction 
because in his theory the drive has an exclusively exogenous origin: “By opposing the 
drive [Trieb] to the instinct [Instinkt], I do not oppose the psychic to the somatic (…) The 
difference is between innate, inherited and endogenous on the one side and acquired and 
epigenetic on the other” (Laplanche, 2007[2000]a, p. 12, my translation).72 
 
I conserve Laplanche’s distinction between the instinct, which aims at bringing the 
quantity of excitation back towards an optimum, according to the principle of 
homeostasis, and the drive that functions beyond homeostasis. But contrary to 
Laplanche, I would argue that the sexual drive of infantile sexuality has its origin in the 
encounter between the enigmatic suggestion of the adult, on the one hand, and the 
infant’s somatic and psychic potential on the other. The infant translates the enigmatic 
suggestions into wishes for enigmatic ideas. This translation is mediated, first, by the 
bodily abilities of the infant, namely the erotogenic zones and secondly, by the psychic 
abilities of the infant. The auto-erotic activities of the infant combine the self-stimulation 
of erotogenic zones and phantazying. My proposal is therefore that auto-erotism is the 
means through which the infant translates the enigmatic suggestion coming from the 
adult. Where Laplanche ascribes an exclusively exogenous nature to infantile sexuality, I 
argue that infantile sexuality rests on two pillars. One is the enigmatic suggestion from 
                                                        
72 “En opposant la pulsion à l’instinct, je n’oppose pas le psychique au somatique (…) La différence ne 
passe pas entre somatique et psychique, mais entre d’une part inné, atavique et endogène et d’autre part 
acquis et épigénétique.”  
 140 
the adult - this has an exogenous origin. Another is the auto-erotic activity of the infant – 
this has an endogenous origin. 
 
The infant creates presentations hallucinated onto the body through auto-erotism. In 
such a way that auto-eroticism is paradigmatic of the hallucinatory mode of thinking, 
infantile sexuality, which is at the core of the hallucinatory mode of thinking, is 
incompletely transposed in the verbal mode of thinking. The auto-erotic activity bears 
witness to the incapacity of a verbal mode of thinking to link sexual thing-presentations 
to word-presentations. It is because some presentations of infantile sexuality are fixated 
in a hallucinatory form that the sexual drive is so to speak ‘obliged’ to behave auto-
erotically at first. 
 
Presentations that exist only in a hallucinatory form create a terrifying world in which 
thoughts are omnipotent. Unconscious presentations of infantile sexuality are like 
suggestions experienced, on the one hand, in a hallucinatory way onto the body through 
auto-erotism and on the other hand, in the language of an eternal quest for meaning, 
which is expressed with such acute intensity in the child’s sexual curiosity that Freud 
“considered giving this epistemophilic urge the status of a separate drive” (Temperley, 
2005, p.62). An effect of this curiosity, that motivates the child to discover answers in 
language, is to hide the hallucinatory nature of the sexual wish. In the same way, one of 
the functions of masturbatory scenarios built by the adult is to create a meaning that 
covers the hallucinatory noise of the sexual wish.  
 
The psychical apparatus generates a hallucinatory mode of thinking whose characteristic 
is to be performative, and a verbal mode of thinking whose characteristic is to bring 
meaning. What comes first is the demand of the unconscious wish that results from the 
hallucinatory mode of thinking. Meaning is achieved secondarily in the après-coup of the 
hallucinatory wish as a way to hide the hallucinatory nature of the wish. In this 
perspective, one of the psychical functions of verbal language is to produce meaning that 
would, in the après-coup, conceal the hallucinatory nature of wishes. I propose to 
understand this masking function of verbal language as a repression après-coup: an ‘after-
repression’. 
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The idea that meaning generated by verbal language achieves a repressive function is not 
only a theoretical one. It has, in fact, a very direct application in analytical practice. The 
fundamental rule of the psychoanalytic cure: the rule of free association, “which lays it 
down that whatever comes into one’s head must be reported without criticizing it” 
(Freud, 1911-1915[1914], p.107) is a method to verbalize beyond the logos. Likewise, on 
the side of the analyst, the unusual way of listening, which consists in not directing the 
attention to anything particular, the so-called ‘evenly suspended attention’ (Freud, 1911-
1915[1914], p.111-112) is a way to listen beyond conscious meaning. The psychoanalytic 
technique endeavours to trap verbal language in order to bypass its repressive function. 
The aim of this technique is to generate a dialogue that challenges the repressive aspect 
of verbal meaning. As a consequence, the defence mechanisms that rest on verbal 
narratives are somewhat thwarted by the analytical framework. Therefore, more primitive 
defence mechanisms may manifest themselves in the analysis. 
 
These primitive defence mechanisms - of which Freud gave an outline: “reversal into the 
opposite or turning round upon the subject’s own self” (Freud, 1915b, p.147) - are of a 
hallucinatory nature. I think that these hallucinatory mechanisms of defence appear on 
the analytical scene through what Freud had described in a letter to Groddeck as “the 
hubs of treatments” (in Freud, 1961, p.316): resistance and transference. 
 
First, I will try to show how hallucinatory mechanisms can manifest themselves through 
resistance to the rule of free association. The stroke of genius of The Interpretation of 
Dreams was to establish, against scientific prejudice, that manifestations of the 
unconscious - dreams, parapraxis, symptoms, free association – have significance: they 
obey the laws of the primary process. A purpose of the analytical framework is to give 
birth to such productions of the unconscious in order to decipher them. Hence, the 
utopia of free association would consist in a speech guided by the grammar of the 
primary process: a kind of spoken dream. The rebus constituted by this ideal chain of 
free association could then be interpreted. In the reality of the analytic session a constant 
flow of free associations is an ideal never attained, as the speech of the one who is free-
associating comes up against more or less explicit resistances. I think this resistance to 
free association is the expression of psychical phenomena that are not understandable 
through the primary process. The primary process describes the functioning mechanism of 
unconscious presentations.  
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What I have named the hallucinatory mode of thinking describes the hypothetical psychical 
act that creates unconscious presentations from perceptions. Because this hallucinatory 
mode of thinking is partly a bodily mode of thinking - as it appears in auto-erotism - 
unconscious presentations resist being verbalized. Thanks to free association the subject 
reproduces the functioning mechanism of unconscious presentations and the non-verbal 
aspects of those presentations can thus appear, so to speak, negatively: the pattern of the 
resistances to free association draws the outlines of presentations that are 
‘unrepresentable’ in verbal language. Unconscious phenomena revealed by 
psychoanalytic practice, which seem irreducible to verbal expression, resist the primary 
process, i.e. resistance to free association, failure to dream or acting out. 
 
This implies that non-verbal phenomena also manifest themselves in the clinic through 
what Freud qualified as “the more specific finding of analytic work” (Freud, 1914a, 
p.112): the transference. I think that it is partly because the analytical framework reduces 
the censorship of verbal meaning that the analysand hallucinates the analyst. In 
transference, the meaning of the analyst for the analysand gets lost.73 The analysand 
creates unconscious presentations of the analyst in a similar way to the infant who 
creates unconscious presentations of the world that surrounds him/her. 
 
The transference and the resistance to the cure replay, in the here and now of the analytic 
situation, a mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical reality. Hence, part of the 
logos gets lost in the analytical encounter. The great specificity of psychoanalytic 
empiricism is to generate clinical phenomena that operate beyond the logos. It is this 
peculiarity of the psychoanalytical phenomena that raises so many questions to both the 
positivist and the hermeneutic traditions. In a way, the task of psychoanalysis is not only 
to study those psychical phenomena but also to invent a framework that can describe 
them. I believe that it is this very task that Freud addressed by seeking a form of writing 
that would describe psychical events functioning beyond the logos. I propose to call this 
form of writing, paraphrasing Derrida: a metapsychological writing – a metapsychological 
                                                        
73 As Freud put it: “psycho-analysis does not create it transference, but merely reveals it to consciousness 
and gains control of it in order to guide psychical processes towards the desired goal. ” (Freud, 1910, 51) 
Psychoanalysis doesn’t have the monopoly on the phenomena of transference and one experiences it in 
day-to-day life, especially in situations of love. And certainly novels and plays have described the many 
ways through which reality of the language gets lost in love. I believe it would be interesting to think of 
love as a situation that generates a hallucinatory mode of thinking.  
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writing whose purpose would be to transcribe psychical writing. In my next chapter, I will 
try to describe the functioning of Freud’s metapsychological writing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A metapsychological perspective has revealed a system unconscious that does not work 
in the mode of the logos: a system unconscious understood not as a receptacle of hidden 
meaning but rather, as a creator of illusions. These illusions are generated by thing-
presentations created through a hallucinatory mode of thinking. I have proposed to think 
of primary repression as the outcome of the superimposition between this hallucinatory 
mode of thinking and the verbal mode of thinking of consciousness. Primary repression 
results from the irreducibility between the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the verbal 
mode of thinking and as a result, some presentations are fixed in the system unconscious. 
It would be around these fixations that we hallucinate reality subjectively perceived. The 
meaning produced by verbal thoughts would conceal these hallucinations from 
consciousness. Verbal language generates meanings as an après-coup of a hallucinatory 
psychical reality. Meaning produced by consciousness is in the après-coup of unconscious 
wishes.  
 
Derrida identified this aspect of Freud’s model and used it against an objectivity that 
would be subjected to a metaphysics of presence. In fact, the repressive function of the 
logos in Freud would, rather, open up the possibility of an objectivity of absence. The 
performative aspect of the hallucinatory mode of thinking and the enigmatic nature of 
unconscious presentations means that unconscious wishes open up a breach in the 
subject. A quest for meaning would, rather, consist of a perpetual race behind this 
absence that unconscious wishes open up in the self: “signified presence is always 
reconstituted by deferral, nachträglich, belatedly, supplementarily: for the nachträglich also 
means supplementary” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.266) I believe that Derrida formed his 
alliance with Freud around a conception of the logos that is not in the field of presence: 
logos as marked by the après-coup – logos as secondary to an enigmatic psychical writing, 
that I have tried to redefine in this chapter through a hallucinatory mode of thinking.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
A Metapsychological Formalism 
 
 
A Textual Empiricism 
 
Freud’s Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams and his metapsychological papers of 
1915 describe the unconscious as a system. This is to be understood in contrast to a 
reductionist view by which the unconscious is perceived as a psychical receptacle of ideas 
expelled from consciousness. The system unconscious works in a way that is alien to 
consciousness. It generates infantile sexual wishes in the form of thing-presentations that 
appear in the subject’s consciousness as enigmatic intentional content. Not only does the 
Freudian subject follow a purpose that he ignores, but also, more fundamentally, he 
follows a purpose that the verbal language ignores. Unconscious ideas resist being 
verbalised and unconscious determinism is not written in verbal formulations.  
 
According to Bion, the “pre- or non-verbal” manifestation of the unconscious in the 
cure is what makes the communication of psychoanalytic work so difficult (Bion, 1970, 
p.15). Indeed, the written account of a psychoanalytic session raises very peculiar 
difficulties. Anyone, analyst or analysand, who has tried to write down the content of a 
psychoanalytic session, knows how complex an exercise it is. The complexity comes 
partly from the great heterogeneousness of the analytical material which becomes 
intermingled: an event from the day before, a dream, a type of silence, a fantasy, a certain 
noise, a distant memory, elliptical phrases, secret intimate languages, and so on. 
However, at a deeper level, I believe it is the non-verbal nature of some clinical 
phenomena produced by the analytical encounter that explains this difficulty.  
 
Psychoanalytic practice generates phenomena that contain hallucinatory thoughts using 
the bodily writing of unconscious presentations. Bion pointed out that even the words 
uttered by the analysand can be used in a hallucinatory non-verbal way: “words are used 
both in the expression of verbal communication and in transformation in hallucinosis” 
(Ibid., p.17). Hence, to write about an analytic session, one needs a form of writing that 
could transcribe this archaic hallucinatory non-verbal mode of thinking. I believe that 
Freud’s metapsychology was also an attempt to create such a form of writing. Freud’s 
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metapsychology would therefore be a double project: on the one hand, a speculative 
endeavour that aimed to understand the genesis of the subjective mind, and on the other, 
a formal endeavour to invent a form of writing of the unconscious, one formulated to 
express clinical phenomena specific to psychoanalysis. It is this formal aspect of Freud’s 
metapsychology that I would like to explore in this chapter. 
 
In the middle of Freud’s major paper on The Unconscious, we find the most 
comprehensive definition of metapsychology: 
 
I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its 
dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a 
metapsychological presentation (Freud, 1915c, p.181). 74 
 
To me, this indicates that Freud’s metapsychology is a form of writing of the psyche 
since what is at stake is the deconstruction of a psychical phenomenon into three 
coordinates: its location in the psychical apparatus (the topographical point of view), the 
outcome of the drives from which the psychical phenomenon results (the dynamic point 
of view) and the energies by which it is cathected (the economic point of view). 
However, the paradox of this system of notation is that none of these three coordinates can be 
directly observed and so they can only be metaphorically referred to.  
 
From the topographical point of view, the psychical apparatus does not bear any 
anatomical reality: it is a “theoretical fiction” (Freud, 1900, p.603). From the dynamic 
point of view, Freud described the drives – that are at the source of the conflict between 
psychical forces – as psychoanalytic mythology: they are “mythical entities, magnificent in 
their indefiniteness”(Freud, 1933[1932]a, p.95). From the economic point of view, the 
energies of a psychic nature cannot be measured and moreover “we know nothing of the 
nature of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of the psychical systems” 
and “are consequently operating all the time with a large unknown factor, which we are 
obliged to carry into every new formula” (Freud, 1920, pp.30-31). 
 
                                                        
74 The German word that Strachey translated into ‘presentation’ is Darstellung. In the conclusion of this 
chapter I discuss this translation. 
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Metapsychology is not a formal system made of quantifiable or observable data. I 
nevertheless believe that it can be thought of as an empirical system of notation since it is 
generated by an empirical experience: the analytical encounter. In order to record the 
non-verbal material of his psychoanalytic practice, Freud did not use a set of quantifiable 
data but invented a metaphorical system. Metapsychology appears as a metaphorical 
system to write the non-verbal dimension of the psyche. If, from a theoretical angle, the 
prefix ‘meta’ of metapsychology designates a psychology ‘beyond’ consciousness, from a 
formal angle this prefix could refer to a form of writing made of metaphors. The 
description of a fictional location, of mythological forces and of immeasurable energies 
corresponds to the description of an archaic mode of thinking. 
 
I think it is this formal role of metapsychology that Peter Fonagy indicates when he 
writes: “Metaphors in metapsychology may be thought of as representing attempts on 
the part of the theorists to grasp the nature of the psychological processes and 
mechanisms of which we have no conscious knowledge and which are not available to 
introspection” (Fonagy, 1982, p.136). Fonagy notices in a clear way that a 
metapsychological writing is not an introspective writing, since it describes the 
functioning of a psyche that exceeds subjective knowledge of it. However, I would argue 
that what is at stake is not so much “to grasp the nature of the psychological processes” 
but to formalise them. From this angle, the aim of Freud’s metapsychological metaphors 
would not be to explain psychological phenomena but to invent a system of notation that 
helps to formalize unconscious processes. 
 
Freud’s metapsychology could thus be considered as a system of notation that as a whole 
is metaphorical of the non-verbal unconscious thing-presentations. The way Freud uses 
metaphors in his metapsychology is formal rather than didactic: it creates a form of 
writing that aims to reproduce the strangeness of unconscious psychical writing. It is this 
peculiarity of the Freudian metaphor that Derrida stresses when he writes: “Freud, no 
doubt, is not manipulating metaphors, if to manipulate a metaphor means to make of the 
known an allusion to the unknown. On the contrary, through the insistence of his 
metaphoric investment he makes what we believe we know under the name of writing 
enigmatic” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.250). The metapsychological metaphor is not 
explanatory but it is a way to write an unconscious mode of thinking, a system of 
notation whose purpose is to record the psychical writing of unconscious presentations. 
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The study of psychoneurosis led Freud to evolve from “local diagnoses and electro-
prognosis” to the verbal “detailed description of mental processes such as we are 
accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers” (Freud, 1893-1895, p. 160). 
Freud developed an empiricism that does not rest on the observation of the senses but 
on the intelligibility of a text. Regarding Freud’s textual empiricism, The Interpretation of 
Dreams is a founding text. This book is also the story of Freud’s self-analysis and many 
commentators have pointed out that it could be read as an autobiography.75  
 
The extreme originality of this autobiography, however, is that it is written from an 
unobservable point of view: the one of sleep, a point of view from which one escapes 
rationality, freewill and the capacity to directly introspect. Freud drew his self-portrait not 
through an introspective writing of the self but through a writing from his otherness. The way 
Derrida analysed the fort:da scene describes well the autobiographical dimension of this 
otherness – autobiographical as it is heterobiographical – that appears in Freud’s work: 
“far from entrusting us to our familiar knowledge of what autobiography means, it 
institutes, with its own strange contract, a new theoretical and practical charter for any 
possible autobiography” (Derrida, 1987[1980], p.322). 
 
What makes this otherness-writing possible in The Interpretation of Dreams is the 
transformation of writing made of dream images into writing made of words. As pointed 
out by Stéphane Mosès “Freud does not study the dream as a visual structure but as a 
text (…) The most striking aspect of Freud’s approach is the transformation of images 
into words” (Mosès, 2011, pp.77-78, my translation).76 In this book, Freud’s empiricism 
consists in making the visible readable, and it is from the text of the dream that 
knowledge arises. This is to say, that Freud used a form of empiricism, which does not 
resort to observables but to a text. Knowledge of an experience does not come from its 
sensory perception but from the transcription of this experience into a text. The text is 
empirical because it itself becomes the object of observation. 
                                                        
75 Peter Gay, for instance, described it as “an autobiography at once candid and canny, as tantalizing in 
what it omits as in what it discloses” (Gay, 2006, p.104).  
 
76 “Bien que le rêve se présente à nous sous forme d’images, Freud ne l’étudie pas comme une structure 
visuelle mais comme un texte. (…) Le plus frappant dans la démarche freudienne est la transformation des 
images en mots.” 
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The child analyst, Laurent Danon Boileau explained that the knowledge contained in 
clinical cases also came from the discrepancies between the reality of the analytic 
dialogue as it happened and its written transcription. Indeed, he argues that a significant 
aspect of the cure comes from the evanescence of real language in the session, and this 
evanescence can be apprehended through the effort of the analyst to reinvent the analytic 
dialogue through his counter-transference (Danon Boileau, 1980, p.23, my translation).77 
Empiricism of data would perceive a weakness in the written transcription of a session 
and could be tempted to register the reality of the dialogue using, for instance, a tape 
recorder. On the other hand, from the angle of a textual empiricism, the fruitfulness of 
this method comes from its imperfections, because in those imperfections something of 
the evanescence of verbal language can be registered. 
 
Following Freud, the field of psychoanalysis has accumulated an empirical knowledge 
about its practice that is expressed in the form of texts. This peculiar textual empiricism 
is something that lies at the heart of the bond between psychoanalysis and literature. 
Through the endeavour to describe mental processes, the psychoanalyst faces a very 
similar problem to that encountered by the creative writer or “Dichter”: the problem of 
inventing a form of writing to describe our inner minds. Edmundo Gomez Mango 
proposed that Freud perceived the fundamental link that unites literature and 
psychoanalysis through Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus Rex and Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Gomez 
Mango, 2012, p.325). According to Freud, at the root of both these creations there lies a 
child’s wishful phantasy, and through their writing, the poets compel us “to recognize 
our own inner minds, in which those same impulses, though suppressed, are still to be 
found” (Freud, 1900, p.263). 
 
Like neurotic symptoms or dreams, all genuinely creative writing expresses unconscious 
thoughts, but unlike symptoms or dreams, in literature this movement has a verbal 
formulation. The creative writer invents techniques to write a non-verbal psychical 
reality. Hence, the inventiveness of the Dichter can help the psychoanalyst by enriching 
                                                        
77 “C’est de l’évanescence du langage dans la séance que naît une part non négligeable du processus de la 
cure. (…) Dés lors, comment faire si l’on veut dire quelque chose de l’échange tel quel, et des mots? Il faut 
évidemment les réinventer en laissant parler son contre-transfert. Il n’y a pas d’autre solution. (…) Dans les 
bons cas, donc, les mots inventés ne sont pas ceux de la réalité, mais ne changent ni la force ni le sens de ce 
qui a eu lieu. Au contraire : ce que l’analyste après la séance va placer dans la bouche du patient comme 
dans la sienne n’est sans doute pas vrai. Mais c’est justement parce que ce n’est pas vrai qu’il y a quelque 
chance que cela soit bien trouvé.” 
 149 
the kind of textual empiricism that is so peculiar to its discipline. The cathartic effect 
produced by reading works of fiction can be understood in light of the creative writer’s 
capacity to invent a form of writing that is able to express unconscious thoughts.  “In my 
opinion” writes Freud, “our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a 
liberation of tension in our minds” (Freud, (1908[1907]), p. 153). 
 
 James Strachey, in his paper called Some Unconscious Factors in Reading, further explored 
the unconscious nature of this liberation. He identified a sadistic oral component 
contained in the act of reading: the reader is the son “hungry, voracious, destructive and 
defiling in his turn, eager to force his way into his mother, to find out what is inside her, 
to tear his father’s traces out of her, to devour them, to make them his own and to be 
fertilized by them himself” (Strachey, 1930, p.331). Strachey saw the act of reading as an 
efficient cathartic release of sadism and, according to him, “the facilities of reading 
offered to the whole population in modern life may, by providing the opportunity for a 
far-going sublimation of some of the sadistic components, actually contribute to a 
diminution of unmodified brutality” (Ibid., p.329). Thus, according to Strachey the act of 
reading in itself would generate unconscious transformations independently of the 
content of the text. It seems to me, that the great importance of Strachey’s paper comes 
from this point: to show how the written text cannot be reduced to language or meaning 
but is also a stage on which unconscious phantasies are being played.  
 
In continuity with Strachey’s research, Anne Golomb Hoffman compares the act of 
reading with “the ongoing exchange of conscious and unconscious thoughts between 
analysand and analyst” in a session (Golomb Hoffman, 2006, p.401). Like the experience 
of reading, that of psychoanalysis exceeds the intentional exchange of information. They 
are both verbal experiences and yet they generate a type of transformative knowledge 
that exists outside of verbal language: a transformative knowledge rather than an 
informative knowledge. My hypothesis in this chapter will be that Freud’s 
metapsychology constitutes the attempt to formalize this transformative knowledge. I 
will explore this hypothesis in two main sections. 
 
First, I will try to situate Freud’s metapsychology by exploring the opposition between 
the philosopher and the poet. In this confrontation between the philosophical system 
and literary texts, the metapsychological corpus is sometimes deceptive because it can 
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appear as the most philosophical part of Freud’s work but what is at stake, on the 
contrary, is a literary question: a question of how to write. Freud’s metapsychology is not 
a metaphysic of psychoanalysis but rather the formal attempt to describe the psyche as 
an unconscious non-verbal writing rather than a conscious verbal language. 
 
Secondly, I will try to identify the main stratagems conceived by Freud to write beyond 
the logos. What are the forms invented by Freud to inscribe unconscious thoughts that 
resist being verbalized? I will try to understand what characterises the strangeness of 
Freud’s style in his metapsychological papers. A strangeness, which might not have so 
much to do with the esoteric nature of the text but more with a kind of hesitation. The 
aim would be to locate the passages in the text wherein Freud’s speculations seem to 
hesitate. Perhaps it is the case, that the hesitation in his writing is so intimately linked 
with the object it tries to describe, that Freud’s metapsychology is a project whose 
completeness is impossible. 
 
The Dichter Against the Metaphysician 
 
In his book on Psychoanalysis and Literature, Jean Bellemin-Noël mentioned this anecdote: 
when asked who his masters were, Freud answered by pointing to the novels on his 
bookshelves where he kept the masterpieces of western literature (Bellemin-Noël, 1978, 
p.11). Literary creation is not only a confirmation of psychoanalytic theories it also opens 
up new avenues of research. As suggested by Paul-Laurent Assoun, Freud attributes a 
“primacy to the fact of creative writing, which searches an appropriate expression in the 
metapsychology and not to overcome literature with science” (Assoun, 1997, p.539, my 
translation). 78  Indeed, in the invention of forms for writing the unconscious, Freud 
identifies the Dichter as an ally.  
 
This alliance between fictional writing and psychoanalysis seems to me a richer field of 
study than merely an application of psychoanalytic concepts to literature. The study of a 
common knowledge at work in fictional writing and in psychoanalysis raises an 
epistemological question that is absent from a direct psychoanalytic interpretation of 
                                                        
78 “Mais nous ne pouvons désormais perdre de vue ce primat de la référence au fait de la création littéraire, 
qui cherche dans l’instrument métapsychologique une expression adéquate – et non un ‘dépassement’ de la 
littérature par la ‘science’.” 
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literature. I would agree with Gomez Mango and Pontalis when they write: “in as much 
as one should be reserved towards psychoanalytic interpretations of literary texts, it 
seems necessary to enlighten the links that bind psychoanalysis to literature, links that are 
stronger and more intimate than with other types of artistic creations such as painting or 
music”79 (Gomez Mango and Pontalis, 2012, p. 9). Theodor Adorno developed a critique 
against psychoanalytic interpretation of art on the basis that psychoanalysis reduces the 
artwork to its content and seems to ignore that an artwork is expressed through a 
medium (idiom, material, composition…): “psychoanalysis considers artworks to be 
essentially unconscious projections of those who have produced them, and, preoccupied 
with the hermeneutics of thematic material, it forgets the categories of form and, so to 
speak, transfers the pedantry of the doctors to the most inappropriate objects, such as 
Leonardo da Vinci or Baudelaire” (Adorno, 1997[1970], p.8). 
 
At times, I would share this critique and yet I also think that Adorno misses the point 
that a psychoanalytic theory of creation cannot be reduced to its hermeneutics. For there 
is also an epistemological alliance between psychoanalysis and creation and, more 
specifically, between psychoanalysis and literary creation. Psychoanalysis and literature 
use the same medium to express a common object of knowledge: they both search forms 
of writing to express unconscious thoughts. Moreover, as stressed by Jacques Rancière in 
The Aesthetic Unconscious, Freud’s notion of the unconscious was made possible by a form 
of literary knowledge: “if it was possible for Freud to formulate the psychoanalytical 
theory of the unconscious, it was because an unconscious mode of thought had already 
been identified outside of the clinical domain as such, and the domain of works of art 
and literature can be defined as the privileged ground where this “unconscious” is at 
work” (Rancière, 2009[2001], p.4).  
 
In addition to Freud’s papers specifically devoted to the analysis of fictional texts, there 
is, throughout his work, the understanding that he shares an epistemological field with 
the Dichter. Freud believed that literature created models of psychical life. It is because he 
held such a belief that he could transform characters of fiction into metapsychological 
concepts and that he frequently made reference to literary texts to “support his 
                                                        
79 “Autant il convient de se montrer réservé à l’endroit des interprétations psychanalytiques des textes 
littéraires, autant il nous paraît nécessaire de mettre en évidence les liens qui unissent la psychanalyse à la 
littérature, des liens plus forts, plus intimes qu’avec les autres créations artistiques comme la peinture et la 
musique.” 
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demonstrations, such as the multiple references made in the Interpretation of Dreams to 
both the glories of the national literary tradition, such as Goethe’s Faust, and 
contemporary works like Alphonse Daudet’s Sapho” (Ibid., p.2). More than an illustration 
of psychoanalytic concepts, Freud acknowledged an irreducible epistemological status to 
literary texts. As pointed out by Jacques Lacan about the writer Marguerite Duras: “the 
only advantage of the psychoanalyst’s position is to recall with Freud that in his field of 
knowledge the artist is always in advance and so the analyst should not play the 
psychologist precisely when the artist opens the path to him” (Lacan, 2000, pp.192-193, 
my translation).80 
 
In Freud’s eyes, creative writers acquire their invaluable knowledge of the mind through 
their technique of writing – through their ars poetica – but Freud never really explored 
how this technique functioned. Most of Freud’s work on fictional writing focuses on a 
semantic analysis of the content rather than an analysis of the writing’s formalism 
(Safatle, 2010). At the beginning of his study on Michelangelo’s Moses, Freud confessed: 
“I have often observed that the subject-matter of works of art has a stronger attraction 
for me than their formal and technical qualities” (Freud, 1914a, p.211). Moreover, Freud 
seems to lay down his analytical arms in front of the technique of writing, which remains 
the Dichter’s “innermost secret” (Freud, 1908[1907], p.153). However, I think that in his 
metapsychological texts Freud did, nevertheless, raise the formal and technical problems 
of writing, that are also central to fictional writing: the invention of forms to write an 
unconscious mode of thinking.  
 
Freud’s metapsychology is not, by any means, a theory about aesthetics but there is an 
aesthetic to Freud’s metapsychology. My point is that Freud invented a 
metapsychological writing that falls within the province of ars poetica. Thus, the object of 
my chapter is not Freud’s work on literature but the forms invented by Freud in his 
metapsychological texts. The specificity of Freud’s metapsychological writing can be 
understood through its difference from the system of the philosopher and its similarities 
with the fiction of the creative writer. Freud establishes a fundamental distinction 
                                                        
80  “Le seul avantage qu’un psychanalyste ait le droit de prendre de sa position, lui fût-elle reconnue 
comme telle, c’est de se rappeler avec Freud qu’en sa matière, l’artiste toujours le précède et qu’il n’a donc 
pas à faire le psychologue là où l’artiste lui fraie la voie.” 
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between the texts of the creative writer and the ones of the philosopher: the opposition 
between the Dichter’s writing and the metaphysician’s Weltanschauung.81  
 
At the beginning of his study on Jensen’s Gradiva, Freud seems delighted to find in an 
imaginary work a type of knowledge “of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream”: 
 
But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, 
for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of 
which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their knowledge of the 
mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon 
sources which we have not yet opened up for science (Freud, 1907[1906], p.8). 
 
In striking contrast with the admiration he expressed for the fiction of the creative writer, 
Freud made no secret of his scepticism and even his hostility towards the concept of the 
philosopher. My point in this chapter is not to analyse Freud’s criticisms of philosophy 
but rather to study these criticisms in order to define the specificity of a 
metapsychological writing. In a lecture given before the Wiener Medizinishes 
Doktorenkollegium, Freud reassured his colleagues that his notion of the unconscious will 
not “land us in the depths of philosophical obscurities” since the psychoanalytic 
“unconscious is not quite the same as that of philosophers and, moreover, the majority 
of philosophers will hear nothing of ‘unconscious mental processes’” (Freud, 1905[1904], 
p. 266). 
 
If, in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud recommended one should “shrug his shoulders” 
in front of “the utterance of philosophers” which assures that “consciousness is an 
indispensable characteristic of what is psychical” (Freud, 1900, p.612), in his 
correspondence he gave a more radical diagnostic of philosophy: “I believe that one day 
metaphysics will be condemned as a nuisance, as an abuse of thinking, as a survival from 
the period of the religious Weltanschauung”.82 Until his very last work, Freud would attack 
                                                        
81 “‘Weltanschauung’ is, I am afraid, a specifically German concept, the translation of which into foreign 
languages might well raise difficulties. If I try to give you a definition of it, it is bound to seem clumsy to 
you. In my opinion, then, a Weltanschauung is an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of 
our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question 
unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place” (Freud, 1933[1932]a, p.158). 
 
82 Letter of 30th January 1927 from Freud to Werner Achelis (in Freud, 1961, p.375). 
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philosophy on the basis that “the majority of philosophers (…) declare that the idea of 
something psychical being unconscious is self-contradictory” (Freud, 1940[1938], p.158). 
However, I believe this main reproach of Freud’s contains another one, which would be 
addressed to the formalism of philosophy. A type of philosophical writing would cover 
and hide unconscious modes of thinking, which are precisely the ones that both a 
metapsychological and a poetic writing aim to express.  
 
When he describes the dream-work, Freud compares the function of secondary revision 
to the one “which the poet maliciously ascribes to philosophers: it fills up the gaps in the 
dream-structure with shreds and patches” (Freud, 1900, p.490). The poem to which 
Freud alludes is Heinrich Heine’s Die Heimkehr. Freud quotes it again in the New 
Introductory Lectures to criticize the outrageous pretention of philosophical systems that 
aim to propose an absolutely coherent picture of the universe: 
 
Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves like a science and works in 
part by the same methods; it departs from it, however, by clinging to the 
illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps 
and is coherent, though one which is bound to collapse with every fresh 
advance in our knowledge. It goes astray in its method by over-estimating the 
epistemological value of our logical operations and by accepting other sources 
of knowledge such as intuition. And it often seems that the poet's derisive 
comment is not unjustified when he says of the philosopher:  
Mit seinen Nachtmützen und Schlafrockfetzen 
Stopft er die Lücken des Weltenbaus 
(Freud, 1933[1932], pp.160-161).83 
 
Freud considers that the purpose of the philosophical system is to subject knowledge to 
logical operations in the same way that the purpose of secondary revision is to subject 
the representation of dreams to a consideration of intelligibility. To further examine this 
comparison between the writing of the philosopher and secondary revision, I will try to 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
83 Strachey’s translation of Heine’s lines goes as follows: “With his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing-
gown he patches up the gaps in the structure of the universe”. In Lucien Leuwen, Stendhal similarly mocked 
the grandiloquence of “the depth of German philosophy” (Lucien Leuwen, first part, chapter VIII).   
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expose the specific role that secondary revision holds amongst the different aspects of 
the dream-work. 
 
In a footnote added in 1925 to The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud warns against a 
confusion triggered by a too literal reading of his book, according to which, the essence 
of a dream would be its latent content. In fact, the latent content of a dream is not its 
essence but a transcription of its essence: the transcription of a hallucinatory mode of 
thinking into a verbal mode of thinking: “At bottom, dreams are nothing other than a 
particular form of thinking, made possible by the condition of the state of sleep. It is the 
dream-work which creates that form, and it alone is the essence of dreaming” (Freud, 
1900, p.506, fn.2). What characterizes the dream is the reactivation of a primal mode of 
thinking that pre-existed the verbal mode of thinking allowing the dream-work to be 
described as a temporal regression.  
 
In a way, the rituals that one follows before going to sleep constitute the beginning of the 
dream-work as they stage a regressive movement towards infantile existence. Freud 
describes how this staging of the body – to get undressed, to take off “spectacles, false 
hair and teeth”, to “resume the foetal posture” – leads to an “undressing” of the mind: it 
“lays aside most of” the “psychical acquisitions” and thus, sleeping, one can “approach 
remarkably close to the situation in which (…) life began” (Freud, 1917[1915]a, p.222). 
Similar to the way that the dream-work creates forms that pre-exists the use of words: 
“thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-
presentations are taken back to the thing-presentations which correspond to them” (Ibid., 
p.228). The dream-work operates a formal regression of verbal language “where 
primitive methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual ones” 
(Freud, 1900, p.548): word-presentations of the preconscious system are taken back to 
thing-presentations of the unconscious system. Freud described the primal form created 
by the dream-work as a primitive form of writing: “the dream-work makes a translation 
of the dream-thoughts into a primitive mode of expression similar to picture-writing” 
(Freud, 1916-1917[1915-1917], p.229). 
 
Jacques Derrida proposed to understand this primitive writing of the dream as “a 
landscape of writing. Not a writing which simply transcribes, a stony echo of muted 
words, but a lithography before words: metaphonetic, nonlinguistic, alogical” (Derrida, 
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1978[1967], p.259). Through the dream-work, words are transformed into the primal 
writing of thing-presentations and so verbal language is trapped by this operation, which 
removes the coding function from words: “for a dream all operations with words are no 
more than a preparation for a regression to things” (Freud, 1917[1915]a, p.229). Derrida 
very elegantly reformulated Freud’s idea when he described the dream “as a displacement 
similar to an original form of writing which puts words on stage without becoming 
subservient to them” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.262). The dream is a form of thinking that 
is not subordinated to an established code, hence the impossibility of conceiving a 
systematic dictionary of dreams. As “with Chinese script, the correct interpretation” of 
the dream script “can only be arrived at on each occasion from the context” (Freud, 
1900, p.353). 
 
When it reaches the perceptual apparatus, the material of the dream is edited by the last 
function of the dream-work: secondary revision. Secondary revision introduces the 
coherence of a narration into the apparent disconnectedness of the psychical writing. 
Unlike the other factors of the dream-work, secondary revision is a psychical function 
operated by the activity of the preconscious and so is not restricted to the dream-work. It 
plays its part with every perceptual signal that reaches consciousness: “Our waking 
(preconscious) thinking behaves towards any perceptual material with which it meets in 
just the same way in which [secondary revision] behaves towards the content of dreams. 
It is the nature of our waking thought to establish order in material of that kind, to set up 
relations in it” (Freud, 1900, p.499). Secondary revision aims to introduce a waking, 
conscious form of thinking, into the dream’s script: “It moulds the material offered to it 
into something like a day-dream” (Ibid., p.492). 84  Secondary revision displays a less 
primitive form of thinking than the other factors of the dream-work: it rearranges 
infantile wishes through a verbal mode of thinking. In other words, a psychical writing 
without a systematized code, that cannot be read through a dictionary, is organized into 
an orderly sequence of signs. Secondary revision brings back the picture writing of the 
dream towards the verbal images of narration. It is this factor of the dream-work which 
aims to transform the psychical writing of the dream into the speech of the day-dream. 
 
                                                        
84 Ron Britton defines secondary revision as the “part played by daydreams in the formation of real 
dreams” (Britton, 1998, p.113).  
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In the psychical writing of dreams it is not so much that words have lost their meaning 
but rather that meaning has lost the use of words. Instead of verbal signs, meaning is 
expressed through a primitive picture-writing. A psychoanalytic approach to dreams 
shows how a hallucinatory mode of thinking through sensitive images pre-exists a verbal 
mode of thinking and as pointed out by the psychoanalyst José Renato Avzaradel: “the 
psychoanalytic process when directed toward developing the capacity to think finds a 
consistent basis in dreams for understanding the connections between image-rich dream 
language and thoughts” (Avzaradel, 2011, p.833).85  
 
The hypothesis that the construction of thought appears through a pre-verbal form of 
writing led Freud to replace the usual analogy between ontogenesis – the development of 
the individual – and phylogenesis – the development of the species to which the 
individual belongs – with an analogy between the genesis of thinking in the individual 
and the genesis of writing in the species:86 
 
Let us recall that we have said that the dream-work makes a translation of 
the dream-thoughts into a primitive mode of expression similar to picture-
writing. All such primitive systems of expression, however, are characterized 
by indefiniteness and ambiguity of this sort (…) The coalescence of 
contraries in the dream-work is, as you know, analogous to the so-called 
‘antithetical meaning of primal words’ in the most ancient languages (…)  
 
The old systems of expression—for instance, the scripts of the most ancient 
languages—betray vagueness in a variety of ways which we would not tolerate 
in our writing to-day. Thus in some Semitic scripts only the consonants in the 
words are indicated. The reader has to insert the omitted vowels according to 
his knowledge and the context. The hieroglyphic script behaves very similarly, 
though not precisely in the same way; and for that reason the pronunciation of 
Ancient Egyptian remains unknown to us. The sacred script of the Egyptians 
is indefinite in yet other ways. For instance, it is left to the arbitrary decision of 
the scribe whether he arranges the pictures from right to left or from left to 
                                                        
85 In my view, the key point is to describe this “image-rich dream language” as a psychical writing.  
 
86 It is worth noting that in his book, The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry, the American 
orientalist, Ernest Fenollosa developed a similar intuition that studying ideograms would help the 
understanding of primal mental mechanisms (Fenollosa, 1918). 
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right. In order to be able to read it one must obey the rule of reading towards 
the faces of the figures, birds, and so on. But the scribe might also arrange the 
pictographs in vertical columns, and in making inscriptions on comparatively 
small objects he allowed considerations of decorativeness and space to 
influence him in altering the sequence of the signs in yet other ways. The most 
disturbing thing about the hieroglyphic script is, no doubt, that it makes no 
separation between words. The pictures are placed across the page at equal 
distances apart; and in general it is impossible to tell whether a sign is still part 
of the preceding word or forms the beginning of a new word (Freud, 1916-
1917[1915-1917], pp.229-230).      
     
According to Freud, only speech through intonation and gesture would clarify the 
ambiguity of these primitive scripts and thus make communication possible. Secondary 
revision acts as a form of speech: it reorganises the writing of the dream that is “not a 
vehicle for communication” and “does not want to say anything to anyone” into a 
narrative that can be communicated. Freud’s comparison between the purpose of 
secondary revision and the one of the philosopher, finds its meaning in this tension 
between the narrative speech of the ego and the non-communicable psychical writing of 
the unconscious. The writing of the philosopher is demonstrative: its purpose is to 
communicate meaning and meaning is therefore presupposed to be communicable. The 
philosopher’s writing distorts the facts of the psyche that resist verbalization and it 
subjects the psyche to a writing of the logos, a writing of the communicative system. If 
Freud thinks that Adler’s Individual Psychology is incompatible with psychoanalysis it is 
precisely because Adler has substituted a metapsychological writing with a writing of the 
logos:  
 
The Adlerian theory was from the very beginning a ‘system’ – which psycho-
analysis was careful to avoid becoming. It is also a remarkably good example 
of ‘secondary revision’ (…) In Adler’s case the place of dream-material is 
taken by the new material obtained through psycho-analytic studies; this is 
then viewed purely from the standpoint of the ego (Freud, 1914b, p.52). 
 
In Freud’s eyes a philosophical writing aims to establish a system: it is a type of writing 
which rationalizes the psyche by locking it up in the categories with which the ego is 
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familiar. Put otherwise: the system of the philosopher aims to conceal the primitive 
psychical writing through a rational speech pattern. 
 
By opposing unconscious psychical writing and conscious speech, I want to emphasize 
how Derrida’s radical separation of writing and speech is articulated with Freud’s 
criticism of the philosophical system. Derrida wrote that grammatology “ought not be 
one of the sciences of man, because it asks first, as its characteristic question, the question of 
the name of man” (Derrida, 1976[1967], p.84). If Derrida acknowledges: “a certain 
privilege should be given to research of the psychoanalytic type” (Ibid., p.89) it is because 
Freud attacked the idea that the name of man could be founded on rationality. 
 
Freud described the three “blows to human narcissism”: Copernicus destroyed the 
illusion that the earth was at the centre of the universe; Darwin, that man was at the 
centre of the animal kingdom; and Freud, the illusion that the ego was at the centre of 
the mind (Freud, 1917b, p.143). These three scientific revolutions threatened human 
narcissism because they challenged human ontology; they raised, in a dramatic way, 
questions about the existence of the human species. In the aftermath of each of these 
blows, new concepts were invented in order to redefine what Derrida calls the name of 
man. In his book Natural Right and History, Leo Strauss (1953) explains how Copernicus’ 
and Galileo’s revolution led Thomas Hobbes to completely rethink the status of man 
within the state of nature: if the universe is not organised around the earth but is 
determined by forces, how would our conception of man change? What would man be in 
a world of natural forces? Hobbes highlighted the consequences of the discovery that 
natural forces are intelligible, by defining that in the state of nature man was not centred 
around an essence but around these natural forces. He describes this as man being 
defined not by his reason but by his passions (Strauss, 1953, p.180).87 In the same way 
that Hobbes constructed his notion of natural rights from the perspective of the 
emergence of modern natural science, I believe that Derrida’s concept of the archi-trace 
appeared as a consequence of the emergence of psychoanalysis. 
                                                        
87 Leo Strauss shows how Hobbes’ conception of man in the state of nature, as centred in his passions 
rather than his reason made way for an entirely new type of political doctrine. With Hobbes, natural right is 
no longer defined as a state that allows the fulfilment of an essence but as a state that allows everything 
that is in one’s power. Such a shift challenges the antique figure of the sage as the sage has knowledge of 
the essences but not of one’s passions: there is a hierarchy of knowledge for the reasons, but not for the 
passions. This question is beyond the scope of my work, but I believe it would be fruitful to think about 
how – in a similar way to Hobbes – Freud’s notion of the unconscious challenged the authority of the 
medical specialist, the modern figure of the sage.  
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According to Derrida, Freud’s research revealed that instead of a rational essence, 
subjectivity is founded on a psychic writing: a script of thing-presentations that Derrida 
will redefine around the concept of the archi-trace. I propose to think of the archi-trace 
not as an empirical reality but as a concept born from an interrogation that Derrida 
addresses to Freud. This interrogation would be: what is the ontological consequence of 
a subjectivity that is not defined by an essence – such as rationality, truth, gods or any of 
the idealized notions that characterise Western metaphysics – but by unconscious forces 
and energy? What is the primal object of a psychology that is not a science of the logos 
but a science of writing? It is the archi-trace that would become this primal object, the 
‘natural being’ of a psyche that operates through a “labor of the writing” which circulates 
“like psychical energy between the unconscious and the conscious”(Derrida, 1976[1967], 
p.266). 
 
With the notion of the archi-trace, Derrida indicates that Freud’s radicalism lies in the 
hypothesis that thought is determined not by consciousness but by a supply of infantile 
traces. By pointing out that unconscious mental processes rest on the transcription of 
primal traces, Derrida shows that the question of writing cannot be suppressed by 
psychoanalysis. The main steps in Freud’s discovery of the unconscious correspond to 
the unveiling of forms of writing independent of the oral circuit of communication: 
firstly, the bodily text of the hysterical symptom; secondly, the pictorial text of the dream 
and thirdly, the text born from the clinical setting. The formations of the unconscious – 
neurotic symptoms, dreams, parapraxis, jokes and wit – reveal a form of infantile writing, 
which is autonomous from, and irreducible to, verbalisation. To a certain extent, the 
analytic session is also a production of the unconscious, because through its framework 
the analytic dialogue is partly transformed into a language of primary processes, an 
archaic writing. The analytic dialogue is not a two-voice conversation but, rather, a two-
voice monologue, which tends towards the status of an autonomous text. 
 
I would like to examine what, in the analytic framework, makes it possible to move from 
speech to an archaic writing. The analysand who, session after session, is confronted with 
the asymmetrical analytic dialogue, can evoke something of Scheherazade’s destiny. 
Scheherazade is said to have told stories to the King of Persia, night after night, in order 
to avoid her own death. These stories form the text of One Thousand and One Nights, 
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which follows the story of a Persian King who, after discovering that his wife was 
unfaithful, decides to marry only virgins and to kill them after their first night together. 
Therefore, the stories told by Scheherazade, which are so often erotic, are a way to 
verbalize sexuality rather than enacting it. If one considers that the analytic position aims 
to verbalize transference instead of enacting it, it makes this analogy even more 
pertinent. But unlike Scheherazade and the king, both analysand and analyst try to follow 
rules: a certain way to tell stories, and a certain way to listen to them, and these 
techniques aim to reveal the infantile text in the patient’s narrative. 
 
The analysand tries to obey the fundamental rule that specifies the analytic treatment. In 
an article addressed to his colleagues in 1913, Freud stressed how this fundamental rule 
must be explained to the patient at the very beginning of the treatment: 
 
One more thing before you start. What you tell me must differ in one respect 
from an ordinary conversation. Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting 
thread running through your remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that 
may occur to you and any side-issues, so as not to wander too far from the 
point. But in this case you must proceed differently. You will notice that as 
you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to 
put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be 
tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here, or is quite 
unimportant, or nonsensical, so that there is no need to say it. You must never 
give in to these criticisms, but must say it in spite of them—indeed, you must 
say it precisely because you feel an aversion to doing so. Later on you will find 
out and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the 
only one you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as 
though, for instance, you were a traveller sitting next to the window of a 
railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing 
views which you see outside. Finally, never forget that you have promised to 
be absolutely honest, and never leave anything out because, for some reason 
or other, it is unpleasant to tell it. (Freud, 1911-1915[1914], p.134-135) 
 
This method of free association is motivated by Freud’s conviction about the existence 
of psychical determinism: “Whenever one psychical element is linked with another by an 
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objectionable or superficial association, there is also a legitimate and deeper link between them which is 
subjected to the resistance of the censorship” (Freud, 1900, p. 530). In the patient who free 
associates, the conscious purposive ideas are replaced by unconscious purposive ideas. The 
seemingly arbitrary lines of thought followed by the patient are determined by these 
unconscious purposive ideas. I believe that the unconscious purposive ideas are formed 
of the primal traces that constitute a psychical writing. Free association is therefore an 
attempt to get rid of the censorship of rationality so as to reach the hidden determinism 
of a written text. 
 
In order for this text to appear, the psychoanalyst adopts a particular way of listening. 
Free association aims at investigating a psychic determinism hidden behind rationality, so 
the analyst must not reintroduce his own rationality, his own secondary elaboration. To 
avoid the analyst projecting his own purposive ideas onto the narrative of the patient, the 
analyst makes the conscious effort to suspend the motives which usually direct his 
attention. However, I would argue that the analyst cannot help but have his unconscious 
purposive ideas influence and orient his attention. Therefore, it could be understood that 
the analysand discovers his unconscious patterns through the medium of the analyst’s 
unconscious.  
 
Freud at times thinks of the unconscious as an instrument: the analyst “possesses in his 
own unconscious an instrument with which he can interpret the utterances of the 
unconscious in other people” (Freud, 1913a, p.320). I believe that this notion of an 
instrument can be read in a literal sense. The analyst transforms his attention in such a 
way that his unconscious becomes a sort of optical instrument, something like a 
distorting mirror on which a text can appear.88 The two-voice monologue of the analytic 
session becomes a palimpsest: the traces of the analysand appear on the parchment 
provided by the attention of the analyst. 
 
That the analysand deciphers the enigma of his own infantile sexuality through the 
infantile sexuality of the analyst would justify why it is that every analyst must have a 
                                                        
88 In Attention and Interpretation, which takes up the main Bionian concepts from the vertex of the analytic 
session, Bion theorises the transformation of the analyst’s attention in a very radical way. Bion proposes 
that for an analytic knowledge to emerge in the session, the analyst should “impose on himself a positive 
discipline of eschewing memory and desire.” Bion writes: “I do not mean that ‘forgetting’ is enough, what 
is required is a positive act of refraining from memory and desire” (Bion, 1970, p.31).   
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training analysis. Indeed, the aspects in the analyst’s unconscious that would have 
remained too mysterious would be like a ‘blind spot’ in the understanding of the patient. 
From an epistemological point of view, this point holds great importance. Every truth 
that emerges from the psychoanalytic cure is a result of the encounter between two 
unconscious texts and is therefore a contextual truth.89 Having said this, it should be clear 
why I believe that not only is it impossible to have a completely neutral attention, but 
also that it is precisely what is a-neutral in the analyst’s listening that allows the analysand 
to identify what is a-neutral in his associations. In both cases, the a-neutral element is the 
instrument that deciphers unconscious thoughts. 
 
Apart from suspended attention, Freud gives one other indication concerning the nature 
of the analyst’s way of listening: “he must behave as ‘timelessly’ as the unconscious itself” 
(Freud, 1918[1914], p.10). The analytic dialogue does not function on a dialectical model. 
Rather than two viewpoints that argue, there is a two-voice monologue: the voice of the 
analyst alerts the analysand to what he/she hears in the voice of the analysand. If Freud 
indicates that the voice of the analyst must escape the influence of the present, it is 
because “the later impressions of life speak loudly enough through the mouth of the 
patient, while it is the physician who has to raise his voice on behalf of the claim of 
childhood” (Freud, 1919, pp.183-184). The voice of the patient and that of the physician 
create a sort of hybrid voice that reflects different levels of the patient’s subjectivity. The 
patient hears the presence of another voice and yet at times he can feel that he is alone 
even in the presence of this other. This “aspect of the transference in which the patient is 
alone in the analytic session” is crucial to Winnicott because according to him “the basis 
of the capacity to be alone (…) is the experience of being alone while someone else is 
present” (Winnicott, 1958, p.417). 
 
Through its setting, the analytic session transforms the speech of a conversation into a 
form of monologue determined by an unconscious written text. Anne Golomb Hoffman 
describes this text as a semiotic of the infantile body: “In the clinical setting, this semiotic 
body and its history emerge through free association, analytic work with dreams, 
symptoms, and in the medium of the transference” (Golomb Hoffman, 2006, p.401). 
                                                        
89 This contextual aspect of analytic interpretations has been used to justify the view that psychoanalysis is 
not a science. I believe on the contrary that it is precisely the acknowledgment of this contextual aspect 
that makes of psychoanalysis a science of the psyche and not a religious practice. However, in the same 
way that the epistemology of biology differs from that of physics, the paradigms of psychoanalysis are its 
very own.  
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According to her, because of this “psychic equivalence” between “the pleasure-body of 
infantile sexuality” and the written text, psychoanalysis and literary criticism “meet in the 
space of the symptom considered as text, or the text itself as figure of the body” (Ibid., 
p.421). Thus, the capacity to be alone in a session can also be understood as the capacity 
to be alone amidst the text of the symptom, the text of the infantile body, and to become 
a reader of this text. 
 
In a paper called ‘The Psychoanalytic Narrative: On the Transformational Axis Between 
Writing and Speech’ (1984) Evan Bellin combines the psychoanalytic theory of 
narratology and poststructuralist literary criticism to apply the writing metaphor to the 
clinical psychoanalytic situation. 90 Bellin studies how a “text emerges from within the 
asymmetrical exchange of speech utterances in the psychoanalytic situation. It is a text 
and not a conversation because it operates as if it were written free of authorial intention. 
Therefore, it is not simply transcribed conversation. It is free as well from the rules of 
conversational constraint. Rather than confusing and obfuscating, this ‘written’ text 
opens upon a plenitude of meaning. To further understand how this occurs, we 
transplant Freud’s writing metaphor from the mind to the scene of action in the 
psychoanalytic narrative”(Bellin, 1984, p.15). Bellin uses a clinical case to show how the 
speech of the psychoanalytic dialogue converges towards patterns that seem determined 
by a pre-verbal text. 
 
This enigmatic text, generated by the psychoanalytic context, does not aim to 
communicate. When he compared the dream to archaic forms of writing, Freud already 
insisted: “that the system of expression by dreams occupies a far more unfavourable 
position than any of these ancient languages and scripts. For after all they are 
fundamentally intended for communication: that is to say, they are always, by whatever 
method and with whatever assistance, meant to be understood. But precisely this 
characteristic is absent in dreams. A dream does not want to say anything to anyone. It is 
not a vehicle for communication” (Freud, 1916-1917[1915-1917], p.231). In as much as 
the analytic encounter tries to supplant the tools of verbal language by the primary 
process of the dream, it creates forms that do not communicate meaning.  
 
                                                        
90 The main thinkers of this theory are Loewald (1980), Schafer (1980) and Spence (1982). 
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From this angle, psychical writing is radically different from the systematic writing of the 
philosopher but it shares something fundamental with the writing of the Dichter. As 
pointed out by Jonathan Culler: “The attempt to understand how we make sense of a 
text leads one to think of literature not as a representation or communication but as a 
series of forms which comply with and resist the production of meaning” (Culler, 1975, 
p.259). Like this psychical writing, poetic writing creates forms, which are the expressive 
medium for experiences that exist prior to, or outside, the verbal language and that resist 
the production of meaning. The psychical text that appears in an analytic session and the 
literary text both challenge a metaphysic of presence because they produce forms before 
producing meaning. As a consequence, they generate a written text irreducible to the 
record of a spoken text. 
 
The dialogue that Derrida undertook with Freud and psychoanalysis rests partly on this 
premise, that there is an “impossibility of reducing a text as such to its effects of 
meaning, content, thesis, or theme” (Derrida, 1981[1972]a, p.7). In Plato’s Pharmacy, 
Derrida has shown how this poetic writing is condemned by the philosopher, the writing 
that Plato condemns in the Phaedrus – a poetic writing that Derrida describes as this 
“essential drift, which is proper to writing as a structure of repetition, a structure cut off 
from any absolute responsibility or from consciousness as ultimate authority, orphaned 
and separated since birth from the support of the father” (Derrida, 1982[1972], p.376). 
Gradually, the drift of the analytic dialogue “approaches the inscriptive strangeness and 
autonomous monumentality of the written text as described by Derrida” (Bellin, 1984, 
pp.27-28). Freud’s elaboration of the psychoanalytic session is the invention of a 
situation, which reveals the patterns of a primal writing through the speech of an 
asymmetrical dialogue.  
 
From this viewpoint, psychoanalytic practice foreshadows the general reasoning of 
Derrida’s deconstruction. Geoffrey Bennington describes with remarkable clarity this 
reasoning: “deconstruction gets going by attempting to present as primary what 
metaphysics says is secondary”(Bennington, 1993[1991], p.42). Writing that appears as a 
secondary object of language operates, at another level, as the primary object, which 
makes the study of language and, more generally, the study of subjectivity possible. The 
psychoanalytic session is a frame that stages this movement of deconstruction: a mise en 
scène of a primal writing. A task of the analytic work is to get through the barrage of 
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verbal meaning so that the unconscious text of psychic reality can be played out in the 
session. 
 
I find the way Ella Freeman Sharpe (1940) describes the use of the individual metaphor 
in analysis a convincing example of how this task can be accomplished. I mention 
Sharpe’s work on metaphor also because, it seems to me, that her clinical understanding 
of the metaphor is more akin to a Derridean reading of Freud than to a structuralist one. 
As pointed out by Sara Flanders, Ella Freeman Sharpe was the first, in a series of lectures 
given in the 1930s to the British Society “to make the leap made famous by Lacan (…) 
locating in the mechanisms of the dream-work” the laws of poetics and equating “ 
condensation and displacement with metaphor and metonymy” (Flanders, 1993, p.8). 91 
However, in her essay on Sharpe’s literary and linguistic analysis of dreams, Mary Jacobus 
explains how “Sharpe troubles a strictly Lacanian account of the language of the 
unconscious” as she “frequently represents dream-thoughts and phantasies concretely in 
terms of their manufacture, and even as a woven texture–literally, as textile–rather than 
metaphorically, as a linguistic text” (Jacobus, 2005, p.5).  
 
What is shown by Sharpe’s clinical work is that the metaphorical language used in a 
session rests on an unconscious language that is not organized on the primacy of the 
signifier but on the primacy of bodily discharges. In the same way that the “implied or 
crystallized metaphors” can reveal the reality of “past ages of history”, Sharpe describes 
the individual metaphors used in analysis as a verbal creation that reveals a pre-verbal 
reality, the forgotten reality of the infantile body: “Spontaneous metaphor used by a 
patient proves upon examination to be an epitome of a forgotten experience. It can 
reveal a present-day psychical condition which is based upon an original psycho-physical 
experience” (Sharpe, 1940, p.212).  
 
According to Sharpe, ideas are first expressed through psycho-physical experiences that 
could be described as a writing of the erotogenic zones and it is only when the bodily 
orifices become controlled that “words themselves become the very substitutes for the 
bodily substances”. Speech is therefore secondary to a bodily writing of ideas and Sharpe 
goes as far as considering that “speech in itself is a metaphor” of this more primal mode 
                                                        
91 These lectures were published as a book named Dream Analysis (1978[1937]). 
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of thinking. She writes: “Speech secondly becomes a way of expressing, discharging 
ideas. So that we may say speech in itself is a metaphor, that metaphor is as ultimate as 
speech” (Ibid., p.203).92 Individual metaphors invented in the analytical encounter are not 
“a façon de parler”, they reveal a primal writing of the body’s orifices. As eloquently 
phrased by Jacobus: “Sharpe’s model makes bodily continence the price paid for 
language and language itself a form of materiality. (…) Words assume the qualities of 
substitute substances. They function as projectiles, weapons, gifts, or magical 
performances. Speech (utterance) becomes metaphorical ‘outer-ance’” (Jacobus, 2005, 
p.6). It is this emphasis that Sharpe places on the bodily concreteness of the psychic 
traces that haunt speech, that reminds me of some of the key intuitions of post-
structuralism.93 
 
I believe that the specificity of a metapsychological writing comes from the attempt to 
give an account of the back-and-forth movement between speech and writing: the 
movement from the word-presentation to the thing-presentation that is at stake in the 
dream-work or in analytical-work. The practice of psychoanalysis does not reveal a Being 
of the unconscious, nor even an entity of the psyche but, rather, unconscious processes: 
rational thinking is supplanted by unconscious determinism, the logos of the discourse is 
supplanted by the pathos of transference and resistance. It is because Freud’s 
metapsychology was an attempt to theorize the dislocation of conscious speech into 
unconscious mechanisms that Freud’s metapsychological writing challenges analytic 
expression and phonetic writing. Freud’s metapsychology is not a theoretical system 
(Weltanschauung) of the unconscious but a form of writing, a mode of representation 
(Darstellungsweise) for unconscious mechanisms.  
 
Unlike philosophical systems that treat the written text as a mere record of a concept, 
Freud’s metapsychology treats the written text as the transcription of a primal text, which 
has never been present to consciousness. Freud’s metapsychology is not guided by the 
elaboration of a concept but by a writing-work which enables the expression of an 
unconscious determinism. The first published appearance of the word ‘metapsychology’ 
                                                        
92  Mary Jacobus has noticed that in this quote, Sharpe was paraphrasing John Middleton Murray: 
“Metaphor is as ultimate as speech itself, and speech as ultimate as thought” (Jacobus, 2005, p.6 fn.10).    
 
93 I believe an interesting avenue of research would be to compare the philosophical intuitions of the 
young Derrida with the metapsychology of some of the analysts from the School of British Objects 
Relations, particularly that of Sharpe and Bion. 
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in Chapter 11 of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life reads almost like an epistemological 
slogan: “to transform metaphysic into metapsychology”(Freud, 1901, p.259). The program that 
Freud assigned to metapsychology is to change the “supernatural reality” – what Nietzsche 
called the “backworlds” (Hinterweltlern) – back into a “psychology of the unconscious”. The 
metaphysician projects endopsychic perceptions into the external world and as a 
consequence his formalism is secondary towards his concept. Metapsychology aims to 
bring the suprasensitive external reality imagined by metaphysics back towards the primal 
text of psychical reality. To “transform metaphysic into metapsychology” also signifies 
the transformation of the speech of the concept into the text of unconscious 
determinism. 
 
A Metapsychological Writing 
 
To characterize the specificities of Freud’s writing in his metapsychological texts is not so 
much an attempt to raise the question of Freud’s written style but rather to point out a 
type of writing that continuously threatens the communicative possibilities of writing: a 
type of writing that seems to defeat the verbal dimension of a text. The paradox would 
be, that it is precisely when Freud is least preoccupied with the question of a written 
style, that he invents a new form of writing. In his metapsychological papers, as in most 
of his work, Freud is less concerned with the attempt to create new sentence structures, 
than to be understood. Juliet Mitchell explained how Lacan felt that the classical 
humanistic tone of Freud’s idiom was a mistake since, as a challenge to an ideology 
which believes that “man is at the centre of his own history and of himself”, 
psychoanalysis cannot “rest on a linguistic appeal to that same ideology” (Mitchell, 1985, 
p.4).  
 
Despite his inhibition in writing, Lacan was a stylist and the difficulty of his texts serves a 
strategic purpose. Freud, on the other hand, did not take up writing as an exercise in 
virtuosity or as a rhetorical technique, but as a means to be pedagogical. In the first 
scholarly book on the subject of Freud as a literary artist, Walter Schönau argued that 
throughout his work, Freud subordinated his style to the purpose of convincing his 
readers (Schönau, 1968). Indeed, Freud strove to be clear, and yet there is a profound 
strangeness in his metapsychological texts. As noticed by François Roustang, in his study 
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of Freud’s style in Chapter seven of the Traumdeutung, Schönau seems to ignore the 
strangeness of Freud’s metapsychological writing (Roustang, 1977, p.65). 
 
Jean-Claude Rolland, on the other hand, points out this strangeness that arises from the 
reading of metapsychological texts, when he describes how Freud’s metapsychological 
writing “espouses and outlines the soul’s very movements, an ‘iconic’ writing that would 
be like the concrete trace of the psychical transformation the author inflicted on himself 
to bring to conscious awareness and impose on his ego this reality of the psychical 
depths that even the most penetrating clinical experience does not spontaneously bestow 
on the observer” (Rolland, 2005, p.96). Rolland stresses how one becomes destabilised 
by the reading of Freud’s metapsychology, not only because of its lack of concrete 
clinical instances but, more fundamentally, because metapsychological writing is not discursive. 
It is a form of writing that operates through the ways in which it escapes the framework 
of discourse: its hesitations, its use of scientific formulas or of mythology, its 
incompleteness – are the many vanishing points by which “Freud’s writing produces 
knowledge rather than merely describing it” (Mahony, 1982, p.14). Thoughts emerge 
from a reading of what resists direct verbal expression. As an attempt to formalise the 
psychical systems, Freud’s metapsychology never ceases to write the impossibility of an 
inscription of its objects. 
 
To open The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud chose a quotation from Virgil’s Aeneid: 
“Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo”. Strachey translates this as: “If I cannot 
bend the Higher Powers, I will move the Infernal Regions” (in Freud, 1900, p.608). 
Freud explained that he had borrowed this quotation from Lassalle in order to 
“emphasize the most important part in the dynamics of the dream. The wish rejected by 
the higher mental agencies (the repressed dream wish) stirs up the mental underworld 
(the unconscious) in order to get a hearing.” 94 The infantile wish of the dream that 
cannot be expressed in the verbal language of consciousness triggers hallucinatory 
unconscious presentations. I think that Virgil’s line can also be read as a motto for 
Freud’s metapsychological writing. Psychic reality resists the clarity of verbal exposition: 
                                                        
94 Letter of 30th January 1927 from Freud to Werner Achelis (in Freud, 1961, p.375). 
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“How bungled our reproductions are, how wretchedly we dissect the great works of 
psychic nature” Freud complained in a letter to Jung.95  
 
If the functioning of an unconscious mode of thinking cannot be expressed in the clarity 
of the logos, a metapsychological writing will need to invent other forms of 
intelligibility.96 Freud concluded Beyond The Pleasure Principle, the text in which he pushes 
his metapsychological speculations to their extremes, with an equivalent slogan in the 
form of Friedrich Rückert’s lines: “What we cannot reach flying we must reach 
limping…The Book tells us it is no sin to limp” (Freud, 1920, p.64) It is no sin to limp 
within the framework of the logos in order to invent a form of writing that expresses a 
relation with unconscious thing-presentations. Freud pointed out that the danger for 
abstract thoughts was to become trapped by words, to “neglect the relations of words to 
unconscious thing-presentations” so that the most theoretical discourse becomes akin to 
a schizophrenic delirium.97 I believe that it is precisely to avoid this trap – a trap into 
which (according to Freud) so many metaphysicians fall98– that Freud invents a form of 
writing that challenges the logos itself. Where the schizophrenic uses words in a way that 
‘derails’ the real, Freud’s metapsychological writing tends to ‘derail’ the logos. 
 
The exhaustive research of the stratagems Freud invented in order to write beyond the 
logos is an extraordinarily complex and rich task. Indeed, the problem raised by Freud’s 
metapsychological writing goes beyond the difficulty of formalizing knowledge about 
non-verbal presentation. What is at stake is the link between a form of writing and 
psychoanalytic practice: some aspects of this practice create and structure this form of 
                                                        
95 Letter of 30th June 1909 from Freud to Jung (in McGuire, 1974, p.238) 
 
96  The idea that verbal language is incapable of communicating the affects is very much present in 
Nietzsche: “Our true experiences are not at all garrulous. They could not communicate themselves even if 
they tried: they lack the right words. We have already gone beyond whatever we have words for.” (Twilight 
of the Idols, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” § 26) Patrick Wotling (2008) used this very idea to explain the 
specificity of Nietzsche’s philosophical writing.  
 
97  “When we think in abstractions there is a danger that we may neglect the relations of words to 
unconscious thing-presentations, and it must be confessed that the expression and content of our 
philosophizing then begins to acquire an unwelcome resemblance to the model of operation of 
schizophrenics”(Freud, 1915c, p.204). 
     
98 “It might be maintained that a case of hysteria is a caricature of a work of art, that an obsessional 
neurosis is a caricature of a religion and that a paranoic delusion is a caricature of a philosophical system.” 
(Freud, 1913[1912-1913], p.73).    
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writing. In a paper written in 1930, Walter Muschg99 points with great sensitivity to some 
of the links between the sequence of events in an analytic session and Freud’s written 
style. However, my approach here is rather different. I do not aim to subordinate the 
content to the style but, rather, to show how the formalism of unconscious processes 
resists rhetorical or stylistic devices. I will try to identify the means by which Freud’s 
metapsychology is expressed through a negative dimension of the process of writing. 
Hence, the quotes I will use to support my argument will come more from Freud’s 
description of the conditions of existence of his metapsychological texts, rather than 
from the metapsychological texts themselves.  
 
In Freud’s Legacy, Derrida tried to apply Freud’s speculative model to its own speculative 
writing. Derrida demonstrated through his reading of Beyond the Pleasure Principle that the 
metapsychological “scene of writing does not recount something, the content of an 
event”, for this event “remains unrepresentable, but produces, there producing itself, the 
scene of writing” (Derrida, 1987[1980], p.336). Because its events are unrepresentable, 
Freud’s metapsychology is the formal invention of a scene of writing in which, at times, a 
writing of the incomplete - a scaffolding, a mythology, a topography with no localities, or 
a quantity with no measurements - replaces a discursive writing. 
 
In this chapter, I would like to draw a sketch of the metapsychological scene of writing 
by first describing the aspects of it that are conditioned by psychoanalytic practice, 
followed by the three main systems used by Freud in his metapsychological writing. 
 
Esoteric Form of Writing, Writing of the Incomplete 
 
Born from an intimate dialogue that led to the creation of texts which do not allow for a 
definitive conclusion, Freud’s metapsychology resembles psychoanalytic practice. 
 
A characteristic of psychoanalytic objects is the difficulty of proving their existence. A 
metapsychological writing therefore describes phenomena whose very positivist existence 
remains speculative. What makes the existence of psychoanalytical objects so hard to 
observe comes partly from an aspect, which Freud had warned of, when he addressed his 
                                                        
99 Muschg’s paper (1959[1930]) that is entitled Freud als Schriftsteller [Freud as a Writer] has not yet been 
translated into English. I read its French translation by Schotte that was published in La Psychanalyse, 5, 
pp.69-124.   
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listeners at the beginning of his introduction to psychoanalysis: “The talk of which 
psycho-analytic treatment consists brooks no listener; it cannot be demonstrated” 
(Freud, 1917[1916-1917], p.17). Psychoanalytic clinical phenomena come from a dialogue 
that cannot be observed without losing its internal truth. Like the phenomena it tries to 
describe, the first traces of a metapsychological writing appeared in the privacy of a 
dialogue: that of the correspondence between Freud and Wilhelm Fliess.  
 
Unlike the term ‘psycho-analysis’ which Freud had used for the first time in a scientific 
publication,100 the word ‘metapsychology’ was created in a letter that Freud wrote to 
Fliess on the 13th of February 1896: “I am continually occupied with psychology – really 
metapsychology”. It is certainly not a coincidence that Freud revealed his neologism 
specifically to Fliess. In the genealogy of Freud’s creation of psychoanalysis, Fliess 
personifies the esoteric companion. Unlike Charcot and Breuer, who are officially named 
in Freud’s biographical account, Fliess occupies a more intimate role. He is the individual 
on the margins of academia who will join Freud in a speculation on the enigma of 
sexuality. Freud created this new form of writing in the secrecy of this correspondence 
and in the intimacy of his self-analysis. I believe that this esoteric aspect is a first 
characteristic of Freud’s metapsychological writing that can be linked to analytical 
practice. 
 
The second aspect linked to analytical practice that I would like to stress, is the 
incompleteness of the project elaborated through metapsychological writing. Firstly, 
because it is the nature of metapsychology to constantly take into account new clinical 
material and secondly, because when clinical material ceases to be informative, 
metapsychology is the only way to carry the theoretical reflexion further. In his 
introduction to Freud’s metapsychological papers, Strachey bemoans the loss of the 
seven papers, which were destroyed by Freud: “It is difficult to exaggerate our loss from 
the disappearance of these papers” (Strachey, 1957, p.106). Together with the five 
existing papers, they would have made up a comprehensive metapsychological work in 
the form of a book that would have been entitled: Preliminaries to a Metapsychology (Zur 
Vorbereitung einer Metapsychologie).  
 
                                                        
100 Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses, first published the 30th of March 1896 in the Revue Neurologique  
(Freud, 1896a) 
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I would argue, however, that the project to record an exhaustive description of 
metapsychological concepts is not conceivable. When Freud speaks of metapsychology 
as “the furthest goal that psychology could attain” (Freud, 1925[1924], p.59) it is, in my 
opinion, a way to ascribe an asymptotic value to such a goal. In the word 
metapsychology, “meta” is often understood as designating “beyond” the consciousness. 
It has also been suggested that “meta” stands for “beyond” psychology or “beyond” 
clinical observations (Assoun, 2007). I propose to add to this list the interpretation of 
“meta” as “beyond” completeness. Metapsychology is therefore a constant work in 
progress, a place for exploration, something similar to the laboratory of the scientist or 
the studio of the artist. Moreover, as an epistemological rampart, it is an unsettled one 
that pushes the specificity of Freud’s analytical discourse further and further. 
 
The Scaffolding 
 
Metapsychology emerged as new questions and new models born from the practice of 
psychoanalysis arose. It appeared in the material of Freud’s self-analysis and, from then 
on, accompanied the adventure of his analytical practice. At the end of his life, Freud 
studied the “interminable” analyses: those treatments that can be interrupted for a period 
but which seem to function as ‘a way of life’ rather than as a cure. This peculiar clinical 
event raises its own metapsychological question, which is: can analytic therapy tame the 
demand made by the drives upon the ego? (Freud, 1937a, p.224). What interests me in 
Analysis Terminable and Interminable is, in fact, not the content of this question but its form. 
In this text, Freud gives a quasi definition of the way in which a clinical problem (the 
interminable analysis) is transformed into a metapsychological question (the taming of 
the drives). This transformation is carried out by three modes of investment in the 
clinical material: to speculate [Spekulieren], to theorise [Theoretisieren], and to phantasize 
[Phantasieren]. In front of the clinical material “we must call the Witch Metapsychology to 
our help” wrote Freud, as without “metapsychological speculation and theorizing – I had 
almost said ‘phantasying’ – we shall not get another step forward”(Ibid., p.225). 
Metapsychology does not maintain an observational relationship with the manifestations 
of the unconscious, thus a metapsychological writing is not a descriptive one. 
 
Gilbert Diatkine (1985) pointed out that on many occasions, Freud has defined the 
metapsychological approach in a way that is similar to the fundamental rule of free-
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association: an attitude that makes it possible to follow an idea to see where it will lead, 
without it being suppressed by the censorship of causality. Thus, in Beyond The Pleasure 
Principle, Freud writes: 
 
It may be asked whether and how far I am myself convinced of the truth of 
the hypotheses that have been set out in these pages. My answer would be that 
I am not convinced myself and that I do not seek to persuade other people to 
believe in them. Or more precisely, that I do not know how far I believe in 
them. There is no reason, as it seems to me why the emotional factor of 
conviction should enter into this question at all. It is surely possible to throw 
oneself into a line of thought and to follow it wherever it leads out of simple 
scientific curiosity, or, if the reader prefers, as an advocatus diaboli, who is not 
on that account himself sold to the devil (Freud, 1920, p.59). 
 
Freud’s metapsychological writing does not aim to trigger an affect of conviction in the 
reader, rather an impression of movement: ‘to throw oneself into a line of thought’. 
However, that Freud’s metapsychological writing gives form to the associative dimension 
of his thought does not mean that Freud wrote in the manner of free-association, 
because there is a manifest coherence in his metapsychological texts. What is at issue is a 
way to write that does not endeavour to teach a theory, but to follow its own associative 
chain. From that angle, Freud’s metapsychological writing achieves what Nietzsche 
considers a well-executed writing: a form of writing that contains “ideas of the sort that 
breed ideas” (Nietzsche, 1996[1878], p.303).  
 
Far from passing on ready-made concepts, the metapsychological writing brings the 
concept about. In a letter to Fliess, Freud explains how his composition of The 
Interpretation of Dreams “follows the dictates of the unconscious” and he compares it with 
“the well known principle of Itzig, the Sunday rider. ‘Itzig, where are you going?’ ‘Do I 
know? Ask the horse.’” Freud adds: “I did not start a single paragraph knowing where I 
would end up” (Letter of July 7th 1898, in Masson, 1985, p.319). It is perhaps, as if 
Freud was aiming towards an ideal writing that would be almost dictated by his 
unconscious, an associative writing that would not be a description of the unconscious 
functioning but its manifestation. 
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Kurt Eissler, who insisted that Freud’s scientific achievement was primarily in his writing 
capacities, reported that in Freud’s manuscripts, even “in those on such complicated 
subjects as are dealt with in his metapsychological papers, a correction is a rarity. They 
convey the impression rather of a process of pouring out than planned composition, 
based on careful ratiocination” (Eissler, 1971, p.277). There is, in the associative 
movement of Freud’s writing, the mark of necessity that is at play in the manifestations 
of the unconscious. A few months after having finished his metapsychological papers of 
1915, Freud wrote to Ferenczi: “I maintain that one should not make theories—they 
must fall into one's house as uninvited guests while one is occupied with the 
investigation of details”.101 The metapsychological writing registers the movement of this 
internal necessity. As pointed out by Patrick Mahony, the unfolding movement of 
Freud’s composition evokes the Baroque prose that “adapts itself to the movement of a 
mind discovering truth as it goes, thinking while it writes” and whose purpose is “to 
portray, not a thought, but a mind thinking, or, in Pascal’s words, la peinture de la pensée” 
(Mahony, 1982, p.164). 
 
The kineticism of Freud’s writing plays the role of a method of investigation: to stimulate 
encounters and analogies between unconscious modes of thinking and language. In 
Freud’s metapsychology the psyche is modelled through those analogies born from an 
associative writing rather than through anatomical charts. Freud stresses the novelty of 
writing psychical localities in a fictional apparatus rather than ascribing them anatomical 
locations: “So far as I know, the experiment has not hitherto been made of using this 
method of dissection in order to investigate the way in which the mental instrument is 
put together”(Freud, 1900, p.536). To replace anatomy by a speculative writing does not 
mean that Freud ignores the materiality of the mind. In fact, what guarantees the 
epistemological validity of such a method is the plasticity of the metapsychological 
concepts. Freud comes back to this point in most of his metapsychological texts. 
 
In Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams, he writes: “We are justified, in my view, in 
giving free rein to our speculations so long as we retain the coolness of our judgement 
and do not mistake the scaffolding for the building” (Ibid., p.536). As Gilbert Diatkine 
noticed, many fell into this pitfall of metapsychology and “the ones excited by 
                                                        
101 Letter from Freud to Ferenczi 31st July 1915 (in Falzeder and Brabant, 1996, p.74) 
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speculation, such as Fliess, Jung, Rank or Reich lapsed into theoretical delusions and 
transformed the scaffolding into one of Ludwig II of Bavaria’s castles” (Diatkine, 1985, 
p.1233, my translation). 102 103 
 
Then, in On Narcissism: an Introduction, Freud explains that for psychoanalysis to be a 
science erected on observation it should have at its basis not “a smooth, logically 
unassailable foundation” but metapsychological concepts described as “nebulous, 
scarcely imaginable”, concepts that the progression of knowledge hopes “to apprehend 
more clearly” or even “to replace by others” (Freud, 1914c, p. 77). The same line of 
thought is developed at the beginning of Instincts and their Vicissitudes where Freud defines 
the metapsychological concepts as “abstract ideas” which must “possess some degree of 
indefiniteness” as “there can be no question of any clear delimitation of their content” 
(Freud, 1915a, p.117). It is this conviction that the “advance of knowledge (…) does not 
tolerate any rigidity” that made possible Freud’s metapsychological attitude with which 
he could invent a form of associative writing that is not alienated from the unconscious 
but that takes into account the phantasised investment of the clinical material as a 
method of research. 
 
The Three Points of View 
 
In her paper, Trauma, Recognition, and the Place of Language, Juliet Mitchell raised the 
question of why theories of trauma “revert to neurophysiological models” if they “regard 
the breaching event as the originary trauma”. Indeed, “there can be nothing biologically 
causative about a rape or a mother’s death or about their possible effects” (Mitchell, 
1998, p.124). Mitchell’s hypothesis is that it is not “because we cannot conceptualize the 
psyche at the level of a traumatic experience” that “we engage with natural science 
explanations” but rather “because they echo our existential experience” (Ibid., p.124). 
Through clinical cases, Juliet Mitchell shows how in a traumatic experience, one is 
withdrawn from reality at the level of his or her own verbal language. Hence, the use of 
biological models rather than psychological ones would reflect the very fact that a trauma 
                                                        
102 “Beaucoup de ceux que la spéculation excitait, comme Fliess, Jung, Rank, ou Reich, ont versé dans le 
délire, et transformé l’échafaudage en château de Louis II de Bavière.”  
 
103  I wonder to what extent neuro-psychoanalysis, in its instrumental approach to metapsychological 
concepts, confuses the scaffolding of metapsychology with the building of a scientific theory. 
 177 
forces the subject outside of its language and that the level of traumatic experience is a 
non-verbal one. 
 
I would like to show that, in the same way, the textual consequence of Freud’s use of a 
scientific language is to push the writing beyond words in order to describe a memory 
that is at first hallucinatory. One of the most recurrent reproaches addressed to the 
formalism of Freud’s metapsychology is its irrelevant use of a language belonging to a 
natural science that would become out of date (Gill, 1975; Gedo, 1977). I would like to 
think of Freud’s scientific formulation based on physics, not as a scientific anachronism, 
but as a symbolic writing to describe a non-verbal mode of thinking. The three points of 
views of Freud’s metapsychology – the dynamic, the topographical and the economic – 
would be symbolic means to represent a psyche that resists being verbalized.  
 
In order to study Freud’s use of the notions of physics’, Darius Ornston (1982) has 
shown that it is necessary to take into account the influence of Strachey’s translation. 
Ornston demonstrates how Strachey’s translation shifted Freud’s comparative 
description into quantitative explanations: “Strachey read Freud’s descriptions as 
explanatory technical language” (Ornston, 1982, p.423). Freud used quantitative notions 
like energy, cathexis, intensity, force and so on… as “necessarily vague descriptive 
convention” and Strachey’s translation turned those descriptive symbols into a set of 
unified concepts. James Strachey’s systematic approach in his translation of Freud is one 
of the great achievements of the Standard Edition but perhaps also one of its limits. By 
choosing a single English word for each German one and then sticking to it, Strachey ran 
contrary to the “quality that Freud much preferred in writing”, the one “he called 
Geschmeidigkeit, that is, super flexibility (…) Until the end Freud used the same words in 
various ways, and many different words to describe the same ideas” (Ibid., p. 411).104 
Robert Holt (1962) for instance, spotted over a dozen different ways in which Freud 
used ‘bound’ and ‘free cathexis’ throughout his work. 
 
This plasticity in Freud’s writing is especially important when it comes to quantitative 
and physiological metaphors because what is at stake in psychical locality, force or energy 
is not explanatory scientific concepts but symbolic comparisons that raise new questions. 
                                                        
104 In a paper published in The International Journal Of Psychoanalysis just after Freud’s death, Ernest 
Jones described Freud’s prose as “Austrian prose” rather than German “since Freud showed a marked 
preference for what he called the Geschmeidigkeit of the Austrian manner of writing” (Jones, 1940, p.10). 
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In his paper on Repression, Freud called the quantitative description of repression for each 
type of neurosis “a series of comparisons” (Freud, 1915b, p. 157). Ornston stresses how 
Freud inherited this symbolic use of scientific notions from Brücke who had already 
explained “that although Kraft or force has a precisely defined mathematical meaning in 
physics, it is used as an animistic description in physiology. Force is often ‘a symbol’ of 
ability, ‘a name’ for causes which we cannot see and do not understand”(Ornston, 1982, 
p.423). Freud’s metapsychological description of “a psychical process in its dynamic, 
topographical and economic aspects” (Freud, 1915c, p.181) is similarly an animistic 
writing because each of these three aspects touches on an impossibility to be named: a 
limit of the logos. I will try to identify those limits. 
 
Freud built the topographical point of view on the idea of psychical localities, which are 
not determined in any “anatomical fashion” but rather, as the constituents of a “fiction” 
(Freud, 1900, p.598) with which to model our mental functioning: the psychical 
apparatus. The topographical point of view consists in locating a psychical process in this 
apparatus and Freud insisted that the “crudest idea” of a psychological system was a 
“spatial one” (Freud, 1917[1916-1917], p.295). Precisely because he didn’t base the 
spatial representation on any anatomical ground, Freud had to invent the geography of 
this apparatus. He could not refer to any physiological reality and so had to draw a new 
map that corresponded to the dissection of this fictional apparatus. Throughout his 
work, in order to map a psychical process, Freud invented diagrams of mental activities, 
such as the famous graphics that appear in ‘Part b’ of Chapter seven of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. From a textual angle, this corresponded to a replacement of writing by drawing. I 
propose that the replacement of verbal writing with the graphic of a fiction constitutes 
the topographical limit of the logos. 
 
The dynamic and economic points of view rest on the idea of force and energy: psychical 
processes would be the outcome of forces and they would be cathected by amounts of 
energy. Both theories are inspired by physical science: the notion of force is at the core 
of Newtonian mechanics and that of energy is at the core of thermodynamics. The fact 
that the medium of psychical force remains unclear and that quantitative changes of 
psychical energy are impossible to measure in a clinical observation have appeared to 
some adversaries of Freud’s metapsychology as “the weakest element” of a dynamic and 
economic theory of psychological causations (Kubie, 1947). As noticed by Mark Cousins 
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in his introduction to a selection of Freud’s theoretical papers: “Within psychoanalysis it 
is more the idea of the economic dimensions and its relation to the drive that has come 
in for criticism or simply neglect. Faced with the inexorable progress of measurement 
within psychology there has been an increasing reluctance to refer to a quantitative 
dimension within psychical life without being able to assign numbers or measured 
relations to it” (Cousins, 2005, pp.xiv-xv).  
 
I would argue that the economic and dynamic points of view are not so much the 
testimony of Freud’s scientism, but rather, a non-verbal form of writing. They both lead 
towards a mathematical formalization of psychical processes in which forces could be 
modelled by vectors, and energies by numbers. However, unlike some post-Freudian 
psychoanalytic thinkers such as Bion (in his use of the grid: a sort of metapsychological 
algebra) or Lacan (in his use of mathème: a sort of metapsychological topology) who have 
proposed mathematical approaches to the psyche, Freud never really followed this path. 
I believe, nevertheless, that he initiated it. When he wrote that the economic point of 
view “endeavours to follow out the vicissitudes of amounts of excitation and to arrive at 
least at some relative estimate of their magnitude”(Freud, 1915c, p.181) one feels a 
numerical writing looming on the horizon. And yet, “the indefiniteness of all our 
discussions on what we describe as metapsychology (…) due to the fact that we know 
nothing of the nature of the excitatory process that takes place in the elements of 
psychical systems” constrains to operate “all the time with a large unknown factor, which 
we are obliged to carry over into every new formula.”(Freud, 1920, pp.30-31) This 
unknown factor, that is carried in an economic and dynamic description of psychical 
phenomena constitutes, I believe, the economic and dynamic limit of the logos.  
 
Freud’s transcription of a psychical process into a metapsychological presentation tends 
towards a non-verbal writing form: along the topographical axis, it tends towards the 
form of a drawing and along the economical and dynamic axis it tends towards 
unsolvable equations that are structurally condemned to carry over “a large unknown 
factor”. 
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The Greek Myth 
 
In parallel to the use of viewpoints borrowed from natural science, the other main 
resource in Freud’s metapsychological quest to formalize unconscious psychical 
determinism was constituted of figures of Greek mythology. In The Creation of Mythology 
(1986[1981]) Marcel Détienne shows how from the fifth century bc, through Pindar and 
Herodotus, the Greek notion of mythos became distinguished from that of logos. Détienne 
explains that this opposition between mythical and rational thought has endured in 
western thinking. Freud played on this opposition, using myth as a form of discourse 
distinct from conceptual discourse, in order to describe a functioning of subjectivity that 
is not determined by rationality but by tragic forces.  
 
As Elisabeth Roudinesco has pointed out: “without his genius idea to bring back Greek 
tragedy – which is to say into an unconscious destiny – in the middle of the nineteenth 
century and into the middle-class European family, Freud would have remained a 
psychologist of the neuroses in the same way as Pierre Janet” (in Roudinesco & Derrida, 
2001, p.32, my translation).105 The birth of Freud’s ‘psychology of the depths’ was linked 
with the refinding of the Oedipus myth at the core of both his first patients’ inner life 
and his own. The hypothesis raised in Freud’s self-analysis that the Oedipus tragedy 
could seize “on a compulsion which everyone recognises because he feels its existence 
within himself” (Letter to Fliess of October 15th 1897, in Mason, 1985, p. 272).  
 
Throughout Freud’s work, Greek mythology seems to define the paradigmatic steps of 
his metapsychology, whose evolution could be summarized around the succession of 
three of these mythological figures: Oedipus, Narcissus and Thanatos. Oedipus would 
correspond to the discovery of infantile sexuality, Narcissus to the introduction of the 
concept of narcissism and Thanatos to the apparition of the death drive. Figures from 
Greek mythology are milestones in Freud’s metapsychological writing because they 
represent a form of knowledge that imposes itself onto existence. Unlike the 
philosophical knowledge of the logos, which comes from the benevolence of a rational 
mind, the myth incarnates a movement of pathos that impels a search for knowledge 
because it breaches thought with the violence of a symptom. In his endeavour to 
                                                        
105 “Si Freud n’avait pas eu l’idée géniale, à la fin du XIXe siècle, de ramener les petites affaires de la famille 
bourgeoise occidentale à la tragédie grecque – c’est à dire à un destin inconscient –, il serait resté un 
psychologue de la névrose au même titre que Pierre Janet.” 
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formalize unconscious presentations, Freud transformed the logos of a theory of 
psychological causations into the pathos of Greek mythology. Moreover, by writing the 
subject’s psychical reality through the Greek tragedies, Freud reinstated the significance 
of the violence of destiny which is contained in these myths: the determinism of 
unconscious presentations disguised in the form of destiny 
 
Conclusion: A ‘Stracheyesque Freud’  
 
If the invention of psychoanalysis was an event for the history of literature, it is not so 
much because it became a new method to interpret fictional texts but, more 
fundamentally, because the question of writing concerns psychoanalysis from within. 
Psychoanalysis from its origins has defined its epistemological status through the 
production of written texts. In her paper about the psychoanalyst as a writer, Geraldine 
Pederson-Krag stressed this literary aspect of psychoanalytic epistemology: “While 
workers in the physical sciences use models and diagrams to make plain the entities with 
which they are dealing, the psychoanalyst wishing to explain what he perceives of 
psychoanalytic structures and relationships can depend only on words” (Pederson-Krag, 
1956, p.66).  
 
In Character in Fiction, a paper given in 1924 to the Cambridge Heretics Society, Virginia 
Woolf proposed a “scientific” reason to explain the appearance of modern fiction and 
that reason was Freud: 
 
“If you read Freud you know in ten minutes some facts - or at least some 
possibilities - which our parents could not have guessed for themselves: to 
read Freud was to come to know something that even scrupulous scrutiny 
could not divine.” (Woolf, 1991, p.504) 
 
The new knowledge that made of Freud a catalyst of modernity in literature was of 
course the explicit knowledge of the unconscious. However, even more than the 
unconscious as a concept, I wonder if Freud’s influence on literature might also have to 
do with the transcription of the unconscious in his practice of writing. This idea rests on 
the hypothesis that I have tried to explore in this chapter: the psychoanalytic mechanism 
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generates psychical phenomena, which in the here and now of the analytic situation 
replays a hallucinatory mode of thinking that was at the origin of psychical reality. 
 
The question of the influence that Freud’s metapsychology may have had on the literary 
writing of memory goes beyond the scope of my study. However I would like to mention 
the hypothesis that to set language to work in a way that can convey the subjective 
construction of a memory has appeared as a new challenge for both Freud and the 
writers of modern fiction: the challenge of a formal research that aims to transcribe 
internal images into a text that is not a recording of an object’s external reality but a 
description of the transformation of an object into an internal enigmatic representation. 
 
As an example, I find very inspiring the way Timothy Mathews in his book on 
Apollinaire analyses how the poet had argued for an artistic expression that would 
consist “in the creation of an image of perception itself, in opposition to the object in 
perception” (Mathews, 1987, p.29). Independently of the material reality of an image, the 
poet should describe the internal emergence of a subjective image. But as Mathews 
explains: “the distinction between perception and the object cannot be established, it is 
the object of a desire. In the same way, the barrier that makes the unconscious 
unavailable to consciousness cannot be located, even though the unconscious is banished 
by it, emerging as vestiges of memory and traces of the self” (Ibid., pp.31-32). The 
“vestiges of memory” are the outcome of a perception transformed by an unconscious 
mode of thinking and I believe it is the image of this transformation that Freud’s 
metapsychology attempt to formalise. 
 
“For I am actually not at all a man of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, not 
a thinker. I am by temperament nothing but a conquistador – an adventurer, if you want 
it translated – with all the curiosity, daring, and tenacity characteristic of a man of this 
sort” (Letter to Fliess of 1st of February 1900, in Masson, 1985, p. 398). In his 
metapsychological conquest of unconscious territories, Freud did not use observation or 
experiments but a form of writing that models an irreducible otherness at the core of the 
subject. From this angle, psychoanalysis could be described as a literary science: a science 
whose knowledge is archived through a textual form. 
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The fact that I read Freud mainly through James Strachey's English translations of the 
original works in the Standard Edition constitutes an obvious limitation for my research. 
Perhaps even more than elsewhere in the thesis, it would be in this chapter on Freud’s 
formalism that reading Strachey’s translation raises issues. It is therefore at this point of 
my work that I wish to discuss the nature of this limitation. 
 
In august 1920 James Strachey and his wife Alix settled in Vienna where they both 
undertook an analysis with Freud that would last until the winter of 1922. In his General 
Preface of the Standard Edition James Strachey remembers how after a few weeks of their 
analysis, Freud had “suddenly instructed” them to translate some of his works (Strachey, 
1966, p.xxi). In 1924 Strachey began to publish some volumes of Freud’s Collected Papers 
at the Hogarth Press directed by Leonard and Virginia Woolf. After Freud’s death in 
1939, Ernest Jones sent a letter to Strachey in which he invited him to translate the 
‘Gesammelte Schriften’. Jones’ plan was to publish the whole of Freud’s psychoanalytic work 
in English with the financial help of American psychoanalytic associations but under an 
editorial committee that would remain in Britain (Steiner, 1987, p.43). The outcome of 
Jones' enterprise was the publication between 1953 and 1974 of the 24 volumes of The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud translated under the 
general editorship of James Strachey. 
 
Since the early 1960’s a vast critical literature has been published around Strachey’s 
translation (Brandt 1961, 1972; Brull 1975; Ornston 1982, 1985; Mahony 1982; 
Bettelheim 1983; Junker 1987; Gilman 1991). Apart from the specific errors that have 
been pointed out, two categories of criticisms can be distinguished. 
  
The first kind of criticism aims to demonstrate mistakes in translation by which the 
meaning of some technical terms would have been distorted or at least obscured. For 
instance the translation of Nachträglichkeit as ‘deferred action’ has been discussed and 
challenged as unsatisfactory because the “essential difference between the verb nachtragen 
and ‘to defer’ consists in the fact that they express exactly opposite relations to time: the 
former is backward-looking (nach= ‘after’, so... after what?), whereas the latter is forward-
looking (defer… until when?)” (Thomä & Cheshire, 1991, p.422). It has been argued that 
‘deferred action’ fails to capture Freud’s idea that in a delayed traumatic experience, it is 
the retrospective attempt to construct significance that activates the traumatic effects. 
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More than the “variable time-lapse, due to some kind of storing procedure, between 
stimuli and response” what is central to Freud’s notion of Nachträglichkeit is the “complex 
set of psychological operations” involved in “a work of recollection” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1973[1967], p.114).  
 
The second kind of criticism claims that Strachey’s translation would have modified the 
character and ethos of Freud’s text by transforming a humanistic prose into scientific and 
academic language. The use of neologisms derived from ancient Greek and Latin, the 
shifts from subjunctive mood to indicative (Ornston, 1985, p.398), the typographical 
rearrangements of the texts (Frankland, 2005, p. xxv), the changes from the passive voice 
into the active voice (Mahony, 1997), the replacements of “affect-laden German terms by 
neutral English words” and the reification of a process into a structure (Brandt, 1966, 
p.50) are amongst the main stylistic means through which the Standard Edition is thought 
to have lost ‘Freud’s soul’ (Bettelheim, 1983).  
   
The second criticism therefore includes the first one since it argues that Strachey’s 
distortions of Freud’s technical terms are not random but that they follow the distinct 
agenda of casting a scientific and biological light on Freud. The most famous and 
virulent advocate of this view was Bruno Bettelheim who in his book Freud and Man’s 
Soul described the Standard Edition as an inadequate translation that “makes Freud’s direct 
and always deeply personal appeals to our common humanity appear to readers of 
English as abstract, depersonalized, highly theoretical, erudite, and mechanized-in short, 
“scientific”-statements about the strange and very complex workings of our mind” 
(Bettelheim, 1983, p.5).  
 
In this second category of criticism also falls the reproach according to which Strachey 
would have ignored the historical specificity of Freud’s discourse (Junker, 1987) (Gilman, 
1991). 
 
Those critical readings of James Strachey’s translation have in their turn prompted a 
discussion and some studies have attempted to nuance them. Mark Solms (1999) showed 
the continuity between the language of Freud’s earlier neuroanatomical writings and his 
later psychoanalytic writings. In both Freud used the same direct language. Solms 
explained that unlike English neuroanatomy in which most concepts are named with 
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neologisms derived from Greek or Latin, German anatomy “use everyday, descriptive 
terms” (Solms, 1999, p.32). According to Solms, Strachey’s use of neologisms borrowed 
from neuroanatomy would reproduce Freud’s use of neuroanatomical terms in his 
psychoanalytic texts: “when Strachey translated Freud’s psychological terms in the 
manner in which he did, he was following the conventions of English scientific writing 
(…) which in many ways differed from those of German science” (Ibid, p.33). 
 
Emmet Wilson (1987) answered to the list of stylistic reproaches that Darius Ornston 
(1985)  makes of Strachey’s translation in what I see as a convincing way. For instance he 
points out that in the paragraph from The Interpretation of Dreams quoted by Ornston to 
illustrate Strachey’s replacement of subjunctive mood by indicative, the subjunctive is in 
fact used to express conceptualization rather than the degree of truth of a statement 
(Wilson, 1987, p.303).106 Moreover it is interesting to note that in her translation of the 
same passage, Joyce Crick follows Strachey in using the indicative mood (Freud, 
1999[1900], p.377). 
 
Being an analyst and a translator, Strachey may well have combined two “impossible 
professions”. 107  In their practices both the analyst and the translator face the 
impossibility of “a position of neutrality with respect to languages” (Craig, 2010, p.718). 
It would certainly be naïve to expect a neutral transcription of a work as complex as the 
Freudian text. Any translation of Freud is also an interpretation of Freud, and within the 
field of psychoanalytic studies it is possible to speak of an ‘American Freud’ (Birksted-
Breen, 2010a), a ‘French Freud’ (Turkle, 1978), a ‘British Freud’ (Birksted-Breen, 2010b), 
and for that matter of a ‘Stracheyesque Freud’ (Solms, 1999). In fact Strachey made no 
mystery of his intention to interpret the language of Freud as the one “of some English 
man of science of wide education born in the middle of the nineteenth century” 
(Strachey, 1966, p.xix). In his study on the history of the Standard Edition, Riccardo 
Steiner demonstrated the role played by Ernest Jones in a translation that increased the 
‘scientificity’ of Freud’s writing in order to add medical credibility to psychoanalysis. 
Steiner quoted Jones presenting Freud as a “Darwin of the mind, who has replaced the 
                                                        
106 The paragraph that is discussed is: “But it seems to me unnecessary to suppose that dream-processes 
really maintain, up to the moment of becoming conscious, the chronological order in which I have 
described them: that the first thing to appear is the transferred dream-wish, that distortion by the 
censorship follows, then the regressive change in direction, and so on.” (Freud, 1900, p.576) 
107 In Analysis Terminable and Interminable Freud wrote of psychoanalysis as “the third of those ‘impossible’ 
professions”, the other two being “education and government” (Freud, 1937a, p.248). 
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metaphysical or poetical phrases of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Shaw, by a 
scientific and biological one” (in Steiner, 1987, p. 53). I believe it is fair to state that such 
an understanding of Freud as a Darwin of the psyche has guided the choices of the 
Standard Edition. To read this translation therefore signifies to read Freud coloured with a 
positivist light. 
 
The controversies about Strachey’s translation cover the dispute between a humanistic, 
hermeneutic and a scientific reading of Freud. In this dissertation I try to show that a 
concept of memory put forward by Freud in his metapsychology resists both those 
readings. The difficulty is that in my attempt to show that Freud’s metapsychology could 
not be entirely reduced to a scientific psychology, nor to a theory of interpretations, I 
have been using a translation that favours a scientific interpretation of Freud’s text.     
 
In order to understand the influence that Strachey’s translation has on my commentary, 
it should be noticed that a kind of scientific prose and a mechanistic language are 
consistently to be found in the original German version of Freud’s metapsychological 
texts (Hoffer, 1989, p.208). It is also in Freud’s German metapsychology that the reader 
encounters many terms inspired by a Greek or a Latin terminology. In a non-exhaustive 
list that comes from the one established by Emmet Wilson (1987, p.304), one would read 
in Freud’s metapsychology such non-Germanic words as:  
Metapsychologie, Objekt, Objektlibido, Libido, Erogenität, erogene Zone, 
Libidobesetzung, Psychogenese, Introversion, Mechanismus, Apparat, Quantität, 
Qualität, psychische, Konversion, Reaktionsbildung, Affektstörung, Restitutionsversuch, 
Niveau, Differenz, Differenzierung, Libidotheorie, Funktion, Sexualobjekt, 
fundamentale, charakteristisch, Tendenz, primäre, sekundär, Ideal, Genese, Faktor, Basis, 
Impulse.  
 
Therefore the metapsychological texts seem more in accordance with the premises that 
guided the elaboration of the Standard Edition than other parts of Freud’s work. It is 
probably for that very reason that the adversaries of the Standard Edition are often also 
the ones who would like to rid psychoanalysis of Freud’s metapsychology (Wilson 1987, 
p.313). 
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However in my reading of the metapsychological texts, I have attempted to show that 
Freud used the language of natural science as one means amongst others in order to 
describe a memory that does not operate like an archive. It is I believe at this very point 
that the tension between my argument and Strachey’s translation lies. I do not read 
Freud’s metapsychology as a scientific psychology but as a disguised portrayal of a 
hallucinatory memory. 
 
To explain the precaution I take in reading the Standard Edition, I would like to come 
back to Freud’s 1915 definition of metapsychology: 
 
I propose that when we have succeeded in describing a psychical process in its 
dynamic, topographical and economic aspects, we should speak of it as a 
metapsychological presentation. (Freud, 1915c, p.181) 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I proposed that this definition describes not only a 
conceptual tool but also a system of notation. I would like here to use the German text 
in order to stress the notion of Darstellung. In the Gesammelte Werke, Freud writes: 
 
Ich schlage vor, daß es eine metapsychologische Darstellung genannt werden 
soll, wenn es uns gelingt, einen psychischen Vorgang nach seinen 
dynamischen, topischen und ökonomischen Beziehungen zu beschreiben. 
(Freud, 1991[1915], p.281) 
  
Strachey translated eine metapsychologische Darstellung into ‘a metapsychological 
presentation’. Usually Strachey uses the word ‘presentation’ to translate Vorstellung and he 
translates Darstellung into ‘account’ or ‘representation’. Now as Joyce Crick explains in the 
introduction of her new translation of The Interpretation of Dreams, Vorstellung and 
Darstellung mean representation in a quite different sense: Vorstellung indicates the image 
or the idea of an act of thought, whereas Darstellung “consists of disguises, substitutions, 
and stand-ins” for the thought (Crick, 1999, p. xlv).  
 
In his translation of The Unconscious for The New Penguin Freud, Graham Frankland 
translated eine metapsychologische Darstellung into ‘a metapsychological account’. My 
hypothesis is that in this above definition of metapsychology Strachey chose to translate 
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Darstellung into ‘presentation’ rather than ‘representation’ or ‘account’ in order to 
reinforce the sensation that the mechanistic language used by Freud was not 
metaphorical. ‘A metapsychological presentation’ would not lead to a metaphorical 
reading but rather to an understanding of metapsychology as a thermodynamic of the 
psyche. I read the term Darstellung as an indication that metapsychology is a more deviant 
form of representation: a mode of representation that – as I have tried to show in this 
chapter – points towards the limits of a verbal description of the psyche. 
 
Apart from the more usual ‘representation’ and ‘account’, Darstellung is a word for which 
many translations have been proposed.  I have already mentioned in Chapter 5 
‘presentification’ that was coined by Monique David-Ménard (1989[1983]) to describe 
how an unconscious idea is performed through a hysterical symptom. Riccardo Steiner 
mentioned that Ernest Jones had proposed to translate Darstellung with ‘dramatisation’ 
(Steiner, 1987, p.79). Botella and Botella chose to use ‘figurability’ as a translation of 
Darstellbarkeit in order to emphasize that the psychic work of representability is similar to 
a process of translation: a process “of ‘clarifying’, and of sending out on reconnaissance 
to explore an unknown terrain” (Botella and Botella, 2005[2001], p.2). 
 
It seems to me that all those translations give an idea of Darstellung as a theatrical 
representation of thought. It is actually also worth noticing that Darsteller means ‘actor’. 
When in a hysterical symptom or in a dream, an unconscious thought is represented – or 
one could say ‘performed’ – I believe that Freud used the term Darstellung to stress the 
‘theatricality’ of this representation. 
 
In Chapter seven of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud takes over Fechner’s hypothesis 
that “the scene of action of dreams is different from that of waking ideational life” (Freud, 1900, 
p.536) and he explains that it is such a scene of the dream that reveals the hallucinatory 
mode of functioning of unconscious processes. When Freud describes how an 
unconscious memory attracts thoughts  on this hallucinatory stage, it is the term 
Darstellung that he uses:  
 
Diese Erinnerung zieht gleichsam den mit ihr in Verbindung stehenden, an 
seinem Ausdruck durch die Zensur verhinderten Gedanken in die 
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Regression als in jene Form der Darstellung, in der sie selbst psychisch 
vorhanden ist. (Freud, 1968[1900], p.281) 
  
Strachey’s translation: 
 
The thoughts which are connected with a memory of this kind and which are 
forbidden expression by the censorship are, as it were, attracted by the 
memory into regression as being the form of representation in which the 
memory itself is couched. (Freud, 1900, p.545-546) 
 
Thoughts connected with an unconscious memory are attracted under a mode of 
dramatisation characteristic of the unconscious; similarly, in order to theorise the 
unconscious, Freud’s metapsychology ‘dramatizes’ the language of science. I think that to 
read the metapsychology in the Standard Edition one should resist a too literal reception of 
the text and keep in mind that metapsychology is a Darstellung: a scene on which scientific 
language is like a scenography to give an account of unconscious processes.  
 
To conclude my comments on Strachey’s translation, I would like to point out that by 
establishing a text the Standard Edition has made close textual readings of Freud possible. 
What John Forrester writes at the beginning of his book Language and the Origins of 
Psychoanalysis testifies, I believe, to this invaluable merit of the Standard Edition: “My debt 
to the erudition, exactitude and uniform care displayed on every page of its twenty four 
volumes is as incalculable as every other reader of Freud's now is, whether he is read in 
English, French or German … Where I have modified the translation, I do not 
necessarily believe that my modified text is a more accurate or better translation than that 
to be found in the Standard Edition (…) In many passages my modifications are 
alternative translations, which are hoped to give at least as faithful or as treacherous a 
reading as in the Standard Edition” (Forrester, 1980, p. xiv). It seems to me that the 
alternative translations of technical terms as well as the main criticisms addressed at 
Strachey’s translation are now part of the Standard Edition: they operate like a palimpsest, 
a sort endless 25th volume. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
From the Proton Pseudos to the Proton Algos 
 
 
This last chapter should be read as an epilogue to what has come before, and will refer to 
A Child is Being Beaten. Until now, I have dealt with Freud’s metapsychological texts 
written prior to his 1915 attempt to write a comprehensive account of metapsychology, 
but I would now like to examine what his metapsychology then made possible in his 
clinic: that to understand in the context of psychoanalysis, is a verbal act of creation. 
 
Unconscious ideas appear in the clinic through such an act of creation, in the form of a 
construction. I will argue that the appearance of this construction in the clinic led to 
Freud’s discovery of the primacy of self-aggression over heteroaggression, revealing the 
masochistic nature of primary unconscious ideas, and therefore the presence of the death 
drive lurking behind them. 
 
I shall now examine the link between the notion of memory that Freud elaborated in the 
metapsychological texts that I have so far discussed and his clinical discovery of primary 
pains. 
 
Father and Daughter 
 
From his first hysterical patients to the cases described in A Child is Being Beaten (1919), 
the figure of an aggressive father and that of a passive child seem a recurrent dyad. 
However, between the systematic search for a scene of passive seduction and, twenty-five 
years later, the construction of unconscious masochistic beating phantasies, Freud’s 
understanding of this theme changed drastically. The seducing father and the passive 
daughter ceased to be understood as historical truths unearthed in the analytic 
investigation. Rather, they came to be understood as creations of the analytic encounter: 
masks through which sexual destiny is replayed in an individual history.  
 
This change corresponds to Freud’s gradual evolution from a view in which the 
psychological cause of a neurotic symptom is an unchanging idea, towards a view in 
which a symptom rests on a system of presentations [Vorstellung] irreducible to 
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consciousness. In the former position, the cure attempts to make the causes of the 
symptom become conscious. In the latter position, the aim is not so much to find causes, 
but rather, to create a verbal language for them: to construct them in the analytical 
situation. The analytical framework is not so much a device of inquiry as a device of 
creation.  
 
Reading Freud’s clinical cases, one intuitively feels this shift: it is apparent in the 
difference between the thriller-like atmosphere in the cases from Studies on Hysteria and 
that of Dora (1905[1901]), and the atmosphere of modernism found in the Wolf Man, in 
which the “scenes from infancy are not reproduced during the treatment as recollections, 
they are the product of construction” (Freud, 1918[1914], pp.50-51). The story of Dora 
is interrupted only by her escape from the treatment. In the Wolf Man, on the other 
hand, it seems as if the threat is internal to the text: Freud’s writing proceeds more 
slowly, embracing the path of the patient’s associations (Perelberg, 2005, p.209) and it is 
the reader who, faced with Freud’s attempt to write the construction of a memory in an 
analytic encounter, is at risk of abandoning the story: “I have now reached the point at 
which I must abandon the support I have hitherto had from the course of the analysis. I 
am afraid it will also be the point at which the reader’s belief will abandon me” (Freud, 
1918[1914], p.36). 
 
From Dora to the Wolf Man, it is not the psychoanalytic framework that has changed 
but the understanding of what is at play within this framework. To contain his clinical 
discoveries Freud invented a metapsychological form of writing but in return Freud’s 
metapsychology also made the clinic intelligible.108 The succession of analytic sessions 
reproduces something that exists in the functioning of the unconscious, hence a better 
understanding of the unconscious casts a sharper light on the events of the clinic. As 
Freud’s model of the psychical apparatus became more refined, his understanding of 
clinical facts and his therapeutic ambition evolved.  
 
                                                        
108  Jean-Claude Rolland described this two-fold function of Freud’s metapsychology in terms of a 
metapsychology of beforeness that “anticipates and authorizes the rigorous observation of clinical facts” and a 
metapsychology of afterwardsness, which re-inscribes “the pathological accident in the logical continuity of 
human psychical functioning” and thus “guarantees the universality of the phenomena presented providing 
a coherent ontological basis for them” (Rolland, 2005, p.93). 
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The aim of the psychoanalytic cure became more than just the disappearance of neurotic 
symptoms through the discovery of their causes, it was an attempt to create an image of 
infantile experiences – in both their real and phantasy aspects – that had sculpted the 
patient’s character. In Studies on Hysteria, Freud was describing the analyst as someone 
who, faced with the patient’s associations, tries to solve a Chinese puzzle: 
 
The whole spatially-extended mass of psychogenic material is in this way 
drawn through a narrow cleft and thus arrives in consciousness cut up, as it 
were, into pieces or strips. It is the psychotherapist's business to put these 
together once more into the organization which he presumes to have existed. 
Anyone who has a craving for further similes may think at this point of a 
Chinese puzzle (Freud, 1893-1895, p.291). 
 
In A Child is Being Beaten, Freud would stress how it is the attempt to understand the very 
beginnings of psychic life that distinguishes psychoanalysis from other type of cures: 
 
analytic work deserves to be recognized as genuine psycho-analysis only when 
it has succeeded in removing the amnesia which conceals from the adult his 
knowledge of his childhood from its beginning (Freud, 1919a, p.183). 
 
At first glance, a great continuity and coherence exists between these two quotes, 
although separated by a twenty-four year period: in both cases the psychoanalytic 
technique aims to recover the idiosyncratic history of the patient. However, Freud’s 
metapsychological research has changed the meaning attributed to this work of recovery. 
The removal of childhood amnesia no longer involves the discovery of primal 
experiences but rather the construction of primal modes of thinking in the present of the 
analytic situation. In other words, if in Studies on Hysteria the role of the analyst was to 
solve the enigma of the patient’s associations, at the time of A Child is Being Beaten, it is to 
construct an enigma from the patient’s associations. What makes this shift possible are 
the 1915 papers on metapsychology. In these, Freud put forward a concept of memory 
in which amnesia is not a weakness of memory’s functioning but constitutes its condition 
of existence. Freud imagines that memory depends on the void created by primal 
repression [Urverdrängung], the process through which the drives generate ideas 
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inaccessible to consciousness: it “consists in the psychical (ideational) representative” of 
the drive “being denied entrance into the conscious” (Freud, 1915b, p. 148). 
 
The prefix Ur, also present in primal phantasy [Urphantasie] and primal scene [Urszene] 
points towards the link between primal repression and man’s archaic heritage. The first 
phase of repression that constitutes the unconscious nucleus is not the repelling of ideas 
that have been present to consciousness but the production of forms that belong to the 
heritage of the species and that are incompatible with consciousness:  
 
The theory of psycho-analysis (…) holds firmly to the view that the motive 
forces of repression must not be sexualized. Man’s archaic heritage forms 
the nucleus of the unconscious mind; and whatever part of that heritage has 
to be left behind in the advance of later phase of development, because it is 
unserviceable or incompatible with what is new and harmful to it, falls a 
victim to the process of repression(Freud, 1919a, pp.203-204).  
 
Primal repression is not the disappearance of a piece of memory but the creation of an 
absence within the self that undermines every conscious presentation. “One of the 
essential characteristics of the primal” wrote Le Guen “may well reside in the fact that it 
is based on absence” (Le Guen, 1982, p.531).  Childhood amnesia is the scene of this 
absence. Amnesia is not understood as a void but as a solid absence made of archaic 
presentations which organise the contingent events of the subject’s life into a 
predetermined pattern. In this tragic vision, the subject is a character who, in its 
idiosyncratic life, embodies the trans-individual history of its drives. Primary repression 
generates an absence that reorganises the contingency of life around a destiny of the 
drives. In Freud’s metapsychology, memory is not a tool to access a primal or modified 
form of presence, but the abyss within which the subject is forced to encounter an 
irreducible otherness. The act of remembering therefore consists not of a rediscovery, 
but of an ongoing act of elaboration around this otherness. 
 
Derrida has insisted on this aspect of Freud’s metapsychology: “There is then no 
unconscious truth to be rediscovered by virtue of having been written elsewhere. There 
is no text written and present elsewhere which would then be subjected, without being 
changed in the process, to an operation and a temporalization (the latter belonging to 
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consciousness if we follow Freud literally) which would be external to it, ﬂoating on its 
surface” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.265). The unconscious text cannot be discovered but it 
will nevertheless be embodied in the analytic encounter. From this angle, the 
psychoanalytic session is considered to be a scene on which the tragic figures of this text 
will be constructed. 
 
By establishing the status of memory as a tragic subjective instrument in the 1915 
metapsychological papers, Freud came to understand that the analytical cure does not re-
construct but constructs unconscious presentations. In a more fundamental way, it is 
Freud’s metapsychological approach that both initiates and reproduces this constructive 
aspect of his clinic. Serge Viderman has clearly articulated this point: “because of the 
multiplicity and the ambiguity of the parameters at stake in the analytic cure, any deep 
interpretation does not re-construct the history of the subject but rather constructs a 
history. This history is based on a type of data that does not lead to certainties. Hence 
analytic constructions necessarily remain of the uncertain nature of a bet, in the same way 
that the metapsychology of the psychical apparatus is not a discovery but a conjecture” 
(Viderman, 1970, p.26, my translation).109 
 
Freud’s metapsychological scaffolding is not a demonstrative research into the mind but 
an uneasy speculation – a “phantasy” as Freud would write at the end of his life – which 
never ceases to question its capacity to formalize the unconscious. There is an internal 
necessity to this speculation, which emphasises certain aspects of the clinic and seems to 
ignore others. My point is that Freud’s metapsychology generates the creative aspect of 
the clinic and in return is influenced by it. This intricacy is not as direct as it would be in 
a – perhaps naïve – model of empirical science. Thus, I would argue that to read Freud’s 
metapsychology as a manual of the unconscious would be completely irrelevant and 
would lead to a form of dogmatic teaching, rightly denounced by Joseph Sandler when 
he complained about:  
 
                                                        
109 “Car il semble bien que la multiplicité et l’ambiguïté des paramètres mis en jeu dans la cure analytique 
font que toute interprétation profonde ne re-construit pas l’histoire du sujet, mais bien plutôt construit une 
histoire, inferrée à partir de données qui ne permettent pas de conclure avec certitude et dont les 
constructions gardent toujours et nécessairement le caractère aléatoire d’un pari, tout de même que la 
métapsychologie de l’agencement de l’appareil mental n’est pas davantage une découverte, mais bien une 
conjecture.”   
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psychoanalytic training institutes where substantial quantities of 
metapsychology (…) are taught to beginning students, as an end in itself 
rather than as one aspect of the history of ideas in psychoanalysis. For how 
long will we need to expound the vicissitudes of cathexes and the acrobatics 
of energy transformation to our clinical students, as if these matters had 
direct relevance to their clinical work? (Sandler, 1983, p.37).  
 
However, I think that there is a fundamental link between the experience of reading 
Freud’s metapsychology and clinical work, which makes their reading crucial for any 
psychoanalytic training. This link appears if one approaches these texts, not as an 
axiomatic system, but through an experience of reading, which tends to reproduce the 
situation of listening in a psychoanalytic way. In fact, many psychoanalysts have 
described how writing about the unconscious, or even reading metapsychological texts, 
forces the mind to work in a way which has many similarities with the type of thinking 
involved in the attempt to listen an analysand’s unconscious. For instance, as François 
Gantheret has explained: “I am not listening with metapsychology in mind and yet I 
would not know how to listen without it. It seems to me that I engage in the same 
psychical work when I try to think about metapsychology and when I try to think about 
what is said between the patient and myself; even though these two experiences do not 
combine” (Gantheret, 1986, p.99, my translation).110 
 
My question here is not to establish what came first between Freud’s clinical experience 
and his metapsychology but to identify the latter as a form of knowledge, which supports 
the creative dimension of the psychoanalytic cure. Freud’s metapsychology strengthens 
the perception that what is at stake in the clinic is also an act of creation: the creation that 
constructs verbal signs from unconscious traces. In chapters three, four and five of my 
thesis, I have explored the hypothesis that Freud’s metapsychological texts from 1895 to 
1915 were, “those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained 
within logocentric closure” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.249). In chapter six, I have tried to 
indicate how Freud’s metapsychological writing was the invention of a formalism that 
constantly challenges its verbal expression. In this epilogue, I will attempt to describe 
                                                        
110 “Je n’écoute pas avec la métapsychologie en tête et pourtant je ne saurais écouter sans elle. Il me semble 
que je me livre au même travail psychique en essayant de penser la métapsychologie, et en tentant de 
penser ce qui se dit, chez le patient comme en moi-même, et pourtant ces deux temps ne se confondent 
pas.” 
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how Freud’s metapsychology facilitated the possibility of a psychoanalytic clinic that 
operates beyond the logos: a clinic that creates beyond normative categories and beyond 
certainties. 
 
In order to do so, I will focus on A Child is Being Beaten, which I propose to read as an 
account of the way that the psychoanalytic session came to be perceived as the 
construction of a space through which tragic unconscious figures could be created. At 
the centre of this clinical paper, the recurring couple formed of a father and a daughter 
appears. The pair father-daughter is not only a creation of the transference, because 
present amongst the six cases used by Freud to write his article was his own daughter 
Anna. Anna Freud’s most recent biographer, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl has noticed that 
the “fifth patient sounds very much like Anna Freud” but “the sixth patient is not 
directly described at all, and this may signal that Freud protected his daughter’s privacy 
with silence” (Young-Bruehl, 1988, p. 104). Freud finished writing this paper in March 
1919 when Anna had been in analysis with him for a year. According to Young-Bruehl: 
“Anna Freud started her analysis in the fall of 1918” when Freud “had a regular hour for 
his daughter six days a week - while, later, he saw her after his full schedule, at ten 
o’clock in the evening”(Ibid., 1988, p. 115). This first phase ended around the spring of 
1922 and was followed by a second one from 1924 to 1925. 
 
That Freud was able to start an analytical process with his daughter, I believe, was partly 
due to the subtle and gradual evolution that led him to perceive the psychoanalytic space 
as a less inquisitive one. In A Child Is Being Beaten, transference and resistance remain the 
effective means of the cure. However, they are not used as tools to discover a factual 
past but rather as spaces of encounter between an infantile mode of thinking and the 
verbal signs of the talking cure. The analytical framework is not a stage on which the 
primal scene is replayed but a space through which an infantile mode of thinking can be 
constructed. In fact, as it has been stressed by Rivka Eifermann, the “absence in Freud’s 
paper of any reference to the possible effects on the child of exposure to the primal 
scene is remarkable” (Eifermann, 1997, p.166).  
 
Many later analysts have pointed out the absence of reference to primal scene exposure 
as a flaw in Freud’s description of a beating phantasy. Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel has, for 
instance, commented: “I think it is necessary to introduce the fantasy of a 
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sadomasochistic primal scene into Freud’s development of the subject in A Child is Being 
Beaten”  (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1991, p.412). That Freud did not raise the hypothesis of a 
primal scene in the beating phantasy is at first rather intriguing. Indeed, already in his 
paper On the Sexual Theories of Children (1908d) Freud had put forward the idea that when 
children “become witnesses of sexual intercourse between their parents” they “adopt 
what may be called a sadistic view of coition. They see it as something that the stronger 
participant is forcibly inflicting on the weaker” and interpret “the act of love as an act of 
violence” (Freud, 1908d, pp.220-221).  
 
Freud had also suggested that premature sadistic impulses attached to the problem of 
where babies came from might have “emerged under the influence of extremely obscure 
memories of parental intercourse, for which the child had obtained the material – though 
at the time he made no use of it – while he was still in his first years and was sharing his 
parents’ bedroom” (Ibid, p.221). Moreover, it seems that one of the six cases dealt with in 
A Child is Being Beaten – the one that Freud described as suffering from “extremely severe 
and incapacitating” obsessional neurosis – was the Wolf Man (Mahony, 1997, p.50) and 
the question of the primal scene is central to this case. 
 
So why has this question disappeared from A Child Is Being Beaten? It would be tempting 
to interpret the absence of any hypothesis regarding primal scene exposure as Freud’s 
resistance to touch on this question in the analysis of his daughter. 111 However, my 
intuition is that it works the other way around: it is because Freud’s clinical practice 
became less centred on the discovery of a secret and evolved towards the question of the 
construction of a secret that he could undertake analytical work with Anna. The issue of 
Freud’s clinic, as it is described in A Child is Being Beaten, is in fact quite new: Freud aims 
to construct the path by which a set of presentations “finds its way into the permanent 
possession” of the subject’s “libidinal trends” (Freud, 1919, p.186). In other words, to 
describe the means by which an unconscious mode of thinking – that I understand as a 
hallucinatory mode of thinking – generates a masturbatory scenario.  
 
                                                        
111 Arnold Modell has argued that “even though his daughter was only one among six patients, it is Freud’s 
experience of his daughter’s analysis that permeates” A Child is Being Beaten. Thus, Modell raises the 
question of the resistances encountered by Freud in publishing “his daughter’s masturbation fantasies” and 
Modell wonders if Freud’s assertion “that the second phase of the fantasy was never conscious and hence 
had little to do with actual experience represent a wish to distance himself from recognizing any seductive 
involvement with his daughter”(Modell, 1997, p.74).    
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This gives rise to a new tone in Freud’s description of his clinical work in which what 
seems crucial is not the memory or the idea of a memory but the process that led to this 
idea. The third part of the text which summarizes the three phases of the beating 
phantasy, is full of expressions such as:  “process of development”; “end-product”; 
“initial manifestation”; “historical development (…) in the course of which they are 
changed in more respects more than once”; “to follow these transformations”; 
“Profound transformations have taken place between this first phase and the next”; “By 
what path has the phantasy (…) found its way” (Ibid, pp.183-186). The use of these types 
of expressions gives the impression that Freud approaches the unconscious not only as a 
scene in which thing-presentations interact but also as a sort of factory. Similarly, the 
analytic encounter is not the scene on which a secret will be unveiled but a process that 
constructs a secret. To use an archaeological metaphor, in A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud’s 
focus is not so much an artefact but a process of excavation. Transference is not the last 
word of the analytical encounter but a work in progress towards presentations that are 
both intentional and irreducible to consciousness. 
 
This movement of construction that appears in Freud’s clinic continues beyond the 
framework of the analytic session. In the case of Anna Freud, it will give birth to a set of 
papers through which she will herself become an analyst. As she was finishing the first 
phase of her analysis, Anna took up the transference’s work in progress and wrote The 
Relation of Beating-Phantasies to a Day-Dream (1923), an “Oedipally engendered paper” that 
“served also as her ‘write’ of passage – it was a membership paper delivered to the 
Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, which was presided over by none other than her own 
father and analyst” (Mahony, 1997, p.49). Anna Freud claimed that the clinical material 
for her paper came from her first patient, but Young-Bruehl has shown that it “was 
actually written some six months before Anna Freud saw her first patient” and that the 
rapidity with which she wrote it “makes it almost certain that the patient whose case is 
discussed was herself – the one patient she knew intimately” (Young-Bruehl, 1988, 
pp.103-104).  
 
Thus, Anna Freud’s account of the phantasy post-history is more than an appendix to 
her father’s paper. What is at stake is, in fact, the development of the transference. 
Through the attempts – that fail and that are nevertheless systematically renewed – to 
keep apart the masochist beating phantasy from the “nice stories”, one feels the 
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inexpressibility of the incestuous transference relationship.112 Juliet Mitchell has proposed 
a very enlightening reading of this compulsion for story-telling in the secret of her own 
imagination, this ‘bovarisme’ of Anna Freud. Mitchell understands the superstructure of 
Anna’s day-dream not as a sublimation but as “a defence against something else illicit 
breaking into consciousness” and she proposes to think of this psychic structure as “the 
hysterical potential” (Mitchell, 2003, p.86).113 Both “Anna O and Anna Freud could not 
stop their story-telling”, which becomes “a verbal equivalent of a bodily conversion 
symptom”: “the beating fantasies are completely repressed and become unconscious, 
while at the same time the illicit desires which underlie them are not so much sublimated 
into art as converted into ‘nice stories’, fantasies which apparently, but only apparently 
contain care and affection” (Ibid., pp.86-87). Mitchell also points out how by turning “the 
day-dreams of her illness into the written stories of her cure, as did Anna O” for Anna, 
the road to sublimation is open: “arriving will entail mourning the loss of the unique 
self”(Ibid., p.87). 
 
Despite presenting her paper as a prolongation of A Child is Being Beaten, Rachel Blass’ 
careful reading has pointed out how Anna Freud’s ideas “both reflect and conceal an 
important dialogue between daughter and father, for the most part an unconscious one. 
The dialogue is complex, involving the source of her ideas and her creativity, as well as 
the source of her analysis” (Blass, 1993, p.69). An important difference between Anna’s 
paper and her father’s is that she attributed the guilt, which is so crucial in the 
construction of the beating phantasy, mainly to the autoerotic gratification and not so 
much to the actual content of the phantasy. Thus, the content of the conscious phantasy 
becomes more and more elaborate as a substitute to masturbatory pleasure:  
 
In the attempt to enjoy the legitimate pleasure as long as possible, and put 
off its tabooed climax indefinitely, she added on description a wealth of 
details indifferent in themselves. She constructed whole institutions, schools 
and reformatories in which the scenes of beating were imagined to take 
                                                        
112 In his short book on masochism, Paul-Laurent Assoun raised the hypothesis that with her article, Anna 
Freud discovered a structural masochistic motive for feminine writing: the feminine signature of any 
fictional work would be the phantasy of a beaten child (Assoun, 2007, p.40). 
 
113 Juliet Mitchell mentions amongst the “famous exponents of this widespread hysterical tendency to 
elaborate this sort of day-dreaming”: “Mme Bovary (and hence probably Flaubert: ‘Emma Bovary, c’est 
moi’), the Brontë children, Anna O, Anna Freud, Klein’s Erna” (Mitchell, 2003, p.96).   
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place, and established definite rules which determined the construction of 
the various scenes (Freud, 1923, p.91).  
 
It is rather striking that the construction of “institutions, schools and reformatories” bear 
such a charge of erotic pleasure in Anna’s phantasy, when one considers that she would 
devote an important part of her life to the creation of clinics and centres to treat 
children. Moreover, as Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg has noticed, the whole content of the 
conscious phantasy tends toward an institutionalization of the masochistic pleasure:  
 
Institution building, social life tout court stand not simply for the 
postponement of pleasure, but function as the mechanism by which to 
increase pleasurable tension: the little girl’s fantasy functions as a substitute for 
pleasure to the degree, precisely, that it is an instantiation, indeed 
institutionalization of that same pleasure (Stewart-Steinberg, 2011, p.65).  
 
This father-daughter dialogue centred around a masochistic phantasy found another 
repercussion in an article that Freud wrote in the summer of 1925, Some Psychical 
Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes, as Anna was finishing her second 
phase of analysis with him. Here, Freud comes back to the excavation of the beating 
phantasy in girls. Implacable analyst of his daughter’s illusions, Freud re-connects the 
monotonous formulation of Anna’s nice stories to the monotony of the masturbatory 
act, and the presentation hallucinated behind the anonymous hero of those stories 
becomes “nothing more nor less than the clitoris itself” (Freud, 1925, p.254). 
Significantly enough, it was Anna who read this paper on her father’s behalf at the 
Hamburg International Psycho-Analytical Congress. 
 
Lou Andreas-Salomé has certainly played a crucial role in this dialogue, having helped 
Anna to extract original theoretical insights from her analysis. At the beginning of her 
paper, Anna Freud indicates that it was written on the basis of discussions she had with 
Andreas-Salomé and, two years after their first encounter, Anna wrote to her: “Before 
you were here, it was still very difficult for me to talk to others about theory – I learned it 
first with you”.114 In fact, it has even been proposed that Andreas-Salomé had been 
Anna’s real analyst. However, whenever this rumour reached Anna Freud, she would 
                                                        
114 Letter from Anna Freud to Lou Andreas-Salomé, January 13, 1924 (in Young-Bruehl, 1988, p.110) 
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always insist that she had been analysed by her father and would claim, “that the idea 
persisted because people were scandalized by the thought that her father had filled that 
role”(Young-Bruehl, 1988, p.112).  
 
Rather than softening the scandal of this analysis, I would like to stress that it took place 
within the frame of a construction of a masochistic phantasy, which was extended in a 
theoretical dialogue through which Anna Freud became a psychoanalyst. Could it be that 
this act of construction in the cure is in itself a scandal? This question forms the main 
hypothesis of this chapter: that the construction of a masochistic phantasy is 
paradigmatic of a type of clinical act specific to psychoanalysis that remains scandalous 
because it resists both the meaning of interpretation and what is observable in the 
phenomenon. Instead, it creates a verbal expression to describe what “has never had a 
real existence” and is nevertheless “a necessity” of the psychoanalytic account of a 
phantasy. (Freud, 1919, p.185) 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will describe how this work of construction was made 
possible by Freud’s metapsychology. Freud’s clinical work, as it appears in this paper, 
could not have been conceived without his metapsychological work of 1915: the latter is 
the correlate of the former. As Jean Laplanche has explained in great detail at the end of 
his paper ‘Aggressiveness And Sadomasochism’ (in Laplanche 1976[1970]), there is a 
parallel to be drawn between the genesis of a sadomasochistic phantasy that Freud 
constructs in the analytical encounter, and the vicissitudes of the drive as theorized in the 
1915 metapsychology.  My point here will be to argue that this parallel is not only a 
clinical confirmation of Freud’s metapsychology but more fundamentally that it shows a 
unity between metapsychological speculation and the clinical act of construction. In 
Freud’s metapsychology and in some aspects of his clinic the origin of subjectivity is not 
meaning but the creation of forms. Both Freud’s metapsychology and the 
sadomasochistic phantasy constructed in the clinic are a mise en scène of this absence of 
meaning, and I would underline Daniel Lagache’s (1960) idea that the real scandal of 
psychoanalysis is not sexuality or even infantile sexuality but phantasy, as a means to 
stress the radicalism of intentional contents that escape their meaning. 
 
The second part of this chapter will be an attempt to read the act of the construction of a 
phantasy in A Child Is Being Beaten as a way to decipher infantile forms beyond meaning. 
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The originality of A Child Is Being Beaten is to construct the archaeology of the father-
daughter couple as it appears in the transference: to construct the prehistory of these 
ideas. I would like to understand how in the construction of a sadomasochist phantasy, 
the father and the daughter are transcribed into universal images that structure the 
vicissitude of the drive; how their presentations become the mainsprings around which 
the subject is turned into an object. 
 
Proton Algos 
 
The division among Freud’s commentators regarding the importance of A Child Is Being 
Beaten within Freud’s work is rather striking: while some consider it a trivial and confused 
paper, others view it as an essential and paradigmatic Freudian text. 
 
Many Freudian scholars have neglected or dismissed A Child Is Being Beaten. Ernest Jones 
appears to have understood Freud’s paper as a pause in the middle of a burst of 
theoretical creativity: “In 1919, at a time when he was more engrossed with theory, Freud 
turned aside to publish a purely clinical study that reminds one of his earlier days” (Jones, 
1955, p.308). In fact, one often encounters a similar view: that A Child Is Being Beaten is a 
clinical shrub in the shadow of the imposing theoretical tree, which is Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. In Peter Gay’s exhaustive biography of Freud (1988), the paper is not even 
mentioned. George Makari describes it as a “less than revolutionary paper” (Makari, 
2008, p.315) and Rivka Eifermann muses over her “uncomfortable feeling that the paper 
is not easy to follow” and feels that it “could do with considerable editing: it is hardly a 
Goethe Prize piece” (Eifermann, 1997, p.166). 
 
On the other hand, many writers have stressed the paradigmatic value that Freud gave to 
the construction of the masochistic phantasy in A Child Is Being Beaten. Freud himself 
described it in a letter to Ferenczi as “a 26-page-strong paper on the genesis of 
masochism”. 115  In his 1957 seminar, Jacques Lacan’s commentary on Freud’s paper 
presented it as “a study that should be famous” (Lacan, 1994[1957], p.114) because its 
reading is “crucial” to an understanding of how the genesis of a sadomasochistic 
perversion does not escape the Oedipal dialectic. In Freud’s text, Jean Laplanche saw an 
                                                        
115 Letter from Freud to Ferenczi of March 17th 1919 (in Falzeder and Brabant, 1996).  
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illustration of the idea that a phantasy “is intimately related, in its origin, to the 
emergence of the masochistic sexual drive” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p.97).  
 
In her introduction to a collection of papers devoted to A Child Is Being Beaten, Ethel 
Spector Person stressed the anthropological dimension of the masochistic phantasy: 
“masochistic fantasies alone (as opposed to masochistic perversions) are not necessarily 
the result of contingent events in one’s childhood but may be embedded in the human 
condition” (Spector Person, 1997, p.x). Similarly, in his commentary of Freud’s text, 
Paul-Laurent Assoun explained: “if the masochistic phantasy is paradigmatic, it is 
because it reveals that masochism is at the heart of the fantasy in itself” (Assoun, 2007, 
p.32).116  
 
Roger Dorey noticed that for a long time psychoanalysts have used Freud’s 
decomposition of the beating phantasy in its three successive phases as a model: “day 
dream, infantile memory forgotten then remembered and reconstruction of the 
unconscious intermediary phantasy, is indeed a privileged representation of the analytic 
work” (Dorey, 1986, p.118). In her work on siblings, Juliet Mitchell used Freud’s analysis 
of the beating phantasy to elaborate “a psychoanalytic paradigm that takes account of 
sisters and brothers and lateral relationships in general” (Mitchell, 2003, p.85). 
 
My reading of Freud’s essay will follow this second group of commentators: Freud 
deciphered in the combination of suffering and pleasure – that enigmatic fusion between 
a demand for love and an expression of hatred – a paradigm of the phantasy’s 
functioning. Interestingly enough, a textual study of A Child Is Being Beaten shows that the 
form of writing in which Freud made this discovery is itself paradigmatic of a certain 
approach through which Freud formulated his ideas. Thus, Marcelo Viñar explains:  
 
We have also learned, not without difficulty, to see Freud’s concepts in the 
context of their gradual development over time: rather than coming into 
being by an instantaneous act of parthenogenesis, they evolved by a slow 
step-by-step and sometimes contradictory process in which Freud combined 
in his unique way his capacity for coherent systematization with the 
                                                        
116 “Si le fantasme masochiste est paradigmatique, c’est qu’il révèle le fond masochiste du fantasme en tant que 
tel.” 
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nomadism of an indefatigable explorer of the mind. To me, A Child is Being 
Beaten is a paradigm of a synthesis of wandering and coherence (Viñar, 1997, 
p.180). 
 
It is partly because Freud’s essay is so illustrative of the way he formulates his thoughts 
that Darius Ornston (1982) could use it to explore the influence of Strachey’s translation 
of Freud’s theory.117 The way Freud developed his ideas in this essay evokes “those 
fruitful moments in the work of analysis when in attempting to say one thing, the patient 
or the analyst in fact says or finds something else” (Viñar, 1997, p.180). Unlike the 
transparent exposition of a ready-made thought, Freud’s written style transcribes the 
movement of his research. Patrick Mahony pointed out how in A Child Is Being Beaten, 
this expository manner of Freud’s generates and facilitates “the associative and critical 
processes, his own in the act of writing and ours in the act of reading him” (Mahony, 
1997, p.58). 
 
It has been suggested that this essay is so representative of Freud’s associative 
formulation because it starts with Freud “reporting his patients’ fantasies in their own 
words” (Ornston, 1982, p.410). I think that, more accurately, what is at stake is the 
double operation by which the phantasy representation [Phantastische Vorstellung] is 
transposed by the patient in his associations and then by Freud in his essay. The 
peculiarity of Freud’s associative formulation comes from this double work of 
transcription that leads to visual images being transformed into a written text. As pointed 
out by Laplanche, this “transcription into the language of words has the merit of bringing 
to light the grammar of the fantasy itself” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], p. 98).  
 
I think that the great formal discovery of Freud’s essay is precisely that the present 
continuous and the passive voice constitute the verbal mode used for the expression of a 
phantasy. Thus, the title of the essay is not a clinical label or a nosological entity but the 
passive formula used by the patient to describe their phantasy. The repetitive formula “a 
child is being beaten” condenses a sort of perpetual present: the negation of a past and a 
future and the anonymity of the passive voice. This combination of present continuous 
and passive voice makes its mark at the beginning of Freud’s paper. The first sentence: 
                                                        
117 A Child Is Being Beaten was the first of Freud’s works that James Strachey translated. He undertook the 
translation in 1920 when both he and his wife Alix had been in analysis with Freud for a few months. In 
1955 he modified his original translation.     
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“It is surprising how often…” stands for the present continuous and Patrick Mahony 
indicates that in “the first two paragraphs of Freud’s essay (…) there are three clauses in 
which the passive voice was changed by Strachey into the active voice, thus erasing the 
introductory effect of passivity, in which the passive phantasy “a child is being beaten” is 
enveloped” (Mahony, 1997, p.59). Hence, in Freud’s paper, both the turning round of 
the drive upon the subject and the use of the present continuous passive formulation by 
which this movement of turning round is transcribed in verbal language, are paradigmatic 
of the process of fantasmatization. 
 
Thomas Kuhn redefined the notion of paradigm as: “scientific achievements that for a 
time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”(Kuhn, 
1962, p.x).118 Kuhn believed that each scientific theory contains paradigms that impose 
the legitimate questions to be asked and the framework in which these questions could 
be answered. Using Kuhn’s definition, André Green (1979) has proposed that the dream 
is a paradigm for Freud’s conception of the mind. The discovery that every dream 
corresponds to a hallucinatory wish-fulfilment revealed that perceptions of the previous 
day activate infantile hallucinatory thoughts. The dream-work becomes the framework of 
a hallucinatory mode of thinking that escapes the subject’s consciousness and it is from 
this framework that Freud invented the questions and the models of his first 
metapsychology.  
 
I would argue that the masochist phantasy described in A Child Is Being Beaten is an 
addition to the paradigm of the dream. The unconscious mode of thinking is produced 
not only by infantile unconscious wishes but also through the turning round of muscular 
aggressiveness upon the self. The beating phantasy becomes a clinical model through 
which Freud linked the construction of primal thoughts and the genesis of masochism. 
What organises the unconscious system is this process of turning round upon the self by 
which hallucinatory traces are created. 
 
In other words, the hallucinatory mode of thinking is of a masochistic nature: its 
presentations are the outcome of the conversion of the drive into its passive form. The 
                                                        
118 The 1960’s saw the appearance of the first work of a number of thinkers who would later be more or 
less artificially regrouped under a school of thought called the new epistemology. Their attempt was to 
challenge the neo-positivist view of science, the received view as Hilary Putnam called it in What Theories are 
Not (1979[1962]). It is within this contestation of neo-positivism that Thomas S. Kuhn created his concept 
of paradigm. 
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primal hallucinatory presentations of the experience of satisfaction by which psychic life 
begins are governed by the pleasure principle. However, the analysis of the beating 
phantasy shows that those primal forms of thoughts (independently of their content) are 
generated through a turning round of bodily aggressiveness upon the psychical apparatus 
– in this process we see a somatic nature transformed into a psychic nature. The 
psychical apparatus appears in the moment when the subject is invaded by the 
aggressiveness of his own muscular apparatus and therefore primal thoughts can also be 
described as primal psychic pains. To characterize these primal psychic pains, I propose 
(paraphrasing Freud’s proton pseudos, the primal lies of the Project) the term, proton algos. 
The proton algos would be the primal psychical pain of the infantile presentations produced 
by the drive turning round upon the subject’s own self. 
 
When Freud investigates the metapsychology of the neurotic symptom, the 
metapsychology of dreams or the construction of a perverse phantasy, his object of study 
is not so much the phenomenon in itself but, more precisely, the representation of this 
phenomenon. Freud studied the way a psychological phenomenon is verbalised, but also 
the way it resists being verbalised. The transcription of a neurotic symptom, a dream or a 
phantasy is formed from a combination of verbal associations and the resistance 
encountered by those associations.119 The starting point of Freud’s metapsychology is the 
epistemological bet that there is a type of determinism behind the way psychological 
phenomena are represented by a subject.  
 
The initial question of metapsychology was therefore to understand the nature of this 
psychical determinism. In other words, Freud’s metapsychology interrogates the nature of a 
psychical text that would generate a form of speech, which never ceases to encounter its limits. From the 
Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895) to the 1915 Papers on Metapsychology, Freud developed 
an intuition that this psychical text was produced through a hallucinatory mode of 
thinking. The psyche is built as an apparatus that primarily faces the peremptory 
demands of internal needs in a hallucinatory manner. In Freud’s metapsychological 
fiction, the primal activity of the psychic apparatus is to replace perceived reality with 
hallucinatory ideas derived from this reality. 
 
                                                        
119 Resistance to free association has a tendency to involve repetitive patterns and the analytic 
dialogue will attempt to create verbal forms to transcribe those patterns. 
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When he wrote the Project, Freud thought that the hallucinatory power of proton pseudos 
would remain uninhibited. The proton pseudos designate infantile ideas that escape the 
control of the secondary process because they contain a latent sexual content: they can 
be described as ‘sexual pre-sexual’. It is as if the hallucinatory mode of thinking could 
create ideas that contain a sexual potential that will only be revealed at puberty. Puberty 
activates this latent sexual content and hallucinatory presentations manifest themselves in 
the form of symptoms. With the proton pseudos a contingent experience becomes a 
pathological structure: the contingent encounter between a child and manifestations of 
the adult’s sexuality generates a set of hallucinatory ideas that produce the structure of a 
neurotic symptom.  
 
On the other hand, the notion of proton algos that I extract from my reading of A Child is 
Being Beaten would operate in the opposite way: the structure of the hallucinatory mode of 
thinking would transcribed into the representation of an experience. The proton algos 
designate the hallucinatory ideas generated by the internalisation of somatic 
aggressiveness. The genesis of proton algos (a turning round of aggressiveness upon the 
subject) would come about through the construction of a masochististic phantasy. The 
notion of primal lies [proton pseudos] implies that contingent memories are registered 
within the ontology of human sexuality; the notion of primal psychical pain [proton algos] 
on the other hand, implies that the ontology of the hallucinatory mode of thinking is 
established in human memory prior to or regardless of contingent memory. 
Hallucinatory thoughts appear in the internal attack of drive energy upon the psychical 
apparatus and the final content of a masochististic phantasy illustrates this primal 
movement of the psyche. 
 
To understand how the same hallucinatory process can be described as an experience of 
satisfaction and as primal psychical pain, it is useful to distinguish between pleasure as 
Lust and pleasure as satisfaction. Jean Laplanche has stressed that Freud’s notion of 
pleasure “would seem to divide into two directions: on the one hand, enjoyment 
[jouissance], in the sense both of frenetic pleasure and of lust, and on the other, 
satisfaction, understood in terms of the allaying of vital tensions” (Laplanche, 
1976[1970], p.105). The production of hallucinatory thoughts aims to reach a perceptual 
identity in order to satisfy an internal need and yet it also manifests itself as a 
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phenomenon of pain because it operates through “an effraction of the boundary and a 
rush of ‘unbound’ energy” (Ibid., p.105).  
 
On the one hand, the hallucinatory mode of thinking is pleasure, as it produces 
presentations of satisfactory objects. On the other hand, it is pain, because it operates 
through an increase of tension in the psychic apparatus. The hallucinatory mode of 
thinking can be described as masochistic in as much as it achieves hallucinatory 
satisfaction through a turning round of the drive upon the subject. What is shown by the 
analysis of the beating phantasy in A Child is Being Beaten is the link between the 
beginning of psychical life and the genesis of masochism. 
 
The question of whether it is masochism or sadism that comes first is central to Freud’s 
theory of the drives because the sadism-masochism pair is a universal psychical 
manifestation of the sexual drive. In a paragraph added to the Three Essays on Sexuality in 
1915 Freud writes: “Sadism and masochism occupy a special position among the 
perversions, since the contrast between activity and passivity which lies behind them is 
among the universal characteristics of sexual life” (Freud, 1905, p.159). 120 The demand 
made by the drives upon the psychical apparatus gives birth to primal forms of sadism 
and masochism. Sadism and masochism are pre-verbal psychical representatives of the 
drives.  
 
Repression and sublimation are defensive mechanisms that can appear only when a 
verbal mode of thinking has been established and, with it, a sharp cleavage between the 
functioning of conscious and unconscious systems. Freud insisted on this point at the 
beginning of his paper on Repression:  
 
Psycho-analytic observation of the transference neuroses (…) leads us to 
conclude that repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from 
the very beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has 
occurred between conscious and unconscious mental activity. (…) The view 
of repression would be made more complete by assuming that, before the 
mental organization reaches this stage, the task of fending off instinctual 
                                                        
120 In 1915 the writing of the metapsychological papers pushed Freud to reread and add paragraphs and 
footnotes to his ‘shibboleth’ works such as The Interpretation of Dreams and Three Essays on Sexuality. 
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impulses is dealt with by the other vicissitudes which instincts [drives] may 
undergo – e.g. reversal into the opposite or turning round upon the subject’s 
own self (Freud, 1915b, p.147). 
 
In Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915a), Freud described how sadism and masochism are 
generated by these two pre-verbal modes of defence of the mental apparatus against the 
drives. Sadism and masochism as a pair of opposites show the functioning of the drive 
before it the meaning of verbal language conceals it. Through the study of this sado-
masochistic genesis, Freud investigated the primal connection between the mental and 
the somatic. Sadism and masochism display the intricacy of drives in such a way that to 
search for their origin is also to search for the origin of psychical sexuality.121 
 
Within Freud’s first drive dualism between ego or self-preservative and sexual drives, 
sadism exists prior to masochism but psychical sexuality appears only with masochism. 
Freud distinguishes between primal non-sexual aggressive sadism that aims to control the 
object and secondary hedonistic sadism that extracts sexual excitation from the infliction 
of pain on to the object. The point of articulation between these two forms of sadism is 
the experience of masochism. Sexual excitement from pain inflicted on to an external 
object arises from the passive experience of a link between pleasure and pain: “The 
[sexual] enjoyment of pain would thus be an aim which was originally masochistic, but 
which can only become an instinctual aim [Triebziele] in someone who was originally 
sadistic” [in the non-sexual aggressive sense of the term] (Freud, 1915a, p.129). In order 
for pain to play a role in the genesis of sexual pleasure the pain must first be experienced 
passively in the self because “sensations of pain, like other unpleasurable sensations, 
trench upon sexual excitation and produce a pleasurable condition, for the sake of which 
the subject will even willingly experience the unpleasure of pain”(Ibid., p.128).  
 
Already in the Three Essays, Freud had identified that all “intense affective processes, 
including even terrifying ones” are a source of children’s sexual excitation (Freud, 1905, 
p.203). What is described is an odd alchemy by which an experienced pain is transformed 
into sexual excitation. The clinic of A Child is Being Beaten cast a new light on this 
transformation: it showed how this transformation corresponds to the shift from a non-
                                                        
121 The idea of the fusion of the drives that would be so crucial for the concept of the death drive appears 
for the first time in Instincts and their Vicissitudes.  
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qualitative muscular sensation to an excitation made of hallucinatory traces. 
Hallucinatory traces are created in the outburst of pain into the field of sexuality. I use 
the term proton algos [primal psychical pains] to designate these hallucinatory traces in 
order to stress the link established by Freud between the genesis of masochism and the 
genesis of hallucinatory thoughts. 
 
To make this link more explicit, I will return to the sequence of the beating phantasy. In 
previous texts, Freud had put forward the conscious phantasy as a function which could 
serve the pleasure principle. 122 In A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud goes further: he explains 
the different steps of the elaboration of the phantasy and reveals its unconscious 
dimension. The conscious beating-phantasies “represent an end-product and not an 
initial manifestation” (Ibid., p.184). Freud expounds the masochistic grammar of this 
phantasy, and in the same way in which he had dissected the dream-work, he rebuilds the 
phantasy-work from the conscious content of the phantasy as brought to him by his 
patients. 
 
In the first part of the paper, what Freud describes of his patients’ behaviour is a form of 
compulsory masturbation, which is reminiscent of the experiment of post-hypnotic 
suggestion. From around their sixth year, at the beginning of school life, a psychical 
suggestion that urges masturbatory satisfaction keeps being activated in Freud’s patients. 
If at first they can maintain the illusion that the act of masturbation takes place 
voluntarily, it quickly appears that it is done “in spite of the patient’s efforts, and with the 
characteristics of an obsession” (Freud, 1919, p.179). The stimuli that activate the 
masturbatory suggestion can be the sight of other children being humiliated by a teacher 
or, later on, the reading of novels such as Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Les Malheurs de Sophie. In 
fact, one can suppose that any ideas that evoke a submissive child at the mercy of an 
adult’s physical strength would activate the impulse to masturbate.  
 
In the same way that in post-hypnotic suggestion it is not the hypnotist’s command but 
only the command’s outcome that is revealed to consciousness, the patient of the beating 
phantasy is conscious only of the impulse to masturbate and not of the hallucinatory 
ideas that trigger it. Only later on, a conscious phantasy is created like a framework 
                                                        
122 Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming (1908[1907]); Hysterical Phantasies and their Relation to Bisexuality (1908a); 
Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911b) 
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within which the excitation can exist; it is après-coup that the subject elaborates a more or 
less complex conscious fiction around the impulse: “masturbation was at first under the 
dominance of unconscious phantasies and (…) conscious ones were substituted for them 
later” (Ibid., p.190). This conscious fiction constitutes the third phase of the phantasy: the 
one confessed with hesitation in the intimacy of the analytic dialogue. The patient 
behaves like a sleepwalker, obeying unconscious orders, and he elaborates fictions as a 
way to offer some motives for his senseless behaviour: a “vehicle of the excitation 
impelling towards masturbation (…) which on the one hand continue the phantasy along 
the same line, and on the other hand neutralize it through compensation”(Ibid., p.195). 
 
The analytic work reveals how this unconscious order is formed from hallucinatory ideas 
that are created from the awakening of somatic factors at a very early period of 
childhood. The activation of somatic factors corresponds to the first phase of the beating 
phantasy. The transformation of somatic factors into hallucinatory ideas corresponds to 
the second one, which is also the unconscious and masochistic keystone of the phantasy. 
Both the first and the third phase can be consciously perceived and remembered but only 
the latter is sexual: “the essential characteristic which distinguishes even the simplest 
phantasies” of the third phase “from those of the first, and which establishes the 
connection with the intermediate phase, is this: the phantasy now has strong and 
unambiguous sexual excitement attached to it and so provides a means for masturbatory 
satisfaction”(Ibid., p.186).  
 
It is therefore at the second masochistic phase of the beating phantasy that sexuality is 
introduced. To keep the analogy with the experiment of post-hypnotic suggestion, it is in 
the transition between phases one and two that the hypnotic suggestion is built. I would 
like to focus on this transition to show how Freud describes the emergence of psychical 
sexuality as the turning round of a somatic aggressiveness, which gets lost in a puzzle of 
psychical traces with no primal origins. 
 
The first phase of the beating phantasy can be represented by the phrase: “My father is 
beating the child whom I hate” (Freud, 1919, p.185) and yet, Freud rejects the idea that this 
first phase is sadistic. Firstly, because “the child producing the phantasy is never doing 
the beating herself” (Ibid., p.185), secondly and more importantly, because there is no real 
sexual excitement or enjoyment attached to it. Hatred directed towards the rival child is 
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not sexualized but an expression of aggressiveness against an object that causes 
frustration. It corresponds to the primal cruelty described by Freud in the Three Essays, 
which “develops in childhood even more independently of the sexual activities that are 
attached to erotogenic zones” (Freud, 1905, p.192).  
 
Freud ascribed this primal cruelty of the child to the drive for mastery [Bemächtigungstrieb]. 
The notion of a drive for mastery was not thoroughly developed by Freud. The part 
played by this drive in the genesis of sexuality can appear quite equivocal and according 
to the American psychoanalyst, Ives Hendrick, Freud’s usage of the term “seems to serve 
as a convenient evasion when its classification as an ego or sexual instinct [drive] was 
uncertain” (Hendrick, 1942, p.40). I will try to show that the notion of the drive for 
mastery put forward by Hendrick can lead to an original reading of Freud’s theory of 
anaclisis. 
 
In the 1915 edition of the Three Essays, Freud attributes three essential characteristics to 
infantile sexuality. The first is its anaclitic origin: at its origin, infantile sexual 
manifestation “attaches itself to one of the vital somatic functions” (Freud, 1905, p.182). 
The second is its auto-erotic functioning: it has no sexual object. The third is the way it 
obtains pleasure: through erotogenic zones. Now, primal manifestations of the drive for 
mastery such as exhibitionism and cruelty “appear in a sense independently of erotogenic 
zones” and “from the very first” they “involve other people as sexual objects” (Ibid., 
p.192). The paradox of the first phase of the beating phantasy, which is under the 
dominance of the drive for mastery, is to have sexual objects but with no sexual 
excitement attached to them. In other words, the actors of the ‘phantasy play’ (the father, 
the beaten child) are already there but there is not yet a text for this ‘phantasy play’.  
 
As Freud put it: “we may say in terms recalling the prophecy made by the Three Witches 
to Banquo: ‘Not clearly sexual, not in itself sadistic, but yet the stuff from which both 
will later come’” (Freud, 1919, p.187). For that reason, Freud hesitates “to say whether 
the characteristics of a ‘phantasy’ can yet be ascribed to this first step” (Ibid., p.185). 
Rather than an autonomous phantasy, this first step would be the subjective 
representation of the child’s attempts to acquire control of its somatic musculature. The 
first phase of the beating phantasy would then be a clinical confirmation of the 
preliminary stage of sadism that Freud has hypothesised in Instincts and their Vicissitudes: a 
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preliminary stage born “out of the child’s efforts to gain control over his own 
limbs”(Freud, 1915a, p.130). 
 
In ‘Instinct and the Ego During Infancy’ (1942) and ‘Work and the Pleasure Principle’ 
(1943), two papers that he wrote in the early 1940’s, Ives Hendrick emphasized this 
understanding of the drive for mastery as a drive, which was behind the infant’s effort to 
gain control over its muscular apparatus. 123 He defines it as a drive that “provides the 
energy and the need to exercise the physiological organs available for work” (Hendrick, 
1943, p.314). Hendrick tried to show that the drive for mastery is the main force in the 
development of ego functions and that it operates independently of the sexual drives. Its 
aim “is the pleasure in executing a function successfully, regardless of its sensual value” 
and the “function is then at the disposal of the ego for use in a multitude of 
situations”(Hendrick, 1942, p.42). This function can secondarily achieve goals “whether 
the goals be libidinal, egoistic or–as is generally the case–both” (Ibid., p.45). 
 
Even though Hendrick’s definition of the drive for mastery is influenced by both Adler’s 
‘will to power’124 and developmental psychology, I believe it can still be read as a post-
Freudian concept. Indeed, I would argue that Hendrick’s notion of the drive for mastery 
conserves and refines the central role played by infantile sexuality in the genesis of 
mental life. I will propose a reading of Hendrick, emphasising the idea that the first step 
in the genesis of an infantile wish rests on the development of a neuromuscular function. 
I would like to show how this idea casts a new light on Freud’s theory of anaclisis 
[Anlehnung] and how this is helpful to understand the beating phantasy. 
 
To clarify and develop this point, I must first explain how Jean Laplanche has influenced 
the contemporary understanding of Freud’s notion of anaclisis. The theory of anaclisis 
gives an account of the genesis of infantile sexual wishes and with this concept, Freud 
proposed that vital somatic needs initiate psychical wishes, that a sexual wish is attached 
to a non-sexual vital function. Amongst Freud’s commentators, Jean Laplanche is the 
                                                        
123 Yves Hendrick is one of the rare analysts to explore Freud’s notion of a drive for mastery. In his papers, 
he translates Freud’s ‘drive for mastery’ [Bewältigungstrieb] as ‘instinct to master’ but he makes explicit that 
he uses instinct in the sense of drive [Trieb]: “’Instinct’ is open to the usual objection that it is used 
throughout in the special psychoanalytic sense of drive, of a biological need experienced mentally as 
emotion, and impelling the organism to tension-relieving behaviour” (Hendrick, 1942, p.40). For the sake 
of coherence and clarity, I will use the term: ‘drive for mastery’ in this chapter.  
 
124  Hendrick acknowledges Adler’s influence “without following him in rejecting other important 
contributions of psychoanalysis”(Hendrick, 1943, p.314, fn.2).    
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author who has most thoroughly excavated this concept from the Three Essays on 
Sexuality. Through his questioning of the Freudian lexicon (that led him to write The 
Language of Psychoanalysis with J.-B. Pontalis and through the writing of The Order of Life – 
the first of the six lectures that form Life And Death in Psychoanalysis) Laplanche has tried 
to show the importance of the concept of anaclisis within Freud’s model of infantile 
sexuality. Laplanche favours the translation of the German word Anlehnung into the 
French term étayage that Jeffrey Mehlman translated into English as the word propping: 
 
Propping [Etayage], the French reader will perhaps be surprised to hear, is a 
fundamental term in Freud’s conceptual apparatus. In current translations of 
Freud, in French as well as in the excellent Standard Edition in English, the 
only trace of the Freudian concept is the sporadic and poorly justified use of 
an adjective derived from the Greek: “anaclitic.” A prolonged consideration 
of Freudian terminology and an effort at retranslating Freud’s work have led 
us to choose (…) the term étayage (propping) and its derivatives. If we have 
adopted that term, it is because it was necessary to bring into focus, as had 
not been done before, the rigorous conceptual value which the German 
word Anlehnung – meaning “to find support” or propping in something else 
– takes on in Freud. We have attempted thereby to bring into relief with its 
various resonances a notion long obscured by translations more concerned 
with elegance than rigor, specifically by an excessively learned and 
insufficiently explicit pseudoscientific term: anaclisis (Laplanche, 1976[1970], 
pp.15-16). 
 
I will nevertheless, conserve Strachey’s translation of Anlehnung as ‘anaclisis’ because 
apart from having hidden the concept using rather technical terminology, I do not see 
any major conceptual problem with Strachey’s translation. When he wrote Life and Death 
in Psychoanalysis, Laplanche used the concept of anaclisis to show how, in Freud’s 
metapsychology, the emergence of sexuality is neither “a quasi-metaphysical abstract 
genesis”, nor (formed/developed in) relation to an object perceived in its primal 
empirical reality as sexual. In other words, Freud’s anaclisis appears as a solution to the 
“false impasse” between the “vast fable of autoerotism as a state of the primary and total 
absence of an object” from which “the object would be generated as it were ex nihilo, by a 
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stroke of some magic wand” (Ibid., p.18) and a model in which sexuality has an object 
from the beginning.  
 
Laplanche would stress that the notion of anaclisis “by no means designates a leaning of 
the subject on the object (of child on mother)” (Ibid., p.16) but is rather, the process by 
which the accomplishment of a bodily function that is essential to life leaves residual 
messages, that in a second stage will be translated by the child into hallucinatory wishes 
expressed autoerotically. Hence, the somatic function has an object from the beginning 
but “on the other hand sexuality does not have, from the beginning, a real object” (Ibid., p.19). In the 
absence of the object that brings satisfaction, the sexual object is created in a 
hallucinatory way. Freud’s famous quote: “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding 
of it” (Freud, 1905, p.222) would confirm this reading: the search for a sexual object is 
always the search for a primary lost object. 
 
One can already clearly sense in this first chapter of Life and Death in Psychoanalysis what 
will later become Laplanche’s great metapsychological achievement: the so-called general 
theory of seduction, which is in fact a theory of anaclisis. The theory rests on the premise 
that an infant is born with innate biological needs, but does not have the capacity to 
satisfy many of them. The body of the newborn baby needs outside help to carry out its 
vital biological functions. The great length of time during which the infant remains 
dependent on this help is one of the most striking characteristics of our species and Jean 
Laplanche calls this dependence the fundamental anthropological situation.  
 
Through the relation of primal care between the adult and the infant, infantile sexuality is 
introduced into the infant. The messages sent by the adult to the infant are compromised 
by the sexual unconscious of the adult and as a consequence part of the adult’s message 
remains enigmatic for the infant. Laplanche understands the process of repression as a 
repeated attempt to translate this enigmatic message. What comes first in Laplanche’s 
metapsychology is the fundamental anthropological situation: the needs of the infant that 
necessitate the intervention of an adult. These somatic needs are, in a way, twisted by the 
sexual infantile unconscious of the adult and this transmutation of the infant’s needs 
forms Laplanche’s understanding of the notion of anaclisis. The momentous 
consequence of the general theory of seduction is that infantile sexuality has an 
exogenous origin. Under its more elaborate form, this consequence almost became 
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Laplanche’s metapsychological motto: “psychical reality is not a creation of the ego it is 
invasive” 125 (Laplanche, 1999, my translation). 
 
Hendrick’s notion of a drive for mastery can be understood as a direct challenge to this. 
Of course, Hendrick’s drive for mastery is not an answer to Laplanche’s understanding 
of anaclisis since he conceptualized it thirty years before Laplanche’s first texts. 
Moreover, the concept of anaclisis never appears directly in Hendrick’s work. However, I 
believe that his definition of a drive for mastery leads to an original reading of Freud’s 
theory of anaclisis, which throws light on the beating phantasy. Hendrick’s 
metapsychological innovation is to affirm that what comes first in the genesis of an 
infantile wish is not the need for an external object but the display of neuromuscular 
functions: 
 
For it suggests that function initiates the wish; that the development of the ability 
to execute a certain function may determine, for example, the pregenital aims 
by which libidinal gratification is sought during a certain phase. The familiar 
psychoanalytic explanation of development of needs in terms of 
transformation of the libido alone implies that we strive for what we want; 
but consideration of the development of the ego indicates that in many cases 
what we may desire or choose is determined by what we are able to get 
(Hendrick, 1942, p.48). 
 
Following Hendrick, infantile sexuality would lean primarily on the infant’s muscles and 
only secondarily on its needs. For instance, the newborn’s first scream is not the 
expression of a need – not a demand for milk or care – but the expression of the 
muscular impulse to use its voice. Only secondarily is there an encounter between the 
voice and the object. Likewise, the anal phase rests firstly on the infant’s impulse to use 
its sphincter and it is through this impulse that the infant encounters the object of care. 
The infant’s impulse to gain control over its muscular apparatus alters the perception of 
its environment: external reality is filtered by a pregenital function.  
 
Hence, the object of care is not perceived in its empirical reality but through the display 
of pregenital functions: there would be a breast perceived orally, a breast perceived 
                                                        
125 “La réalité psychique n’est pas créée par moi, elle est invasive.”  
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anally, and so on. Under the dominance of the drive for mastery, pregenital functions are 
at first not linked with sexual pleasure but rather, they aim to master a segment of the 
environment: the drive for mastery pushes the infant to impose its muscular reality on its 
environment. At this stage pregenital functions are not yet linked with an unconscious 
mode of thinking but they are the expression of muscular functions. 
 
In Freud’s metapsychological speculation, it is in the absence of the object that the infant 
creates hallucinatory forms of thought through its pregenital functions. In this turning 
round of the drive for mastery upon the self, pregenital functions cease to be only a 
means to master the environment, becoming also a means to represent the environment. 
In other words, the pregenital functions are no longer exclusively dependent on the 
muscular apparatus, but also rely on the psychical apparatus. From this angle, anaclisis 
corresponds to the process by which the pregenital functions shift from being under the 
command of the muscular apparatus to being under the command of the psychical 
apparatus: the process by which pregenital sexuality appears as a primal hallucinatory 
mode of thinking. 
 
In the transition between phases one and two of the beating phantasy, what is at stake is 
this transformation of the pregenital as an expression of the muscular apparatus, into the 
pregenital as a mode of representation. As Jean Laplanche has pointed out, between 
phases one and two “the process of a turning back into autoerotism” takes place in and 
through this process “the fantasy, the unconscious, and sexuality in the form of masochistic 
excitation together emerge in a single movement” (Laplanche, 1976[1970], pp.99-100). 
Hence, the study of the transition between the first and the second phases goes way 
beyond the specific case of the beating phantasy because what is made intelligible is the 
process by which hallucinatory ideas emerge from the turning round of the drive upon 
the subject’s own self. 
 
Freud observes the vicissitudes of the drive through the lenses of the beating-phantasy. It 
is in this sense, I believe, that Freud’s claim on the universality of the beating-phantasy 
should be understood. Primal presentations of objects appear in the turning round of the 
drive upon the self and this movement of turning round is at the core of masochism. 
From this angle, A Child is Being Beaten is Freud’s essential text on masochism. It starts 
from a type of semiology specific to the psychoanalytic cure in order to show the 
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ontological dimension of masochism: the discovery that a condition of existence of 
hallucinatory presentations at the basis of the fantasy is a reflexive masochist phase. In 
his commentary of the beating phantasy, Laplanche insisted on this point:  
 
the process of turning round is not to be thought of only at the level of the 
content of the fantasy, but in the very movement of fantasmatization. To shift to 
the reflexive is not only or even necessarily to give a reflexive content to the 
“sentence” of the fantasy; it is also and above all to reflect the action, 
internalize it, make it enter into oneself as a fantasy. To fantasize aggression 
is to turn it round upon oneself, to aggress oneself: such is the moment of 
autoerotism, in which the indissoluble bond between fantasy as such, 
sexuality and the unconscious is confirmed (Ibid., p.102). 
 
Freud’s discovery of a mental life beyond consciousness is closely linked with his 
observation of sexual manifestations beyond the reproductive function and beyond the 
genitals. In the Introductory Lectures, Freud developed this parallel:  
 
we have been obliged to extend the concept of ‘psychical’ and to recognize 
something ‘psychical’ that is not ‘conscious’. And in just the same way, 
whereas other people declare that ‘sexual’ and ‘connected with reproduction’ 
(or, if you prefer to put it more shortly, ‘genital’) are identical, we cannot 
avoid postulating something ‘sexual’ that is not ‘genital’–has nothing to do 
with reproduction(Freud, 1917[1916-1917], p.321).  
 
To a certain extent, non-genital forms of sexuality would be the manifestation of 
unconscious ideas. In this sense, Freud’s efforts to find criteria that could characterize 
human sexuality were also a way to establish some sort of empirical trace of the 
unconscious.  
 
There is a recurring question throughout Freud’s work: what can be understood to come 
under the umbrella of sexuality covered by the concept of the sexual? What is it that 
allows us to characterize human sexuality? What would be a “recognized criterion of the 
sexual nature of a process, apart, once again, from a connection with the reproductive 
function which we must reject as being too narrow-minded. The biological criteria, such 
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as the periodicities of twenty-three and twenty-eight days postulated by Wilhelm Fliess, 
are still highly debatable; the chemical characteristics of the sexual process, which we may 
suspect, are still awaiting discovery” (Ibid., p.320).  
 
At times, one feels in Freud the temptation to return to the positivist utopias of his 
youth: the temptation to discover a periodicity of time with Fliess, or to identify a 
chemical characteristic of the sexual process with Brücke. However, far from the lure of 
empiricism, in his metapsychology Freud proposed to characterize infantile sexuality as a 
mode of thinking that would operate beyond the logos: a mode of thinking that would 
transform a muscular aggressiveness into a set of ideas that are irreducible to 
consciousness. To define infantile sexuality as a set of presentations irreducible to the 
logos is, I believe, the great originality and the great subversiveness of the Freudian 
reading of sexuality. A Child is Being Beaten shows how the clinical encounter constructs a 
type of idea that “never had a real existence” in the regime of consciousness but that 
constitutes the hallucinatory suggestion by which the subject is lived.  
 
Construction of a Trace 
 
To give the name proton algos to the masochistic presentations created in the second phase 
of the beating phantasy is a way to establish a link between the construction of a 
phantasy in A Child is Being Beaten and the hysterical proton pseudos of Freud’s 1895 Project 
for a Scientific Psychology. I think that the chain of Freud’s metapsychological texts between 
1895 and 1915 – what can be called Freud’s first metapsychology – unites these two 
notions around the same interrogative point: with the proton pseudos Freud attempted to 
discover the secret of hysteria, with the second phase of the beating phantasy, he was 
trying to reconstitute the grammar of a phantasy but they both share the same question 
about the origins of psychic life. 
 
In fact, rather than an investigation into the origins of psychic life, it would be more 
accurate to speak of a ‘calling into question’ of various notions about these origins. Freud 
tries to identify a mode of thinking that existed at the beginning of psychic life and 
throughout his first metapsychology he describes this mode of thinking as hallucinatory. 
The proton pseudos of the Project, the unconscious wish of The Interpretation of Dreams, the thing-
presentation of the 1915 papers on metapsychology, the proton algos of the beating phantasy: 
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these primal forms of thought all appear because of the replacement of a perceived 
external object with a hallucinatory internal object. However, the uncanny noise that 
becomes stronger and stronger as Freud affirms his metapsychological endeavour is that 
these hallucinatory forms challenge the very concept of origin. The code of the primal 
hallucinatory mode of thinking gets lost in man’s archaic heritage and the origins of the 
individual’s subjectivity becomes trapped within the origins of the species. The 
hallucinatory mode of thinking triggers a type of intentionality that is irreducible to any 
form of self-presence and that can only appear to the regime of consciousness in the 
form of the enigmatic. 
 
The primal hallucinatory forms described by Freud, using terms such as the protons 
pseudos, unconscious wishes, unconscious traces or thing-presentations are those 
elements of his model that resist being “contained within logocentric closure”. 126  In 
chapters three, four and five, I tried to show how Freud’s model of a hallucinatory mode 
of thinking challenged the conception of a subject defined around self-presence. In 
chapter six, my purpose was to point out how the attempt to express hallucinatory forms 
of thought would disturb Freud’s writing and for that reason I defended the idea that 
metapsychology is also the name of a type of formalism specific to psychoanalysis. 
Finally, in this chapter I am arguing that manifestations of the hallucinatory mode of 
thinking in the clinic constantly overflow the boundaries of Freud’s clinical encounter. 
Thus, Freud’s concept of the hallucinatory mode of thinking resists the logos by 
challenging the closure of classic western metaphysics, by disturbing the framework of 
verbal expression and by provoking the limits of the analytical setting. It is this last point 
on which I would like to focus in my conclusion. 
 
The discovery that the aetiology of neurosis was not to be found in a real memory but in 
the hallucinatory traces derived from a real bodily experience changed the nature of 
analytical work. In its attempt to make the early development of the subject intelligible, 
the work of analysis does not aim to produce a picture of the past but to construct the 
unconscious hallucinatory presentations derived from this past. 
                                                        
126 To “locate in Freud’s text several points of reference, and to isolate, on the threshold of a systematic 
examination, those elements of psychoanalysis which can only uneasily be contained within logocentric 
closure” (Derrida, 1978[1967], p.249) is the question that Derrida addresses to Freud’s work at the 
beginning of Freud and the Scene of Writing and it is through the spectacles of this Derridean question that I 
have, in this study, been reading Freud’s first metapsychology. 
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These hallucinatory presentations are not rigid forms that pre-exist the subject in a sort 
of original universal womb: hallucinatory presentations are neither Plato’s “ideas” nor 
Jung’s “archetypes”. Freud’s concept of the unconscious is not one that is formed from 
ideas already inscribed in the analysand that the analyst discovers one after the other in 
their original forms through the ‘here and now’ of transference. As noticed by Serge 
Viderman, such a transcendental conception of the unconscious would lead to a notion 
of “unconscious truth given once and for all in a logos that would perpetuate its continuity 
and as a consequence the speech of the analytical situation would reveal its [unconscious] 
truth rather than creating its [unconscious] truth” and “the history of the subject would 
only be the result of a predictable fragmentation from a primal nodal point that would 
contain all the possible later forms of its event” (Viderman, 1970, p.162, my 
translation).127  
 
In other words, his conception of a primal hallucinatory mode of thinking did not lead 
Freud to replace the investigation for a scene of seduction in his early clinical work with 
an ontological inquiry for ideal unconscious forms. What is at stake is to generate from 
the verbal artefacts of the analytic dialogue, a type of presentation (Vorstellung) that 
challenges notions of origin because it is primal and yet never had a real existence in the 
self-presence of the subject. This act of construction of ideas that are at the origin of 
subjective life without having had a real existence, corresponds exactly to the 
construction of the second phase of the beating phantasy: 
 
This second phase is the most important and the most momentous of all. 
But we say of it in a certain sense that it has never had a real existence. It is 
never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming conscious. It is a 
construction of analysis, but it is no less a necessity on that account (Freud, 
1919, p.185). 
 
The intuition that psychical life starts with a sort of ontological lie, in the form of 
presentations that have never existed contemporaneously with subjective thoughts and 
                                                        
127 “La vérité de l’inconscient serait donnée une fois pour toutes dans le logos qui en répète la pérennité, 
comme la parole dans la situation analytique dirait ce qu’elle est, davantage qu’elle ne la ferait advenir par ce 
qu’elle en dit” et “L’histoire du sujet ne serait plus que le résultat d’une décompression dispersive, d’un 
éclatement prévisible à partir du point nodal originel qui enferme en une lettre toutes les formes ultérieures 
possibles de l’événement.”    
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whose intentionality has escaped any form of self-presence, had been present in Freud’s 
metapsychology since the proton pseudos. In various ways, the paradoxical view that mental 
life had a beginning but no fixed origin had never ceased to haunt Freud’s 
metapsychology. 
 
This metapsychological paradox gradually appears in the clinic as a creation of the 
analytic encounter to which Freud would give an epistemological status only in his 1937 
paper Constructions in Analysis. Laplanche and Pontalis, amongst others, have pointed out 
that it “would be no difficult matter (…) to find ample evidence in Freud’s work attesting 
to the fact that the theme of a construction (…) was present in it from the outset, and in 
more than one form” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973[1967], p.89). How, then, should we 
understand such a late reification of the clinical event of construction? 
 
Reflecting on this question, Jacques Press has stressed how “the work of 1935 to 1939, as 
Freud struggled with successive drafts of Moses and Monotheism, represented a final 
turning-point in his œuvre, leading the founder of psychoanalysis to reappraise core 
elements of his theory” (Press, 2011, p.31). Indeed, it seems to me that in his last 
important texts Freud re-examined old questions and stressed their most problematic 
aspects. 128 These last texts almost seem to represent Freud’s conceptual testament to 
what remained unresolved in his theory. This might also be understood, as a way of 
reaffirming that, like the figure of Moses, who set the Jewish people free but never 
reached the Promised Land, the metapsychological project remains, in essence, 
interminable. 
 
In writing the drafts of Moses and Monotheism, Freud came back to the question of primal 
ideas without origins. In this work, Freud developed the hypothesis that myth or religion 
refers to a past that has never been experienced by the subject:  
 
When Moses brought the people the idea of a single god, it was not a 
novelty but signified the revival of an experience in the primaeval ages of the 
human family which had long vanished from men's conscious memory. But 
                                                        
128 Freud’s last important texts are: Moses and Monotheism (1939[1934-1938]); An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 
(1940[1938]a); Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937a); Constructions in Analysis (1937b); Splitting of the Ego 
in the Process of Defence (1940[1938]b). 
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it had been so important and had produced or paved the way for such deeply 
penetrating changes in men's life that we cannot avoid believing that it had 
left behind it in the human mind some permanent traces, which can be 
compared to a tradition (Freud, 1939[1934-38], p. 129).  
 
Such ‘traces’ are presentations that the subject has never experienced, transcriptions of 
an unknown origin, which nevertheless encounter a degree of truth in the subject. This 
reality does not correspond to a material truth but to a historical truth: a type of truth whose 
origin is lost in the past of the species and which could be described as the amnesic 
memory of the species. As noticed by Press, “the passage in Constructions –and indeed in 
Moses– that touches on historical truth is embedded within a discussion of psychosis and 
hallucination” (Press, 2011[2008], p.40). 
 
I believe it is the reconsideration of hallucinatory presentations through the notion of 
historical truth rather than that of psychical reality129 which led Freud to give theoretical 
status to the act of construction. Indeed, Freud defined the act of construction as the 
discovery in the clinical encounter of the way this amnesic recollection of the species 
manifest itself in the core of the analysand’s existence. It is because the clinical act of 
construction transcribes the historical truth of the drives into the language of the cure 
that Freud can make this daring analogy between delusions and construction: “I have not 
been able to resist the seduction of an analogy. The delusion of patients appear to me to 
be the equivalents of the constructions which we build up in the course of an analytic 
treatment” (Freud, 1937b, p.268). 
 
Already at the end of Schreber’s case history, Freud had put forward a similar analogy 
between Schreber’s delusions and psychoanalytic theory: “Since I neither fear the 
criticism of others nor shrink from criticizing myself, I have no motive for avoiding the 
mention of a similarity which may possibly damage our libido theory in the estimation of 
many of my readers. Schreber's ‘rays of God’, which are made up of a condensation of 
the sun's rays, of nerve-fibres, and of spermatozoa, are in reality nothing else than a 
concrete representation and projection outwards of libidinal cathexes; and they thus lend 
his delusions a striking conformity with our theory” (Freud, 1911a, p.78). This quote, as 
                                                        
129 In his texts from 1935 to 1939, Freud never uses the expression ‘psychic reality’. 
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André Green has stated, is an “extraordinary confession by which Schreber’s delusion 
states Freud’s theory, when it should be the theory that states delusion in the process of 
thinking” (Green, 1977, p.34, my translation).130 
 
It is the same trace of a hallucinatory truth without origin, which is at the service of 
psychotic delusions or neurotic symptoms, and at the service of the act of construction 
in the analytic encounter. Thus, Freud and Breuer’s famous proposition that belonged to 
the prehistory of psychoanalysis: “Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (Freud, 1893-
1895, p.7) makes its reappearance forty-four years later at the end of the text on 
Construction:  
 
Just as our construction is only effective because it recovers a fragment of 
lost experience, so the delusion owes its convincing power to the element of 
historical truth which it inserts in the place of the rejected reality. In this way 
a proposition which I originally asserted only of hysteria would also apply to 
delusions–namely, that those who are subject to them are suffering from 
their own reminiscences (Freud, 1937b, p.268).  
 
From its inception in Studies on Hysteria to its revival in Construction in Analysis the meaning 
of the proposition had changed drastically. Initially, it is not only hysteria that is deemed 
to be a manifestation of reminiscences but, more generally, delusions. Now, Freud 
understands delusions to be the pathological expression of a non-pathological infantile 
hallucinatory mode of thinking. From this perspective, it could be said that the very 
activity of thinking is a manifestation of reminiscences. The Freudian cogito would 
represent this odd formula: ‘I think therefore I suffer from reminiscences’. However, 
unlike Descartes’ cogito that served to establish the Subject, the foundation of an ‘I’, the 
Freudian cogito, on the contrary, breaks the subject away from its thoughts.  
 
Indeed, the second momentous change to the meaning of the proposition between 1893 
and 1937 is that the ‘reminiscences’ are no longer to be found in the traumatic past of the 
subject but in the absolute past of the species: the one who thinks, suffers from 
hallucinatory reminiscences from a past without origin. The hallucinatory mode of 
                                                        
130 “Extraordinaire aveu: le délire de Schreber représente la théorie de Freud, alors que c’est la théorie qui 
devrait représenter le délire dans la pensée.”  
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thinking inscribes traces of the species’ biological history into that of the individual’s 
subjectivity. 
 
More than a pseudo-scientific mask, I understand Freud’s affirmation that “Man’s 
archaic heritage forms the nucleus of the unconscious mind” (Freud, 1919a, pp.203-204) 
as a means to undermine the conception of a fixed origin of the psyche. Having just 
finished their work of exegesis on the language of psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis 
returned to Freud’s questioning of the origins in a paper entitled, Fantasy and the Origins of 
Sexuality (translated from the French Fantasme Originaire, Fantasmes des Origines, Origines du 
Fantasme). They write: “Freud finds it necessary to postulate an organisation made of 
signifiers anteceding the effect of the event and the signified as a whole. In this mystical 
prehistory of the species we see the need to create a pre-structure inaccessible to the 
subject, evading his grasp, his initiatives, his inner ‘cooking pot’, in spite of all the rich 
ingredients our modern sorceresses seem to find there” (Laplanche & Pontalis, 
2003[1964], p.122).  
 
This article was written in 1964, in the direct aftermath of Laplanche and Pontalis’ 
separation from Lacan and, as they explained twenty years later in an introduction to its 
reprinting, this short essay displays their ambivalence towards him: “by operating a 
‘return to Freud’ in our own way we were showing our refusal to take a one-way ticket 
towards Lacan and yet we were concerned to establish a continuity between him and 
Freud” (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985, p.8).131 Indeed, one feels a certain tension in this 
paper: on the one hand, they highlight the specificity of Freud’s notion of the memory-
trace that cannot be integrated into consciousness because it has never been experienced 
in a mode of self-presence: “a pre-structure inaccessible to the subject” but on the other, 
one senses Lacan’s influence in the temptation to replace this notion of memory-trace 
with the structuralist concept of the sign. 
 
To describe the “prehistory of the species” as a structure or to speak of the memory-
traces coming from man’s archaic heritage as a sign is, I believe, a misrepresentation of 
Freud’s thinking because unlike the sign there is no phenomenology of the memory-
trace. The specificity of Freud’s memory-traces is that they cannot be fully integrated into 
                                                        
131 “En opérant, mais tout à notre manière un ‘retour à Freud’, nous indiquions notre refus de prendre un 
billet d’aller sans retour vers Lacan. Mais parallèlement, nous restions quelque peu retenus par le souci 
d’établir une continuité entre Freud et lui.” 
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the psyche: they don’t have a direct and observable presence, but manifest themselves 
through their repeated failure to acquire a structure. The one thinker who took over 
Freud’s questioning of the origins in its full radicalism, putting it at the core of his work, 
was the young Jacques Derrida.  
 
In his reading of Freud in Chapter two of Of Grammatology and in Freud and the Scene of 
Writing, he aimed to show against a structuralist perspective that Freud’s concept of 
unconscious ideas led to an “impossibility of re-animating absolutely the manifest 
evidence of an originary presence”(Derrida, 1976[1967], p.67) and that unconscious ideas 
were therefore irreducible to the notion of the sign. The unconscious hallucinatory trace 
creeps within the sign, in ‘the hinge’ between signifier and signified. This “hinge” 
explains Derrida “marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a 
signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. That is 
why there is no full speech, however much one might wish to restore it by means or 
without benefit of psychoanalysis. Before thinking to reduce it or to restore the meaning 
of the full speech which claims to be truth, one must ask the question of meaning and of 
its origin in difference. Such is the place of a problematic of the trace” (Ibid., pp.70-71). 
 
Derrida’s use of Freud in his criticism against a structuralist metaphysical theory of 
language was a starting point for his dialogue with Jacques Lacan. Bearing this criticism 
in mind, it is interesting to examine what Lacan makes of the act of construction as it 
appears in A Child is Being Beaten, a text that Lacan discussed in his seminar of January 
1957, at the peak of his incorporation of Saussure’s linguistic models into his reading of 
Freud. 
 
Lacan describes both the unconscious and conscious phases of the beating phantasy as 
forms of speech. According to him, the subject expresses the unconscious speech of a 
primal situation through its present capacity to symbolise in the here and now of the 
transference (Lacan, 1994[1957], p.116).132 Lacan does not mean that the nature of the 
unconscious speech of the beating phantasy is equivalent to that of the conscious phase 
because his main point is to show that the latter is ternary and involves subjects only 
                                                        
132 “Le sujet formule et organise une situation primitive dramatique à partir du point où nous en sommes 
dans l’analyse, d’une façon qui s’inscrit dans sa parole actuelle et dans son pouvoir de symbolisation 
présent.” 
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when the former is anonymous and desubjectified. However, to conceive of the second 
phase as a primal unconscious speech that can be reconstructed in the analytical work, 
implies that psychical life starts in self-presence. Hence, Lacan insists that the act of 
construction is, in fact, the reconstruction of a lost speech: “an unconscious speech that 
had to be re-found through all the devices of transference analysis” (Ibid., p.118)133 or, as 
he had stated earlier in the text of his seminar: “we are almost always obliged to 
reconstruct this step [the second phase of the beating phantasy] because it is so fleeting 
[fugitive]. This fleeting aspect is so much its characteristic that rapidly the fantasy rushes 
towards its third phase” (Ibid., p.118).134  
 
Freud’s crucial intuition was to describe the second phase of the beating phantasy, not as 
‘fleeting’, but as a phase that “never had a real existence” and was therefore not a 
reconstruction but “a construction of analysis” (Freud, 1919, p.185). In its 
metapsychological radicalism, the Freudian unconscious describes subjective experiences 
that are no longer dependent on the grammar of presence. As early as 1890, Freud 
concluded his paper called Psychical (or Mental) Treatment with the affirmation that the 
beginnings of mental life “are based precisely on hypnotic experience” (Freud, 
1905[1890], p.302). Thus, in a similar way to the post-hypnotic subject who is determined 
by suggestions that he has never experienced in his self-presence, psychical life begins 
with the replacing of perceived experience with hallucinatory presentations that escape 
self-presence. 
 
In order to both conceptualize and stress this absence of origins in subjective life, 
Derrida proffered the concept of trace which he borrowed, to a great extent, from Freud: 
“This deconstruction of presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of 
consciousness, and therefore through the irreducible notion of the trace (Spur), as it 
appears in both Nietzschean and Freudian discourse” (Derrida, 1976[1967], p.71). The 
Derridean trace is a fruitful way to pursue Freud’s metapsychological intuition of primal 
hallucinatory ideas. As suggested by Jacques Press, what Bion termed hallucinosis would 
be a further vicissitude of the same intuition. Rather than the reconstruction of a primal 
                                                        
133 “Une parole inconsciente, qu’il a fallu retrouver à travers tous les artifices de l’analyse du transfert.” 
 
134 “Cette étape (…) nous sommes presque toujours forcés de la reconstruire, tellement elle est fugitive. 
Cette fugitivité est si bien sa caractéristique, que très vite la situation se précipite dans la troisième étape.” 
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sign, the act of construction that Freud described in his clinical work is the creation of 
trace, the creation of an absolute past that never ceases to determine the present. 
 
Conclusion: ‘the time had not yet come’ 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure had compared the language-system [la langue] with chess games: 
“A game of chess is like an artificial realization of what language offers us in a natural 
form” (Saussure, 1974[1964/1916], p. 88). But, Saussure added, unlike chess games the 
rules by which language is transformed are inaccessible to consciousness: “While the 
chess player has the intention of operating a shift and affecting the system, the language-
system premeditates nothing. The pieces of language are displaced, or rather modified, 
spontaneously and fortuitously (…). In order for chess to resemble the play of language 
in all points we would have to imagine an unconscious or unintelligent player” (Ibid., 
p.89).  
 
Samuel Weber took up the chess game analogy in his chapter on the encounter between 
Lacan and the linguistic theories of Saussure, and distinguished two kind of rules in it: 
“There are those that regulate the formal conditions of the game” and “there are also 
those which are less fixed, that regulate the different ways games have been played. 
These are rules of strategy” (Weber, 1991, p. 36). According to Weber, it is the “rules of 
this strategy and their unconscious calculation” that “will constitute one of the major 
concerns of Lacan’s return to Freud” (Ibid., p.37).  
 
The structuralist Lacan of the late fifties or the Foucault from The Order of Things 
perceived the unconscious as a self-contained system of signs that is actualized in an 
unconscious desire. From this vantage point, psychoanalysis would be the finding of an 
unconscious desire through the deciphering of a code: a science of the unconscious not 
because it reaches down to “what is below consciousness in man, but because” it is 
directed “towards that, which, outside man, makes it possible to know, with a positive 
knowledge, that which is given to or eludes his consciousness” (Foucault, 1971[1966], 
p.378). 
 
As subtle as the unconscious chess player could be, Lacan’s seminar on A Child is Being 
Beaten demonstrates how through a structuralist model of the unconscious, the act of 
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construction in analysis is reduced to the reconstruction of a sign while a Derridean reading 
of the unconscious, as I have argued, leads us to understand it as the creation of a trace. 
From this last perspective, the construction of the second phase of the beating phantasy 
is not understood as “an unconscious speech that had to be re-found” (Lacan, 
1994[1957], p.118) but as the transcription of an unconscious psychical writing into the 
analytic dialogue. As explained by Patrice Maniglier, if Derrida states that writing is a 
better model for unconscious intentionality than speech, it is precisely, in as much as 
writing is a secondary system, that it supposes the deconstruction and the reconstruction 
of a previous system (Maniglier, 2011, p.389).  
 
Under the pressure of the drives, the hallucinatory mode of thinking transforms 
perceived experiences into forms that belong to man’s archaic heritage. Unconscious 
ideas are hallucinated through layers of phantasies that pre-exist the subject. From this 
angle, the act of construction is not a discovery but the transcription of a hallucinatory 
mode of thinking into a verbal mode of thinking: ideas that have never been integrated 
into consciousness are transcribed through the means of the analytic dialogue. 
 
The model of the unconscious as a hallucinatory mode of thinking is necessary in order 
to understand the act of construction, not as the disclosure of a primary scene but as the 
transcription of past processes under the pressure of the present analytic situation. 135 
More generally, the hallucinatory mode of thinking leads to an understanding of memory 
as the attempt to read an internal text that has never been present to consciousness. 
Freud’s first metapsychology put forward a tragic notion of the unconscious in which 
existing at the core of the subject’s psychic apparatus there is a text of traces irreducible 
to consciousness: the subjective scene of the most intimate nature is also the scene of the 
greatest otherness.  
 
As noticed by Clement Rosset in his book on tragic philosophy: “What makes of 
Oedipus a psychoanalytic and tragic hero is not so much that he would be incestuous 
and parricide but rather that he would search in external reality for a subject that 
concerns his interiority” (Rosset, 1971, p.61, my translation).136 In such a tragic view, 
                                                        
135 In other words, under the pressure of the transference.  
 
136 “Ce qui fait d’Œdipe un héros tant psychanalytique que tragique n’est pas qu’il soit incestueux et 
parricide, mais qu’il interroge une extériorité à un sujet qui ne concerne que l’intériorité.” 
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repression is not the result of transcendental law but of the irreducibility between a 
primary hallucinatory mode of thinking and a secondary verbal mode of thinking. Thus, 
presentations would not be repressed because of their sexual content – sexuality itself 
would be defined through the production of hallucinatory presentations that are 
irreducible to consciousness. 
 
In The Order of Things, Foucault wrote: “Structuralism is not a new method; it is the 
awakened and troubled consciousness of modern thought” (Foucault, 1971[1966], 
p.207). It is this “troubled consciousness of modern thought” that Derrida attempted to 
challenge through a science of non-phonetic writing. Derrida found the scaffolding for 
such a science in Freud’s theory of the unconscious: a science that put into question the 
originary constitution of objectivity by defining the psychical apparatus as a continual 
rewriting of a text with no origins. However, for Derrida (as for Freud) the time for such 
a speculation beyond the closure of the logos has not yet come. In the beginning of Of 
Grammatology, Derrida predicts: “such a science of writing runs the risk of never being 
established as such and with that name” for “that future world and for that within it 
which will have put into question the values of sign, word, and writing, for that which 
guides our future anterior, there is as yet no exergue” (Derrida, 1976[1967], pp.5-6).  
 
In An Autobiographical Study, Freud also points towards the impossibility of his 
metapsychological project in his epoch: “Later on [in 1915] I made an attempt to 
produce a ‘Metapsychology’ (…) The attempt remained no more than a torso; after 
writing two or three papers – ‘Instinct and their Vicissitudes’, ‘Repression’, ‘The 
Unconscious’, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, etc. – I broke off, wisely perhaps, since the 
time for theoretical predications of this kind had not yet come” (Freud, 1925[1924]b, 
pp.58-59). In this last chapter, I have tried to show that these impossible 
metapsychological texts are necessary for an understanding of the significance of the act 
of construction in analysis. 
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